

ARDP

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NIGERIA: IN SEARCH OF LEADERSHIP IN TIMES OF INSECURITY & SOCIAL DECAY



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(1960 - 1966)



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(1963 - 1966)



Maj Gen JFU Aguiyi Ironsi
(1966)



Gen Yakubu Gowon
(1966 - 1975)



Gen Murtala Mohammad
(1975 - 1976)



Gen Olusegun Obasanjo
(1976 - 1979 & 1999 - 2007)



Alh. Shehu Shagari
(1979 - 1983)



Maj Gen Muhammadu Buhari
(1983 - 1985 & 2015 to date)



Gen Ibrahim Babangida
(1985 - 1993)



Chief Ernest Shonekan
(1993)



Gen Sani Abacha
(1993 - 1998)



Gen Abdusalami Abubakar
(1998 - 1999)



Alh. Umaru Musa Yar'Adua
(2007 - 2010)



Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan
(2010 - 2015)



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- Report on the State of the States in the North
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- Boko Haram and Rising Poverty in the North
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EDITORIAL

21ST CENTURY NIGERIA AND ITS LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES

In history, leadership has been central to management of human societies in the course of their social developments. Similarly, the form, content and contexts of leadership challenges would resonate with internal and external factors, which are influenced by the social dynamics in dialectical relationship between the past, the present and the future.

In Nigeria, the concern with leadership role in its quest for harmony, growth and development has been on the agenda of our national discourse over the last few decades. But, in the 21st century even the continued existence of Nigeria as a single political community is coming under serious pressure. Nigeria faces myriad of social, economic, political and environmental challenges, which have been exacerbated by leadership failures.

Simply put, leadership is the ability to provide directions for others to follow in order to achieve stated societal goals. Its substance influences the actions of others by motivating and encouraging them to support and contribute to the achievement of the societal goals. Leadership traits or qualities are often identifiable with individuals; however, institutions also provide leadership through their operational practices. Therefore, it is the combination of individual and institutional leadership that nations require to achieve growth and development.

Issues of peace, security and sustainable development are top on the global political agenda. Human beings desire peace and security, as these form the very basic foundations of social, political and economic organizations. Peace depicts state of tranquility, which is the

opposite to a state of organized disequilibrium. It also presupposes absence of conflicts and violence including conventional or unconventional war. In an organized polity, peace and security represent not just the presence of rule of law but law and order reigning supreme. Therefore, security is the state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear whether for individuals or groups, classes or nationalities.

In fact, no nation can claim absolute security. Even in the relatively peaceful nations or in some historical timelines of any nation people are ingrained in the psyche of fear of violations of their persons or properties by either criminals or organized state apparatuses for extortions or other humiliating experiences they are subjected to in the hands of rogue political officials.

In theory and practice therefore, all nations face challenges in the course of their social developments and within their specific historical contexts. The 21st century Nigeria faces myriad of social, political, economic and environmental challenges. As I have stated elsewhere, two or so years ago:

The magnitude of our current political, economic and social challenges or crises is self-evident to even the most hopeful of optimists. On a daily basis, Nigerians face crippling waves of insecurity; acute and chronic shortage of electricity supply; lack of good or adequate social and economic infrastructure, especially healthcare, potable water supply and transport systems; a broken educational system; skyrocketing inflation; weak industrial and manufacturing base; an unproductive but thriving

national bourgeoisie; poor financial services; a corrupt, bankrupt and riotous political class; a brutal and ineffectual military-security complex; a creaky and slothful judicial system; a dysfunctional and self-serving public service at all levels; elephantine corruption; mind-boggling cost of governance; spiraling unemployment and grinding poverty; and, worst still, a corrosive and catastrophic collapse of moral and ethical norms; among other staggering failures.

In view of the above, I also suggested that:

A starting point for the rebooting of our state, economy and society would doubtless require a new crop of leaders, ethos and new mode of political organisation and engagement by the elite and mass alike. Without all this, it is hard to see how we can avoid the false dawns of our recent and not-so-recent past. As with post-war Japan and the Asian Tigers, for example, Nigeria clearly needs leaders with the vision, capacity and resolve to chart a new course - leaders with definite reforming zeal and roadmap for change. Such leaders would need to be committed to a new kind of politics that has as its chief purpose the material and spiritual wellbeing of our citizens, and focused on wealth creation, popular participation, social justice and equity, environmental renewal as well as moral purpose.

In these times of insecurity, increasing level of poverty and various forms of social dislocations, Nigeria, more than ever before, require leaders with the vision and mission embodied in well-articulated strategic program of action to achieve societal set goals; it requires leadership to fight all forms of corruption; it requires leadership that must provide for achieving the rule of law, transparency and accountability, and the governance institutions must ensure the supremacy of democratic values in the polity; it

requires leadership with the adequate political, technical, administrative and wealth-generating capacities to implement programs in a transparent and accountable manner; and, on the all-important political front we require leaders who upheld and promote democratic values, that is to say, we require leaders who recognized that democracy requires the interaction of the people and the State through mutually created institutions that serve as links between the people and their governments.

Nigeria requires leaders who recognized that the essential dividend of democracy is democracy itself. As such, government must operate within the framework of primacy of social accountability.

This edition, therefore, focusses on governance, insecurity issues, and challenges of leadership in Nigeria, with particular attention on Northern Nigeria. It contains close examination and analysis of the government structures in the North by bringing out the Rapporteurs' Report of the ARDP Discussion Meeting on the state of the States in the North; it contains articles on Northern Nigeria and the Challenges of Insecurity including an in-depth examination of the impact of Boko Haram insurgency; and, it also contains the Report of the Conference on the North and Challenges of Leadership. The keynote address of this conference on the leadership training and political challenges in Northern Nigeria, 1947-2018, by Prof. Alkasum Abba and an article by Dr. Usman Bugaje on the Nigerian politics and the crisis of leadership provide closer examination of the leadership crisis we face as well as the imperative of the required leadership traits, qualities and skills needed to address our numerous and complex challenges. As usual, for the records section of the Newsletter provides historical anecdotes to its main contents. Happy reading.

Kabiru S. Chafe, PhD
(Editor-in-Chief)

RAPORTEURS' REPORT OF ARDP MEETING ON 'STATE OF THE STATES IN THE NORTH'

*HELD ON SATURDAY, 24TH SEPTEMBER 2016
AT SARDAUNA'S CONFERENCE ROOM AREWA HOUSE, KADUNA*

INTRODUCTION

The ARDP conscious of the approach of the midterm of the incumbent administrations at the Federal and State Governments level that came into office in May 2015, felt that there was need to undertake an unabashed hard look at the economy and see what exactly is wrong and what in the circumstances could be done to salvage the situation. A dispassionate analysis of current predicaments with focus on solutions. ARDP therefore convened the meeting on "State of the States", on Saturday September 24th, 2016.

Key presentations were made at the meeting on (1) security and its wider ramifications, (2) poverty, social security and IDPs, and (3) the economics of governance in the States.

The presentations examined and situated the issues of insecurity, poverty and collapse of social services delivery within the context of dwindling resources and fall in the allocations coming from the Federation Account as a result of fall in international commodity prices and global economic recession and the present precarious situation in the Northern States. In the face

of this deplorable picture and some sixteen (16) months into the tenure of what was an administration taking off on a tack of bringing about "change" the absence of articulated and robust response from the government at all levels –was a major cause for concern.

The meeting examined the current economic recession, explored opportunities for renewed growth and development of the Northern States and Nigeria as a whole. Fantastic presentations on how to improve governance and peace building for long term development were made by (i) Dr. Abubakar Siddique Mohammed, (ii) Mr. Chom Bagu, and (iii) Dr. Kole Shettima who was unavoidably absent but ably represented jointly by Rashida and Ahmad Bugaje.

The meeting also explored how citizens can better engage government on governance. It was interactive and attended by personalities representing a cross-section of the walks of life across the Northern States who enriched the presentations and discussions with forward-looking proposals on policies and community based engagement across the Northern States.

CONVENER'S REMARKS

After opening prayers by Mr. James Magit at 10:30 am, in his remarks the Convener of ARDP, Dr. Usman Bugaje provided a contextual background of the various private discussions of members of ARDP and others of the precarious status of issues of public concern which prompted others to see the need for convening the meeting to tackle the issues rather than just discussing them in the privacy of our homes. ARDP felt the issues should be tabled in the public space to have them addressed and proffer solutions as to how these issues could be resolved.

In providing context and a comparative examination of the economic dimension of the recession - insecurity, low level governance and in some places complete absence of public institutions; the Convener used the opportunity to remind the meeting of the antecedents of the engagement of ARDP on these issues that prompted ARDP's formation following the 2011 elections to foster unity of the North considering role of the North in nation-building. ARDP's role for mobilization of the North to come together to tackle common issues and address the

challenges of politics-without-content – politics as a means of obtaining power and not knowing what to do with power. This has led to colossal waste of resources – corruption with foreseen outcome - impact and influence on the youth.

These iterative processes enabled ARDP to develop the Strategic Agenda For Northern Development (STAND). The STAND has been circulated to the 19 Northern States' Governors for inputs, observations and comments before the document is finalized. Before the end of the year it will be finalized and circulated as well as placed on the website of the ARDP. This will now form the platform for strategic engagement of ARDP and its syndicate working groups in implementing its workplan, programmes, projects and activities in the 19 Northern States.

In the interim, the meeting was invited to note that the seven North West Governors have engaged ARDP on specific areas for implementation of development strategies in the North West Geopolitical zone in the following sectors (i) agriculture, (ii) education, (iii) industries (iv) energy (v) mining and (vi) environment. Implementation Plan of work in the North West has intensified on agriculture as a starting value-chain with linkages to the other sectors as well as a pivotal launchpad for the turnaround of the economy of the Northern States.

The hurdle that has become a challenge for the North West Governors is dearth of funds – cheap investible funds. ARDP has also as result engaged itself as catalyst for mobilization of cheap investible funds – to jump-start the value chain investment in the agricultural sector. To this end, ARDP has facilitated a meeting between the seven Northwest governors and development finance institutions like NIRSAL, NEXIM, CBN, Bank of Industries, Bank of Agriculture and Sassakawa Global. ARDP is also in the process of firming up collaborative efforts with AFRACA.

The Africa Regional Agricultural Credit Associations (AFRACA) was established following Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) sponsored Regional Seminar on Agricultural Credit for Smallholder farmers held in Accra, Ghana in 1973. Subsequently, the World Food Conference on credit for smallholder farmers in developing countries held in Rome in 1975 and recommended that FAO should assist its member countries to establish such associations in different parts of the world.

This resulted in the founding of three regional credit associations: African Regional Credit Association (AFRACA), Near East, North Africa Agricultural Credit Association (NENARACA) and the Asia Pacific Rural and Agricultural

Credit Association (APRACA) and later a similar Association (ALIDE) was established for the Latin America Region. The African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA) is a regional association of financial and non-financial institutions involved in promoting rural and agricultural finance in Africa. AFRACA was established in 1977 alongside similar institutions across the globe as a lead advocate and coordinator of rural and agricultural finance in their respective regions. The AFRACA secretariat is based in Nairobi, Kenya where it was registered under the NGOs Coordination act in 1981 and received diplomatic status from the government of Kenya in 2003.

AFRACA's objectives are:

- Facilitate promulgation of policy and legal frameworks for rural/agricultural financial services development in Africa;
- Seek to interest lenders, local and international investors in opportunities for investment in rural and agricultural sectors for accelerated production;
- Facilitate demand driven capacity-building initiatives for enhancing the skills of professional staff and member institutions through cross-learning and centers of excellence;
- Catalyze and

create greater synergy through partnerships with local and international development organizations engaged in the agricultural sector's different stages of the value chains in Africa;

- Support and enhance innovative financial services, delivery methodologies that increase outreach;
- Foster cooperation in planning and improving financial inclusion for rural and agricultural development in Africa;
- improve the performance of member institutions that allow significant funding to reach various sectors;
- Initiate and support multi-country studies on issues of common interest and undertake such other activities as may be conducive to the fulfillment of the AFRACA objectives;
- Establish a broad-based one-stop virtual knowledge and information hub on rural & agricultural finance in the continent for knowledge management.

The following are some of the governance structures of AFRACA:

- A F R A C A

Western Africa Sub Region I (Francophone)

- A F R A C A Western Africa Sub Region I I (Anglophone)

• A F R A C A Eastern Africa Sub Region

• A F R A C A Central Africa Sub Region

• A F R A C A Southern Africa Sub Region

ARDP has commenced putting in place the processes and structures for membership of AFRACA as well as collaboration on the delivery of AFRACA programmes and training in Nigeria. The benefits of being an AFRACA member institution includes but not limited to the following:

Member Institutions are offered the opportunity to contribute towards improving rural and agricultural finance policies aimed at wealth/job creation, food security and accelerated economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa through an inclusive member participatory strategy.

Be part of diverse league of leading institutions with considerable experience in the sector that provides practical opportunity for learning to deliver appropriate sustainable and effective rural and agricultural finance services (without reinventing the wheel).

Knowledge Management - AFRACA provides a dynamic and focused knowledge management, where members discuss, access and share a wide range of information on best practices and available instruments for managing risks in financing agriculture.

Best Practice and Innovative Product Development – AFRACA facilitates the development of innovative products and replication of best practices through outsourcing expertise or exposure visits within and outside the continent.

Unlimited access to appropriate and effective information collection, analysis and dissemination systems that serve members through appropriate and user-friendly multimedia such as the newsletter, the Rural Finance Series, the website (www.afraca.org) etc and benefitting from the various capacity-building programmes coordinated by AFRACA, sister networks and development partners which contribute towards greater outreach and increased funding to agriculture.

Partnerships and Strategic Alliances – With considerable contacts within Africa and across the world, AFRACA offers a good platform for the creation of new partnerships which bring synergy, business opportunities and sufficient capacities to achieve individual and mutual objectives.

ARDP Secretariat with the support of some of the Governors of the Northern States led a contingent of officials of government and members of ARDP's secretariat to join other Nigerians and participants from other parts of Africa at a training of agricultural officials on value chain orientation in agricultural financing that held in Kigali, Rwanda in August 2016.

The Executive Secretary of AFRACA accompanied by other AFRACA officials were in Nigeria in September 2016 and met with ARDP and NIRSAL officials on finalizing collaboration strategies between AFRACA and ARDP. To this end, ARDP suggested and the AFRACA officials agreed to using the facilities of IAERLS, ABU Zaria as the focal center of rolling out the training aspect of the collaboration with AFRACA.

Dr. Bugaje concluded his remarks by highlighting that it was in the context of a robust engagement on the search for the amelioration of problems in the North that ARDP identified three areas (i) cattle rustling metastising, (ii) poverty, IDPs and social security, and (iii) economic of governance that required an articulated discourse to respond effectively and efficiently to these issues.

Analysis and discussion of this phenomenon posited that Farmer-Pastoralist conflict has resulted in the abduction of women and girls, arbitrary arrest of women by government security agents, use of women as pawns by bandits and similar groups, infliction of collective terror on women, use of women as conflict labour-force, demoralization of women education and livelihood crisis.

PRESENTATION I: RURAL BANDITRY AND RISING INSECURITY IN THE NORTH

The presentation on “*Farmer-Pastoralist Conflicts in Nigeria: Case Studies of Dansadau, Sabuwa and Birnin Gwari Communities of Zamfara, Katsina and Kaduna States*” outcome of a study conducted by Centre for Democratic Development Education Research and Training (CEDDERT) of Zaria, was made by Dr. Abubakar Siddique Mohammed. The presentation explored a very crucial aspect of Farmer-Pastoralist conflict in Nigeria - the consequence of Farmer-Pastoralist conflict on women in Northern Nigeria – a specifically focused study on Dansadau, Sabuwa and Birnin

Gwari communities respectively in Zamfara, Katsina and Kaduna States. The presentation also examined the impact of the conflict and its spread to other parts of Nigeria with resulting consequence in Benue State and focal point at Agatu and other communities, to the South East as well as the South West geo-political zones in Nigeria.

Dr. A. S. Mohammed went down memory lane to trace the origins of the conflict and also the causes of this specific specter of Farmer-Pastoralist conflict in the North West region in Nigeria examining the communities at Dansadau, Sabuwa and Birnin Gwari. Analysis and discussion of this phenomenon posited that Farmer-Pastoralist conflict has resulted in the abduction of women and girls, arbitrary arrest of women by government security agents, use of women as pawns by bandits and similar groups, infliction of collective terror on women, use of women as conflict labour-force, demoralization of women education and livelihood crisis. For the policy recommendations, this presentation recommended among other things that government should make education of youths a priority as this was one major tool to break the cycle of poverty in the region, government security agents should provide security

in communities especially to vulnerable women and girls, the Nigerian national government should collaborate with international communities especially with the neighbouring countries on a concerted fight against Farmer-Pastoralist conflicts.

The presentation by Dr. Abubakar Siddique Mohammed provided an iterative narration of the tales of pastoralists and farmer conflicts going back to about 10 years from the year 2000 and the factors that were the genesis of its escalation. The CEDDERT study revealed that central to the problem has been the decision of Zamfara State and other state governments to convert parts or whole forest and grazing reserves into private farms or settlements. Other causes were poverty, bad governance, land dispute, lack of alternative grazing areas and other socio-political and ethnic factors as well as collapse of communal conflict mediation mechanisms that fueled the farmer-pastoralist conflict.

The paper also highlighted:

- Impact of pastoralists-farmers conflicts on other parts of Nigeria;
- The underlying superstructure of the conflicts
- Complex dimensions of underlying causes
- The international dimensions of incursions from

neighbouring countries such as Republic of Niger - by “soldiers of fortune” for the defunct Gaddafi Regime of Libya

- The four dimensions of cattle-rustling by non-resident armed Fulani bandits
- Emerging ethnicisation manifesting as ethnic assertiveness
- Nationalization of the conflict
- International dimensions of the conflict
- Status of conflict management structures
- That the judicial (Judges) and security system (especially the Police) – were part of the problems rather than the solution.

The presentation was particularly concerned with the consequences of Farmer-Pastoralist conflict on women. This was against the backdrop that the armed bandits have evolved notorious tactics of kidnapping women, impregnating them and waiting until pregnancy was at an advanced stage and then the bandits will release the women back to their families or communities.

Abducted women and girls have been subjected to rape, early marriage and used as sex slaves. Sometimes the rape takes place within the

community orchestrated to be witnessed by husbands and children and relations. The implication was to inflict collective terror on women as a social group as well as dehumanize them. Also fear of violence and sexual abuse trapped women in their homes and prevented them from engaging in important economic activities.

The presentation highlighted the attrition between pastoralists and high political office holders on the changing use of forestlands and grazing reserves that the pastoralists have used for hundreds of years as grazing lands for livestock and only in the last ten years to be converted for use as farmlands in Zamfara and other states of the north. The ensuing reaction of the pastoralists as well as government led to political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of non-combatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). This brought to the fore the centrality of power and influence by those involved in the use of terror to achieve their aims at all cost. Thus the pastoralists-farmers conflict has been used to denote forms of unconventional, illegitimate violence targeted by a group at the state or society, or any section of the population thereof. As could be seen from the iterative narrative of the case study, the pastoralists were

gradually shifting from victims to bandits and then armed groups that at most times operated under collateral damage principle. This specter of the conflict as highlighted in the study indicated that anybody or group of persons can be victims of a terror attack. Conflict equally has a sectarian cloak. Usually a sect or sub-group with obnoxious political, religious or ideological philosophy uses terror to convey such misguided views.

Professor A. S. Mohammed drew specific and particular attention of the meeting to heinous strategies adopted by the bandits for realization of their nefarious activities. These are similar to what other groups have used as tactics of terror, including kidnapping, suicide bombing, massacre (mass killing) by gunfire or beheading, arson, cyber-attack, aggressive media propaganda, hijack of aircraft, trains, ships etc., use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), forced enlistment/recruitment of combatants, destruction of the population's means of livelihood among others. The bandits perpetrating the conflict under study have adopted most of these means in carrying out the conflict and its spill-over to other parts of Nigeria. Therefore the phenomenon of pastoralist-farmer conflict has also thrived on brutality, intimidation and wanton destruction of lives and property. For the purpose of the presentation, in the context of Farmer-Pastoralist conflict,

conflict could come to be seen as the unlawful use of force or violence by a person (at the behest of a group) or organized group (with misguided religious and political ideologies) against the government (sometimes also by government use of security operatives or judicial officers) and its citizens to achieve its desired objectives.

The absence of good governance in these areas has also contributed to this phenomenon of pastoralists – farmer conflict. Absence of good governance therefore suggests that the socio-political environment was infested with administrative injustice, human rights abuse, inequality and endemic corruption. A natural response to this unjust social circumstance was for the downtrodden to seek for redemption through membership of the armed groups. This was a sort of payback to the government that has failed to take care of the aggrieved groups or communities. The heavy handed response of security operatives or the reprisal tactics of arresting elderly members of the pastoralist community to be ransomed or utilization of livestock to pay compensation for purported damages caused by pastoralists added to the maelstrom and sense of injustice and victimization.

Sexual violence as a weapon of conflict:

Violence against women, especially rape, has added its

own brand of shame to the pastoralists/farmers' conflict. Girls and women have been singled out for rape, torture and execution. Rape, identified by psychologists as the most intrusive of traumatic events, has been documented in many armed conflicts. Systematic rape has been used as a weapon of 'ethnic cleansing'. Teenage girls have been a particular target. The paper also reported that impregnated girls have been forced to bear 'the enemy's' child. Their families and communities ostracized many of those who became pregnant. Some abandoned their babies; others committed suicide.

Sexual violation of women erodes the fabric of a community in a way that few weapons can. Rape's damage can be devastating because of the strong communal reaction to the violation and pain stamped on entire families. The harm inflicted in such cases on a woman by a rapist is an attack on her family and culture, as in many societies women are viewed as repositories of a community's cultural and spiritual values.

Yet, policy-making, legislating, implementing in practice, even talking and theorising about these issues remains contentious and thorny. There are also diverse representations of some victims of violence as worthy of grief and others as 'unrepresentable' by ethnic profiling. The paper was of the view that this had led to the

press misreporting a misunderstood perspective of the conflict of one ethnic group against the other. The contingent character of vulnerability to violence is lost in the universal declarations targeting gendered violence in the processes of conflict.

While the survivors of violence are stigmatized and blamed, women and women's groups in places like Dansadau, Anka, Birnin Gwari and other similar communities, are defying the odds, organizing to build peace, stability and respect for women's rights. However, these places have become "ghost towns and settlements." Women work fearlessly to support survivors of sexual violence in conflict by advocating for their rights, setting up trauma counseling centers, lobbying to change laws, offering psychological counseling and access to medical care and shattering the stigma and silence around rape in war.

Recommendations to Federal Government:

The office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) should set up a committee to study the conflicts in Birnin Gwari, Dansadau and Sabuwa as well as similar conflicts in other parts of the country, before decisions are taken on how to resolve them.

The NSA in conjunction with the ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defence and affected state

governments should set up a standing committee to regularly report to the NSA on reconciliation in all conflict areas.

The Federal Government to take the lead and liaise with other ECOWAS member states to discuss the problem and find solutions as well as intensify efforts to recover light weapons in the hands of criminals.

Where there are security problems, the state security committee should invite relevant community leaders and stakeholders to discuss and resolve the problem.

Recommendations to State Governments

State governments need to be proactive in taking decisions, which have implications for security; this is in terms of land allocation, grazing areas, etc.

State Governments should let people know that they are concerned about their security and welfare. Therefore, state governors should be well advised to spend more time in their domains.

There is an urgent need to restore and demarcate stock routes and grazing reserves. State Governments should organise reconciliation of communities and people in the three communities as a way of bringing peace and stability to the communities.

Recommendations to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

Engage with farmers and pastoralists in affected areas to promote better understanding and reconciliation among groups in conflict.

Conduct granular studies at various communities in conflict areas in order to better understand the peculiarities of the conflicts.

Regularly engage with stakeholders (traditional rulers, conflicting group leaders, law enforcement agencies) with a view to promoting reconciliation.

Recommendations to Media

Partnering with Advocacy Groups to conduct investigative and balanced journalism.

Improve understanding on how to report conflict – report on issues rather than inflaming sentiments through opinions.

Liaise with Research Organisations for evidence-based information for content-based journalism.

PRESENTATION II: RISING POVERTY IN THE NORTH, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs) AND SOCIAL SECURITYNETS

Mr. Chom Bagu who made an extempore presentation informed the meeting that the preceding presentation by Dr. A. S. Mohammed has provided the contextual highlights of the problems and the collapse of communities and governance, institutions and infrastructure

within which the problems and challenges of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have to be tackled in the face of dwindling resources.

Chronic poverty, corruption, abuses by the security forces and longstanding impunity by the perpetrators of human rights violations have combined to create fertile ground for the emergence of militant armed groups over the past decade. The most significant was Boko Haram that has systematically sought to destabilize the Nigerian state and impose its brand of Sharia in the northeast of the country since 2009. It has been estimated that more than 20,000 civilians were killed since, and as many as 2.5 million displaced, with the highest number of attacks taking place in Borno State.

Boko Haram began its insurgency with assaults on members of the security services, politicians, civil servants and other authority figures in the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe. It started to expand its operations in 2010, when it bombed buildings in Jos, and subsequently acquired tanks, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and sub-machine guns (which it used to push further south, bombing police and UN offices in Abuja in 2011, and soft targets like

markets, motor parks, schools, churches and places that sold alcohol.

Following the imposition of a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in 2012 attacks on civilian targets increased dramatically. In July 2013, militants set fire to a student dormitory near Potiskum in Yobe state, resulting in some students being burnt alive and

Boko Haram began its insurgency with assaults on members of the security services, politicians, civil servants and other authority figures in the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe.

others shot as they tried to flee. Between 2013 and mid-2014, Boko Haram destroyed 211 schools in Borno state, killing an unknown number of students and teachers and leading to the closure of all state-funded education facilities there in March 2014.

The group issued public demands that Christians leave northern Nigeria. It burned down churches and killed worshippers. It abducted Christian women and girls and threatened them with violence or forced their conversion to Islam or marriage to its members. Men who refused to convert were killed. It attacked traditional Muslim leaders who have condemned its tactics, and targeted their families. The group also attacked mosques when prayers are going on.

The group abducted at least 500 women and girls in northeastern Nigeria since 2009, and large-scale abductions escalated in early 2014. Such tactics constitute a serious abuse of human rights and a form of forced displacement. IDPs cited fear of abduction as a key factor underscoring their decision to flee.

The abduction of 276 teenage girls from Chibok in April 2014 has been the largest single incident so far and the most publicized. About 90 of those captured are still unaccounted for. At the time of the attack, the local population had been swollen by the arrival of IDPs fleeing Boko Haram violence in surrounding villages. The Chibok abductions emboldened the group to step up the tactic, both to instill terror and raise revenue from ransom demands.

The IDPs fleeing Boko Haram were increasingly vulnerable to violence and attack, and their coping strategies were limited. As attacks in rural areas were intensified, many residents fled pre-emptively.

Information on people displaced a number of times and their coping strategies are scarce. It is known that many states in the northeast and the Middle Belt experienced recurrent conflict and violence, which caused frequent and cyclical displacement each time tensions flared. Those households affected did not receive assistance tailored to their increased vulnerability and reduced coping strategies. They were often unable to recover from losses resulting from their displacement or access assistance in their pursuit of durable solutions during periods of relative stability.

The current focus on short-term and adhoc emergency response prevents an understanding of how IDPs' vulnerabilities increase with each cycle of displacement. It also hampers any genuine effort to address the causes of displacement or to help people at risk prepare for or prevent it.

Cumulative figures for internal displacement are provided by the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR). In February 2014, NCFR reported that there were 3.3 million IDPs in the country as of 31 December

2013. NCFR has not provided figures for 2014. The Presidential Initiative on the North-east (PINE) and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported that Boko Haram had displaced 1.5 million people in the north-east.

The UN resident humanitarian coordinator's office or the Abuja regional branch of the Office provided no independent estimates, and neither did the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). There is lack of comprehensive information on IDPs' situations in many parts of the country, particularly those living in protracted displacement, but the number of people displaced by conflict in the Middle Belt is thought to be as high as in the north-east. The continuing shortage of accurate and reliable data has resulted in a distorted picture of IDPs' assistance needs and an alarming lack of understanding of the country's displacement dynamics on the part of national authorities and the international community. Only in areas affected by Boko Haram has better data collection led to an improved understanding of displacement patterns. Three patterns emerge in such areas: IDPs flee to the neighbouring states of Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba, and to central Nigeria and the Middle Belt region. Many of these areas are also affected by conflict and violence, increasing competition for resources between IDPs and host

communities in flashpoint areas.

People flee from rural to urban areas within their home states, increasing population stress on towns and cities and raising further security concerns. IDPs and host communities fear Boko Haram incursions in areas outside the group's traditional areas of operation, in Adamawa state to the south for example.

IDPs and host communities affected by violence and a lack of access to basic needs including food, water and emergency shelter are forced into secondary displacement. The ongoing depletion of community resources and household coping mechanisms increases IDPs' risk and vulnerability with each cycle of displacement.

There were also data collection challenges. States' capacity to collect data varies widely. The poor condition of roads and communications infrastructure continues to hamper the collection of data on displacement, which is only occasionally disaggregated by age, sex and location. Three organisations primarily collect data on IDPs, but there is no official mechanism to standardise their methodologies or the presentation of their findings. NEMA and NCFR are making more information available to OCHA. This has increased the circulation of questionable data from government agencies through humanitarian bulletins

and regional humanitarian snapshots. NEMA collects information on IDPs who seek refuge in camps and camp-like settings and who receive assistance via the country's state emergency management agencies (SEMAs). This includes household size, place of origin and, in some cases, vulnerability factors such as age or disability and groups at higher risk such as female and child-headed households. SEMAs do not have enough staff or equipment to conduct assessments, nor do they receive standardised training from NEMA on methodology. Data collection efforts focused on camps and camp-like settings, but most IDPs found refuge with host families and communities. Providing shelter for people in need is part of Nigerian culture. Many are loath to allow relatives to stay in camps, where large households lack space and privacy. There is almost no publicly available data or information on these IDPs or their hosts, despite a significant increase in data collection, profiling and registration by international NGOs in 2014. There is still a lack of coordination among humanitarian agencies for the collation and analysis of independent data. Estimates provided by government agencies of the number of people displaced during crises are sometimes produced by simply counting destroyed and damaged homes in places from where people have fled.

Government estimates rarely captured return movements, progress towards durable solutions or protracted displacement. Improving data collection and management during all phases of displacement and the complete profiling of displaced communities in need of emergency interventions in the northeast, must be prioritised. Otherwise, mass displacement may further distort the picture of secondary and cyclical displacement caused by desertification, inter-communal violence, Boko Haram's activities and electoral violence. Gains made in data collection and sharing during 2014 will be at risk if the information is not used to revise figures for return and resettlement programming.

Return and resettlement of IDPs is a condition in which all individuals displaced from their homes during conflict are assured the option for a voluntary, safe and dignified return to their homes or resettlement into new homes and communities. Once they reach their destinations, returnees should have recourse for property restitution or compensation, and should receive strong reintegration and rehabilitation support to build their livelihoods and contribute to long-term economic and political development. With proper support, displaced persons can serve as critical and essential human resources toward the rebuilding of the host communities. Return and

resettlement can represent a visible end to violent conflict; legitimize the new political order, and restoration of normal life for the conflict-affected population. In the situation or circumstances of the Northern States resolving rights to nationality, residency, and property will contribute to an effective, trustworthy, and durable state-citizen relationship. But the resources available to the communities have already been stretched thin.

Thus, as was the view of Mr. Chom Bagu and other participants, the meeting has provided an opportunity to undertake a critical assessment and a more serious examination of the various perspectives of the challenges that are staring the Northern States and Nigeria in the provision of security and creation of an enabling environment for safe and voluntary return or resettlement of IDPs. This involves a guarantee of choice for return and one of safety for those who choose to return. These processes include reuniting families and support systems separated because of violent conflict and ensuring a safe and voluntary journey for IDPs returning to their communities of origin, IDPs returning to their hometowns, or any displaced individuals or groups resettling in new communities. Unfortunately, the situation in the Northern States was one in which there was no clear understanding of the situation on the ground in order to plan effectively. Planning requires

reliable information about the areas where displaced people seek to return or resettle, to minimize the challenges they face upon arrival. While it is important to gather credible information on the numbers and conditions of IDPs, it was also key not to jeopardize the security and freedom of movement of displaced populations. Mr. Chom Bagu highlighted the precarious circumstances of IDPs in the sense that the displaced persons are not all found in Camps but are scattered in host communities. Therefore collecting data for an assessment will not be easy, as displaced populations are not always easily accessible. They may not be in camps where they can be registered, but may have assimilated into local communities or urban areas. Others may be in hiding or may fear being identified. Before initiating any strategy for the return of refugees and IDPs, there was need to assess and understand the scope of the problem. This is why government at all levels should consider the following:

- How many people have been displaced? Is the government understating or inflating numbers of IDPs or refugees in order to influence outside response?
- To where have people been displaced?
- Are the displaced combatants/bandits,

IDPs, or both?

- Do the host communities have the capacity to reintegrate the displaced?
- What are the needs of the displaced population?
- What are conditions in the host States, Local Government areas or local communities?
- Are conditions at places of origin or resettlement communities less dangerous than conditions in the camps for the displaced?
- Do viable resettlement options exist for the displaced?

The return and resettlement processes should also focus on providing safe passage for displaced populations as they return to their homes or community of origin. Upon return or relocation, displaced persons should still receive protection from continued threats of violence, harassment, intimidation, or persecution. While it is the responsibility of the host government to provide this protection, international actors may have to help maximize equal access for returnees to security, health, and other public services, along with providing judicial or legal recourse when needed.

Recent successes of the Nigerian military in restoring security and pushing back the onslaught of Boko Haram in the

North East was noted. However, in addition to pacification the meeting noted that the following activities could help improve protection for returning populations:

Disarm and demobilize armed groups. The presence of armed groups will likely deter potential returnees and prevent them from successfully rebuilding their lives in old or new communities, especially in cases where these armed groups triggered the initial displacement. Disarming and demobilizing such groups sends a message to the displaced that violent conflict is over and that they can return safely.

Protect vulnerable groups from abuse. During the return phase, women, children and other groups are susceptible to criminal and sexual abuse from those around them, including other returnees. Ensure special protection for these populations through targeted public security and law enforcement programs. Provide refugees and IDPs with full access to the information they need to decide whether or not to return. One means for doing this is to arrange visits for IDP representatives to assess the conditions of the potential destination. Women and members of different ethnic, racial, religious, and political groups should be included as much as possible on these trips. Important information should be available in a language understood by the population and should include the

following:

(i) The political and security situation of intended destinations, including freedom of movement; amnesties; and the availability of assistance and protection for women, children, minorities and other vulnerable groups.

(ii) A realistic assessment about whether the causes of displacement have been resolved and about the availability of reintegration assistance. If the situation remains dangerous, keep displaced populations informed and be careful about offering return assistance.

Mr. Chom Bagu placed emphasis on building a community-based security infrastructure that will permit stakeholder participation of the IDPs who would also be engaged in rebuilding their communities. This will facilitate conflict resolution and mediation processes in a legal framework to ensure consistency and enforceability. This will also encourage flexibility in the community re-building efforts that would facilitate, for example, defining the kinds of homes, land and property that should be subject to restitution or compensation, considering both formal property and tenure laws, as well as informal practices. In the midst of

conflict, land records are often destroyed or misplaced. It becomes necessary in rebuilding communities to collect, restore, or reestablish records quickly to prevent and resolve property disputes. Mechanisms for resolution should be linked to local reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms, since they can also be the source of further conflict if badly managed.

Boko Haram has disrupted livelihood activities and markets and reduced trade flows. Staples and other basic commodities have become scarcer and prices have risen, preventing IDPs from buying basic foodstuffs.

In examining the role of conflict and insurgency in exacerbating poverty in the North, there was hardly any social safety or social security nets system in existence that could meet the requirements of IDPs. IDPs are often unable to exercise their basic rights to food and essential household

items such as sleeping mats, mosquito nets, jerry cans, soap and cooking utensils. They usually lose access to their sources of revenue when they flee. Assistance for those living in camps, when provided, is inadequate. The destruction of property, crops and stores of food at the time of displacement is a major driver of food insecurity among IDPs. During the early phases of displacement, state governments and aid agencies provide basic food items through SEMAs, but supplies are often quickly exhausted. IDPs may then be forced to turn to their hosts for help in meeting their basic needs.

Boko Haram has disrupted livelihood activities and markets and reduced trade flows. Staples and other basic commodities have become scarcer and prices have risen, preventing IDPs from buying basic foodstuffs. Most are food insecure and host families are overstretched. An inter-agency humanitarian needs assessment carried out in the north-east in mid-2014 found that it was common practice for households to ration food portions as a means of getting by.

State security measures have also disrupted rural markets and transport, contributing further to the food shortages of both IDPs and their hosts. Trade at

major urban markets in Maiduguri, Potiskum, Damaturu, Mubi and Yola has been halved and many peri-urban markets have closed. Vulnerable households including IDPs in the worst affected areas of southern Borno and Yobe states and northern Adamawa state face phase three or crisis level food insecurity.

Poor health and hygiene:

IDPs often have only minimal access to health services, and their lack of access is of particular concern given that the overwhelming majority are women and children. Most health facilities in areas of the northeast affected by conflict were closed as of mid-2014 as a result of insecurity and the displacement of staff. Some facilities have been damaged or destroyed during conflict, or deliberately targeted by Boko Haram. As of March 2014, only 37 per cent of facilities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states were functional.

Health facilities in the northeast were already poorly resourced before the current crisis, and additional resources have not been provided to meet the needs of populations swollen by displacement. In some communities there are not enough facilities or staff to meet even the basic health needs of IDPs and their hosts. Primary health care services in particular have been overwhelmed by the recent influxes of IDPs.

The primary obstacle in accessing healthcare for many IDPs is their lack of resources, including paying for transport to the nearest facilities, which can be some distance away. Some of the State Governments ordered hospitals to treat IDPs free of charge on receipt of a SEMA letter authorising their expenses. SEMAs, however, have failed to reimburse hospitals, leading them to refuse to accept the organisation's letters in lieu of payment. This has effectively priced IDPs out of medical treatment, given that they have to pay an initial registration fee of 500 Naira (\$2.80) plus their consultations and medication costs. There are reported to be few if any medical supplies in government health facilities in Adamawa state. In communities without health programmes run by international NGOs, many IDPs have no access to healthcare at all.

Humanitarian Crisis in the North East:

Outbreaks of disease and malnutrition rates have increased in areas affected by displacement. The number of cholera cases among IDPs and host communities has risen exponentially, with 26,204 cases and 404 deaths reported between January and July 2014, compared with 167 cases during the same time period in 2013. The lack of water and sanitation facilities raises serious concerns about the outbreak spreading. Global acute malnutrition rates in Yobe

and Borno states were 15.5 per cent and 13.6 per cent respectively as of August 2014. The IDPs and host communities in the north-east have only limited access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation, leading to a decline in health and hygiene among both IDPs and their host communities. Public latrines in informal camp-like settings such as schools are often non-existent or unusable. Defecation and the disposal of children's waste in the open are common, particularly in urban or densely populated peri-urban host communities. Open defecation raises health, security and dignity issues, particularly for women and girls, and creates tension with host communities. The contamination of water sources has contributed to cholera outbreaks in a number of displacement sites in Bui, Borno state, in 2014.

No Access to Education:

With many IDPs sheltering in schools and humanitarian assistance often limited to life-saving interventions, displaced children are generally unable to pursue their education. Boko Haram attacks against schools since 2012 and state governments' closure of facilities in the worst affected areas, such as Borno state, have drastically decreased access. All schools in the towns of Baga, Bama, Jajeri, Umarari Garnam, Mai Malari, Mungono and Gamboru were forced to close between February 2012 and June 2013. Unidentified gunmen destroyed 14 schools

in the Borno state capital of Maiduguri between January and April 2013, and at least 256 were destroyed across the state. All state schools in Borno were closed in March 2014.

IDPs and members of the security forces occupying schools have damaged and in some cases destroyed infrastructure. A surge in displacement in northern Adamawa state during the July to September 2014 holidays led to a large number of IDPs sheltering in schools, which prevented classes from resuming at the start of the academic year.

Attendance rates have declined dramatically in the northeast. Even in areas where schools have remained open, many children, including IDPs, do not attend for fear of attack and abduction. The abduction of students in IDPs' home areas has made parents wary of sending their children to school, even in the comparative safety of the areas of refuge in neighbouring states. Parents also tend to prioritise basic needs such as shelter and food over education.

Displaced children's access to education varies from state to state. They are often refused attendance at host community schools that do not have the facilities or staff to take on more students. During the first half of 2014, admission was denied to many IDP children because the school year had already started. In Gombe state, schools have

reportedly been largely unaffected by the influxes of IDPs, but some displaced children were still refused admission.

Obstacles to durable solutions:

Given the focus on short-term humanitarian responses, few resources have been dedicated to the pursuit of durable solutions for IDPs via their return, local integration or sustainable settlement elsewhere in the country. This, combined with the absence of countrywide monitoring, means that only limited information is available on IDPs living in protracted displacement. The information that does exist suggests that they still have substantial needs, particularly in terms of food security, shelter and livelihoods.

Lack of livelihood opportunities:

The loss of farmland, livestock and tools means many IDPs are unable to resume their livelihoods after displacement and most receive no form of assistance to do so. In many cases, farming and grazing land is not available during displacement, so IDPs many have been unable to farm since their flight.

The national efforts to respond to displacement and mitigate its long-term effects on IDPs and host communities tend to be fragmented, uncoordinated and inadequate. Host communities provide most assistance IDPs

receive, regardless of the cause of their displacement. SEMAs have only limited resources and capacity, and there is no law or policy framework setting out responsibilities in terms of IDPs' protection and assistance beyond the initial phase of displacement. In the absence of clear roles for the ministries, departments and agencies involved in any response, they often compete with each other for the limited funding available.

Nigeria ratified the Kampala Convention in May 2012 and submitted a draft policy on IDPs to the cabinet that domesticated its provisions. More than two years later, however, the policy is still to be adopted, and prospects for the introduction of a draft bill to the national assembly seem dim. The cabinet appears to have little enthusiasm for resolving the obstacles hindering its approval, which would pave the way for a parliamentary bill. High-level intervention will be required in 2019 in order to restart the process.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Governments in the Northern States should work with local organizations to build models to have the community adopt – think of new social models.
- Social engineers need to be provided an enabling environment to work on these models for the

medium and long term – because the social displacement brought about by Boko Haram cannot be tackled through “quick – fixes” or in the short term.

- Government should be prepared to facilitate collection of robust data and demographic information that will facilitate re-building communities based on near accurate information on the original communities.
- Turnaround time for government policy formulation and implementation - action should match dynamism.
- Analysis – paralysis instead of waiting for data – pragmatism – response should be geared towards immediate response in view of the reality.

PRESENTATION III: THE ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE 19 NORTHERN STATES

Dr. Kole Shettima in the presentation “State of the Northern States' Finances” examined the structural dysfunctionality of the economy in the last 40 or so years brought about primarily by over-dependence on a single commodity, oil, as the source of revenue through external earnings. Oil commodity as an economic activity represented

only 9% of Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and yet accounts for more than 80% of external earnings and 90% of revenue accruable to government.

The context was that Nigeria, one of the world's oil commodity resource-rich economies, found itself at risk from the current economic crisis driven essentially by the collapse of international prices of crude oil to as low as \$30 per barrel from a previous high of up to about \$135 per barrel.

Nigeria therefore comparatively remains a poor African nation blessed with enormous wealth, beset with lack of leadership, poor institutions and contradictory visions of prosperity since oil first gushed from the marshy ground of the Niger Delta in 1956. The Nigerian crude oil pumped petrodollars into the nation's coffers that by the mid-1970s, the country had joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The only tangible outcome of this was that the revenue from oil has underpinned massive corruption: according to Natural Governance Institute (NGI) \$32 billion has been lost to corruption between 2009 – 2015.

Northern States in particular have been worst hit as they are unable to pay salaries of government employees without bailout funds from the Federal Government – in turn the Federal Government has been

borrowing to carry out recurrent expenditure instead of putting in place measures to reduce the cost of governance.

Why Nigeria is at risk from the current economic crisis and what may be done to ameliorate it?

Dr. Shettima posits that recovery measures should among others recognise the role of good governance and reduction of cost of governance. There was glaring need for reduction of recurrent 'wasteful' expenditure. The State Governments and Local Councils should widen tax base as well as reform governance institutions by putting in place reformed public finance management systems, contributory pension schemes, a transparent public procurement system, etc.

The general thrust of Dr. Shettima's presentation and accompanying photocopy of newspaper reports of the “consumption habits” of legislators and the executive as indicative of the wasteful expenditure that governments have not been able to discard was for a 'syndrome free' policy environment. Syndrome free policy environment is a policy thrust that is largely free from anti-growth or precarious adverse effects of various policy combination, such as; state controls (direct and indirect controls of prices, state production and distribution), redistribution of resources to cronies in favour of regional

constituencies, ethnicity and polarization of the citizenry. Other anti-growth policies are suboptimal intertemporal allocation; bloated public spending above inter-temporal optimal allocation of resources which could aggravate a 'bust' and state breakdown, a situation that may lead to violent conflict, resulting in the reported breakdown of law and order in the North West as well as insurgency in the North East and farmer-herder conflicts in the north central states. The presence or occurrence of these policy syndromes as hypothesized retarded per capita GDP growth and reversed the marginal gains recorded in recent years from high commodity prices (oil export revenue).

As such, pitfalls like inflation, boom-bust growth, policy summersault, corruption and inept leadership should be avoided. Dr. Shettima's presentation was intended to stimulate an interactive discourse on the matter in an effort to be a catalyst for coming up with an economic policy direction for the 19 Northern States without being prescriptive.

While the discussions did not examine with greater depth and focus there were in passing reference to the CBN monetary regulations and the continuing over-dependence of Nigeria's economy as part of the global economy on one reserve currency – the U.S. dollar, as the universal measurement and

expression of value. This made the global economic system to be subjected to the policy failures of the U.S. For the 19 Northern States, the diversification of its revenue base has been indirectly linked to expansion of international trade to boost US\$ income as well as Nigeria's reserves. But the 19 Northern States should critically examine the comparative advantage and disadvantages of this policy plank vis-à-vis the variety and complexities of market innovations that have overwhelmed the skills possessed by regulators in the financial sector.

The CBN as regulator of the financial sector had a narrow perception of the systemic risks that the individual-regulated institutions operated. The 19 Northern States should undertake an appraisal of the impact on the economy of the Northern States on the likelihood that regulatory institutions did not recognise the need for counter-cyclicality in regulation. Thus, they amplified the boom and bust cycle, with far worse deleterious impact in the Northern States.

The economic crisis obviously is a failure of both the market and the state - failure of governance in both private and public sectors. Significant political economy factors drove the inactions and ineptitude of the countries Central Banks (including Nigeria's) and governments. There were

excessive accommodative monetary policy, which was accompanied by greedy and soft regulation in many economies. It has been observed that a cynic had remarked that “under socialism, the governments took over the banks, and under capitalism banks took over the governments.”

It is critical for the 19 Northern States in an attempt to rebuild the areas decimated by insurgency and reconstruct communities from scratch to keep in sight that the failure of the market system and governments at all levels was a failure of the entire economic system. The free market system had a companion – capitalism, and propaganda machine – democracy. The engine of spread is globalisation driven by liberalization and information technology. “The Fallacy of Aggregation”, according to Bhagwati (in Bhagwati, J.N. (2000), “Lessons from the East Asian Experience: Opening Address”, Rosengran, E.S. and J.S. Jordan (eds.). Building an Infrastructure for Financial Stability. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 44:19-29.):

“People think of globalization as a great big blob. They do not distinguish between the different dimensions on which you globalize, but just assume that everything goes together. If you are a free trader you must be for free immigration, you must be for free capital flows,

you must be for free foreign investment, you must be for free love, you must be for free everything.”

These are dangerous for poor and developing economies such as the 19 Northern States of Nigeria. In all of the above there is merit in asking the question; what does the global crisis and its implications have for Northern Nigeria?

The 19 Northern States like other parts of Nigeria are innocent of this crisis and did not contribute to the imbalances. So how did Nigeria get caught-up?

The deep integration of domestic financial markets in Nigeria with global financial institutions; and some of the financial instruments, which later proved toxic in the derivative markets, were distributed across several economies. Thus, there was a global spread of the contagion of distress and Nigeria was not spared. The period 2007 – 2015 saw the complete demise of Northern based/owned financial institutions. Bank of the North (BON) that metamorphosed into Unity Bank and is now under the control of the Ijaws. Habib Nigeria Bank that became Platinum-Habib Bank and lately Keystone Bank, New Africa Merchant Bank (NAMB) that was floated and promoted by the NNDC and northern state governments have been long dead. All financial institutions in the

north have ceased to exist. This state of affairs could give an insight into the lack of financial muscle by the north.

Participants also reviewed previous privatisation processes in which the government heavily distorted major economic fundamentals (labour, finance, domestic and international trade and production). In recent years before the global economic crisis, the Nigerian economy though was not fully integrated with world markets, it pushed further into liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned corporations and integration of its financial markets. This was at variance with pre-1986 structural adjustment programme when government policy and operation was more of socialist orientation. Thus most policies since 1986, and more recently, favoured inward-looking, state-led development strategy and deregulation. Notable examples are the commercial banks recapitalisation, National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), Vision 2020, 7-point Agenda, etc. Some of these strategies induced the use of state controls that may be detrimental to productivity growth.

The discourse also examined adverse redistributive policies. This was where redistributive policies favoured constituencies of respective government leaders, usually regional, ethnic undertones,

etc. Such policies produced inefficient resource allocation by misallocating public investments. Many examples could be pointed to under the leadership of former President Goodluck E. Jonathan who hails from the South-South part of Nigeria, dominated by the diverse ethnic nationalities found in the Niger Delta. The regime has been accused of an unprecedented level of 'ethnicizing' the Nigeria federation that is made up of over 250 ethnic groups. This accusation followed on the heels of appointments of individuals from that specific geopolitical zone into influential positions in the administration of Nigeria like the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Petroleum Resources. The meeting noted the role of Mrs. Diezani Allison-Madueke in the petroleum Ministry and the removal of Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, as he then was the Governor of the CBN for exposing the corruption that Mrs. Allison-Madueke as Minister of Petroleum Resources presided over at the NNPC.

The assertions of Mrs. Allison-Madueke were that crude oil deposits and the main driver of the Nigerian economic growth are in the south-south of the country; therefore “persons from the desert cannot have a say as to dictate how the income from crude oil could be used.” As a result, adverse redistribution syndrome resulted in downright looting at

the NNPC/Ministry of Petroleum Resources and the Defence/National Security complex.

The 19 Northern States should also keep clear tabs on the “bail-out funds” so that this does not become another Suboptimal Inter-temporal Resource Allocation (SIRA), a syndrome of revenue misallocation, over time. It amounts to over-spending in commodity booms and insufficient expenditure during subsequent bust that will lead to the States embarking on projects that may be abandoned due to fiscal difficulties when the booms ended (example is the Warri Cosmopolitan Water Project), the federal railway project from Itakpe in Kogi state to Ovwian-Aladja Steel Plant in Delta state, etc. Such misallocation and waste of resources can deter economic growth.

The State of Emergency that was declared in the North Central under the Obasanjo administration as well as in the North East under the Goodluck administration should be carefully appraised as factors that led to State Breakdown/Failure. State breakdown here referred to open communal violence, such as ethnic strife, insurgency, and armed banditry that resulted in instability as well as breakdown of law and order. State breakdown also resulted in the 19 Northern States, in human suffering, interruption of (agricultural) production and

distribution as well as inefficient allocation of resources from the social sector into non-productive military sector. Clear example was due to the insurgency of Boko Haram, the governments of the States of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe had to close down, schools and markets that brought to a halt almost the entire rural economy of these states.

These states also had to deploy their meager financial resources to meet the expenditure for enforcing the State of Emergency while the federal funds were being looted. The recourse to military resource allocation from productive and social sector no doubt reduced social investment that has led to complete collapse of infrastructure with attendant humanitarian crisis in the North East with repercussions in other parts of the North and the nation. The huge amount spent on security was incongruent with economic growth and a characteristic of poor leadership that was inept in policy design.

Dr. Shettima posited that the 19 Northern States must therefore escalate entrenching good governance at all levels. Good governance that will be evident in improved political governance (a measure of executive constraint). Good governance evident from the absence of the syndromes, thus able to combine political stability with people-friendly

policies. Increase in spending on education, health as well as job creation geared to address youth unemployment.

The impact and nature of the global crisis as now recognised is frustrating and remains a risk factor to the growth and development of economy of the Northern States. However, this crisis like other global crises of the past is not insurmountable. Given resource base of each state (human and material), the participants brainstormed on state-specific programs to cope and compete in the evolving 'new economy' seeing collapse of oil price as great opportunity and blessing, if not for entirety of Nigeria, then at least for the 19 Northern States as now the distraction of oil revenue has been muted to enable the North pay critical and unriveted attention to its area of comparative advantage.

For the Northern States there is an opportunity to escape the oil curse and rentier, consumption economy towards production. The potentials of the 19 Northern States remain in the areas of huge growth reserves: typified by abundant cheap labour; solid minerals; fallow arable land. What was required is for the Northern States to pursue a more diversified market economy with some “shock absorbers”; create enabling environment to attract cheap international finance. There is also a huge elbow room for tax revenues— can increase from less than 5% to more than 20% of GDP: one of

most under-taxed in the world. States can learn from each other.

Success depends on whether oil shock is understood as temporary or permanent shock—hence whether short-term demand management or long-term structural adjustment. Some were of the view that ARDP should spearhead formation of a new political platform considering that fundamental threat to bring about this change to the fortunes of the Northern States is democracy with short-term electoral cycles and hence pressure for “short-term” populist, albeit palliative response as against desired long-term but potentially painful adjustment. Potential conflict between what the people “want” today against what they “need” tomorrow.

The 19 Northern States should not assume that this economic crisis is temporary and therefore not wait for oil price to recover. Restructuring of the Nigerian economy without oil cannot be sustained by merely pumping money into the system, or bail-out for the States to pay salaries. On the contrary the 19 Northern States should seize the moment as this is an opportunity for the turnaround of the Northern economy without external 'conditionalities.' The 19 Northern States governments should have the discipline to self-regulate and make the hard choices. For a productive Northern economy, the

Northern States must pursue an agenda for breaking the dynasties of poverty: addressing both equality of outcomes and more so, equality of opportunity - especially accessible and qualitative education and healthcare, exporting human capital as sustainable agenda for job creation – meanwhile the 19 Northern States should be careful and mindful of internal brain drain that has decimated the region by movement of most of its talents to the Federal Government or international development agencies and the diaspora.

PARLEY ON THE WAY FORWARD

There were several accounts of the genealogy and manifestations of the myriad governance crises, which the 19 Northern States and Nigeria as a nation continue to face five decades after independence. Although no single account was seen as sufficient to explain the governance misadventures, one key point resonating was that progress and development have proved elusive over the years. ARDP

prompted by the desire or aspiration to move away from the dominant characterization of this governance crisis as deriving directly from the consequences of over-dependence on oil economy, and for the Northern States, allocations from the Federation Account, a deeply fractured and volatile political terrain, or even corrupt and patrimonial rule - convened the meeting on “State of the States” to take stock and see what new directions could be charted.

The meeting, in terms of the presentation on the three thematic areas, located the root of the 19 Northern States governance crisis in the pattern of the emergence, reinvention, and manipulation of proto-nationalisms characterized not

For a productive Northern economy, the Northern States must pursue an agenda for breaking the dynasties of poverty: addressing both equality of outcomes and more so, equality of opportunity - especially accessible and qualitative education and healthcare,

by any nationalistic quest for independence and spatial liberation but one pursued to gain foothold in governance and to partake in its perquisites. Invariably, the government at the three tiers, for the most part, neither followed through with any logical expression of genuine nationalism nor mobilized toward a shared vision of nationhood.

The papers presented at the meeting highlighted how individuals and groups within the polity soon became locked in contested and irreconcilable positions that further made the construction of a truly nationalistic identity difficult, if not impossible. The meeting noted that upon return to democratic rule in 1999 some of the state governments unimaginatively followed the divide-and-rule traditions of the colonial state and thus failed to mobilize the popular support required for the construction of a broad-based national identity that is key to managing the protracted governance crises the 19 Northern States have experienced since independence.

“Colonialism wasn't simply the creation of unnatural borders or unfair terms of trade, it was something experienced . . . day after day, year after year.”—President Barack Obama (July 11, 2009)

The aim of the meeting was to identify ways in which ARDP could strengthen local capacities for managing

conflict non-violently and in addressing the root causes of violent conflict, in the short-term, medium-term and long term; through conflict transformation (long-term structural change), conflict resolution (addressing root causes), and conflict management (limiting, mitigating and containing violence). The key principles presented were local ownership of the processes of conflict mediation as well as resettlement of IDPs. It was suggested that ARDP adopt a comprehensive approach using all available ARDP tools, focusing on the factors it can influence while being mindful of those it cannot.

S U M M A R Y O F O B J E C T I V E S

Analysis of causes of conflict, triggers of violence and mitigation measures in Northern Nigeria within the context of a deteriorating economy. Development of possible policy options for ARDP to make recommendations to specifically the governments of the 19 Northern States based on analysis of gaps in existing responses and feasibility and risks of possible policy options. The meeting was structured. After background papers were presented highlighting the results of existing conflict assessments and analysis; this was followed by informal brainstorming that was highly interactive but strictly facilitated to address specific questions in order to map the

conflict dynamics. The participants were invited experts from academia, politics, bureaucrats, private sector entrepreneurs, media practitioners, civil society as well as community based organisations and other stakeholders.

(1) SUMMARY OF KEY ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENCE AND TRIGGERS OF VIOLENCE POLITICAL:

The changing nature of Nigeria's elite consensus, which is now a more regional than national construct; political parties are not ideological and the opposition does not challenge poor governance, etc.

Poor and bad governance in Nigeria and particularly in northern Nigeria: the

lack of response to the population's needs by the political elites, limited commitment to social services and lack of development of a welfare state; mismanagement of public goods, and instrumentalization of radicals by elites.

Socioeconomic: Poverty – especially in Northern Nigeria. Development policies and programmes were viewed as focused on the south of the country.

Low economic activity caused, for example, by the end of Trans-Saharan trade routes and the decline of agricultural production.

The youth bulge: High unemployment, poverty, lack of access to education amongst young people who are therefore vulnerable to radicalisation. Northern elites manipulate Almajirai (young mendicants) to further their own political ends. The demand for social justice and Boko Haram's response to these demands (e.g. it was noticeable that Boko Haram did not attack during strikes over petrol prices).

'Religious,' Identity and Cultural Motivations: Tradition of radical Islam in northern Nigeria, including on doctrinal issues, excluding those 'not Muslim enough' from jobs. Boko Haram also targets 'insufficiently Islamic' clerics more than Christians. Radical, fundamentalist Islamic and Christian groups. Fundamentalism gives a sense of belonging and opportunity.

Globalisation: including global Islamic fundamentalism and the influence of extremists from outside Nigeria. Also, the Arab Spring with its calls for reform served as an inspiration for young people.

Weak Justice and Security Provision: The security services (police, army, intelligence, joint task forces) lack the capacity to gather actionable intelligence, to enforce the law, or to ensure public safety; reform of these agencies has not been a priority for the government; there was often conflict and/or lack of coordination between agencies.

Security agents used disproportionate force and have committed abuses; people are afraid of them and do not trust them.

State institutions – including in the security sector – appeared to have been infiltrated by Boko Haram. The justice system (including non-state actors e.g. hisbah) was incapable of addressing Boko Haram or insurgency in general, or providing public safety, or fighting corruption.

The expertise of the militants indicated the possible involvement of frustrated former peacekeepers and retired military personnel. The proliferation of weapons, including from Libyan arsenals.

Criminal networks: Extensive crime and organised crime networks are operating in Nigeria (and across the Sahel region and beyond).

Communication/Media: The media heightened tension through inflammatory and/or inaccurate reporting, including (inaccurately or prematurely) attributing criminal acts to Boko Haram. The government does not clearly communicate about its response to conflicts and to grievances in northern Nigeria.

YouTube and other new media facilitated rapid and wide distribution of propaganda. The Internet and social media enabled recruitment and publicity.

(2) KEY ACTORS INFLAMING OR RESOLVING CONFLICT

The Bashir Tofa Model based on forming community-based organisations comprising of elites and retired professionals as well as ex-military officers, etc. to organise community self-help groups as a model for community-based sensitization and mobilization of (i) young people, (ii) almajirai, etc. Reinforcing civil society and exploring its potential to work with (i) community policing initiatives, (ii) victims and their families. Civil society inter-communal initiatives involving (i) clerics (ii) Emirs (iii) hisbah (iv) Leaders of ethnic groups (v) Small business e.g. market traders (vi) Muslim scholars in universities in Jos, Lagos, Kaduna.

Concerning armed groups and related actors, participants noted that very little was known about Boko Haram, for example, hard information about its structure, hierarchy, leadership and the organisations that provide it with training, funding and/or ideological inspiration was not available.

Differentiating between and 'driving a wedge' between the leadership and rank and file was an important tool that did not appear to have been utilized by the security operatives considering the botched rescue attempt of British and Italian citizens in Sokoto as well as the trial of the Madallah Church

bomber.

The membership and size of Boko Haram were unclear, as are the question of who belongs to it and why. Some of the alleged members of Boko Haram appeared to be only loosely connected to the group and others seek only to acquire personal benefits.

Recommendations for action by theme

The meeting found that while the root causes of the conflicts are complex the possible actions are manifold. Due to the limited time available only preliminary ideas about entry points for support were discussed. Recommendations needed to be further explored to ensure that they take into account other possible, ongoing or planned actions and to ensure that they respond to and address the problems highlighted in the paper presentation and the discussions.

THEME 1: THE JUSTICE AND SECURITY SECTORS SHOULD DELIVER SECURITY AND SAFETY FOR ALL CITIZENS

Comprehensive reform and accountability to build public confidence in security system – it is important not only to develop specific counter-terrorist capacities but also to strengthen the justice system's overall capacities including protecting the rights of people, increasing access to justice, and working with traditional systems and religious channels to make people aware of their

rights and the dangers of extremism.

Demilitarize the response: the police force is weak, while the State Security Service (SSS) can investigate but it is doubtful from the legislation and intents and purpose of establishing SSS whether its modus operandi will enable it bring a case to court. It is important to consider which of the two to reinforce in view of the emerging scenario and preference of the administration to utilize SSS in situations that fall within the jurisdiction of the police.

Actionable intelligence: Agencies need skills in collecting and digesting information, including forensic skills, whilst respecting human rights. Regional intelligence cooperation is also necessary. Fair and balanced anti-corruption measures would increase public confidence.

The government could tap underused expertise e.g. retired military personnel and to find ways to discourage engagement in criminal activities (for example increase pensions; increase pension age). Better coordination, trust and division of labour between security agencies.

Better strategic communication by the government including challenging misreporting in the media. Communication is a key element in building confidence between government and citizens and strengthening the

social contract.

Increase convictions by training judges and prosecutors; penal reform to equip prisons with specific capacities for housing terrorists; specialised courts could bring counter-terrorist activities under judicial control. Accompany retributive justice with restorative justice for rank and file members of extremist organisations.

Prevention: Government has taken rather too long to develop a strategy and response with the support of the international community to the humanitarian crisis in the North East, in the North West and North Central Parts of Nigeria that have been affected by the conflict and insurgency. This should include developing a counter-narrative; media strategy; education; working with victims; creating jobs. Expertise was needed more than funding.

Building relations with the population: examples of how civil-military relations and relations between communities and police have improved in other countries. Nigeria should engage in sharing information and knowledge with its neighbours in the West Africa sub-region as well as with South Africa.

Community policing including engaging with civil society could increase public safety. There may be positive examples of hisbah and police working together for greater

public safety.

Alternative Dispute Resolution for certain types of cases could address the justice backlog, increase delivery and public confidence.

Tighter regulation of the trade in raw materials for Improvised Explosive Devices, and bomb disposal training for security agencies.

Mapping existing government actions across different issues, which are relevant to counter-terrorism and see which partners could work on counter-radicalisation.

Participants noted the government's anticorruption project shows a lack of capacity in the formal justice system and the potential for strengthening it, including through working with civil society organisations. There should be an emphasis on improving governance: public finance management, anti-corruption, and tackling money laundering.

ARDP may lack influence regarding security sector reform: the government will not want to lose formal and informal control over security forces; devolving some agencies to state-level (e.g. police) is a controversial proposal.

Some bilateral donors are already engaging significantly in this sector. Hence there is a need to ensure coordination and complementarity of efforts.

THEME 2: THE LACK OF EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES FUEL RADICALISM

There were heated arguments on job creation and the type of jobs to be created – most especially the present economic environment where governments at all tiers are unable to pay salaries. The meeting therefore noted job creation should be preponderantly in the private sector and in the self-employment stream of business entrepreneurship. The meetings noted ongoing initiatives to scale up investment in irrigation, agriculture, and basic infrastructure (power, roads), which are key.

Engage communities in identifying their development priorities and strategies.

Identify and address the grievances driving a core group within Boko Haram.

The government has to reach beyond the formal education sector to inform citizens of their rights, government actions and the dangers of extremism.

Government should support interfaith organisations that are working toward building bridges between communities e.g. Interfaith Mediation Centre (Kaduna); religious leaders who use inflammatory language should be encouraged to tone down inflammatory statements.

Strengthen the voice of women who can play an important role in preventing radicalization.

THEME 3: CONTINUED, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERVENTIONS (NOT LISTED IN ANY ORDER OF PRIORITY)

The Government should immediately put a stop to extra-judicial killings and brutality by the security agencies and end checkpoints within cities and between states, which alienate people, create targets and lead to development of grievances and possible recruitment by extremist groups.

Balance security and human rights and strengthen the capacities of the police, customs, State Security Service.

Regain legitimacy and trust by admitting its mistakes in tackling cattle-rustling, conflicts, Boko Haram insurgency and other violence; reassure the population that the government is in control.

Consider an amnesty package for followers of Boko Haram – assessing its possible negative consequences - and support efforts at dialogue with them.

Seek consultative dialogue with the leadership in the North, including groups such as the Islamic Council of Nigeria, Jama'atu Nasril Islam, Sultan of Sokoto, Shehu of Bornu, Emir of Kano, and other traditional leaders; support interfaith dialogue between the Christian Association of Nigeria and

Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs.

Improve its understanding of Boko Haram's target community by supporting research and decode its recruitment methodology.

Launch an information campaign to inform the population of the socioeconomic development work it does, and reduce the recruitment appeal of Boko Haram.

Strengthen efforts to control weapons flow by a robust engagement on the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) on the regional level by extending the ECOWAS regional engagement to T'Chad Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic as well as far as South Africa in order to ensure comprehensive control of sophisticated arms on the African continent.

Starting now, for the medium term:

- the government should work with civil society and with moderates to reach out to those still engaged in extremist activists and drive a wedge between them and the radical leadership.
- the government should work with traditional and religious leaders as key interlocutors, including engaging with them more systematically.

The private sector should:

- Increase its levels of corporate social responsibility and
- its engagement with and response to the interests of local communities.
- The private sector should:
- Strengthen their existing conflict resolution mechanisms (with support from external bodies but locally owned) in order to manage conflict,
- provide an early warning system and support justice sector reform.

Relevant Stakeholders should immediately prod and nudge the 19 Northern States Government to develop (or support the government to develop) a "Marshall Plan" (long term, with quick start-up) for employment and development in Northern Nigeria, to be overseen by civil society, the government and other international development partners and donors.

Civil Society Organizations should undertake research and map out program of action that could contribute to de-radicalization, support field research to meet the gap in empirical data, and research into better understanding Boko Haram's

messaging and to:

- i Support and strengthen conflict management and resolution mechanisms.
- ii Support joint-border initiatives between Nigeria, Niger Republic and Republic of T'Chad.
- iii Support the national government and regional bodies to develop regional and Nigerian road networks and other infrastructure to stimulate trade.
- iv Support education, micro-credit projects for youth and the government's programme on agricultural development.
- v Support and encourage the government to develop community policing projects that engage civil society in order to increase public safety and early warning capacities.

NORTHERN NIGERIA AND THE CHALLENGES OF INSECURITY

Introduction

The major argument of the social contract theorists (Hobbes, Locke, etc.) is predicated on the fact that security concerns predate the existence of the state. Impliedly, the state, primarily, exists to ensure the safety and survival of its citizens. No doubt, the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, specifically states “The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary concern of the government”. Despite this clear commitment by the Nigerian state, the nation has been characterized by years of violent ethno-religious and political conflicts, rising violent crimes and widespread corruption resulting into internal displacement of populations largely due to bad governance, socioeconomic imbalances, injustice and inequalities, as well as insensitivity to the plight of its citizens. For example, in 2015, over 70,000 Nigerians were reported to have fled the country to other neighboring countries like Cameroon, Niger, Benin Republic, Chad,

etc. It is also evident that within Nigeria, there are about 1000 IDPs camps across the 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory. The cost to the nation and the regions is inestimable. A study conducted in 2015 shows that the federal government was losing \$13.7 billion in revenue annually because of herder-farmer conflicts in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states. The study further found that on average these four states lost 47 per cent of their internally-generated revenues. Furthermore, in March 2017,

This debilitating state of insecurity, occasioned by the escalation of perennial security threats across the country, coupled with the evident lack of capacity to contain the crises has resulted in people's disillusionment with the state and the resort to self-help. The dangerous resort to self-help is evidenced in the attacks and counter-attacks taking place in Benue, Borno, Kaduna, Katsina, Plateau, Rivers, Taraba and Zamfara states. Admissibly, the conflict is pervasive, but the violent conflicts colored in cattle-rustling, rural banditry, ethnic militancy and the waning but active Boko Haram insurgency, occur mostly within the northern Nigerian states and remain the most debilitating threat to the peaceful coexistence of the nation.



Kashim Shettima, Chairman of Northern Governors Forum

Benue state Governor Samuel Ortom asserted that attacks by herders had cost his state N95 billion (about \$634 million at that time) between 2012 and 2014 (*The Nation*, 22 March 2017).

Northern Nigeria consists of 19 out of 36 states clustered into three geopolitical zones of North-West, North-East and North-Central. The North today is, no doubt, at a crossroads – confronted by threatening forms of insecurity.

In the North East is the waning but active Boko Haram; the North-West is festered with banditry and cattle-rustling; and the North Central is locked in partly, farmers/pastoralists conflict and evidences of local criminalities. These threats to peace have persisted in spite of huge resources that have been expended by both state and federal authorities. In the light of foregoing, this article examines the context, complexities, causes and impacts (social and economic) of the crisis in northern Nigeria. The objective is to establish the true nature, dimensions, causes and impacts of the conflict, with a view to proffering some recommendations.

Conceptual Framework

In order to elucidate the concept of insecurity, it is pertinent to first understand the concept of security. Some scholars in conceptualizing security placed emphasis on the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion, political and socioeconomic objectives of a country (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). Similarly, security has been seen to embody the mechanism put in place to avoid, prevent, reduce, or resolve violent conflicts, and threats that originate from other states, non-state actors, or structural socio-political and economic conditions (Stan, 2004). While the former conceptualization takes into account the centrality of the state in ensuring security, the latter recognize the role of both state and non-state actors in

guaranteeing security for citizens. Nonetheless, both perspectives approach the concept of security from national security concerns, which essentially relates to the territorial integrity of the nation and the physical safety of its inhabitants. However, security can equally be viewed from the human security angle. In this respect, security shares the conceptual space of the people-centric approach to human development, pioneered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Egwu, 2015). Central to the idea of human security, as espoused by the 1994 Human Development Report on Human Security, are two important issues: freedom from threat to violence, and freedom from the scourge of want, deprivation and poverty. Within the human security paradigm, human beings become the central focus, with a fundamental set of functions related to survival, livelihood and dignity' as the irreducible minimum (Egwu, 2015).

Insecurity is an antithesis of security. Udoh (2015) sees insecurity as the state of being subject to danger or injury. Impliedly, insecurity refers to anything that is capable of causing physical harm or injury. This falls within the realm of national security paradigm. Belend's (2015)

definition of insecurity as "the state of fear and anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection" encapsulates the human security nexus." Apparently, protection could be from violence or from poverty. Insecurity in this article therefore, constitutes threat to physical wellbeing, wants, deprivation and threat to lives, which hinder economic activities, and discourages local and foreign investors, and in turn, retards human and economic development of the nation.

The Complex Dynamics of Violent Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

Insecurity in northern Nigeria is a complex mix of violent activities ranging from: banditry, cattle-rustling, farmer-herders conflict, criminalities, insurgency and



Rt. Hon. Aminu Bello Masari,
 Chairman of the North-West Governors Forum

citizenry deeply entrenched in abject poverty and all forms of social exclusions. These violent conflicts mesh and intermesh, at the level of triggers and are inexorably linked to criminality, ethnic assertiveness and economic predation. As Shita (2017:14) observes, "the link between criminality and conflict (in the region) manifests in the form of rural banditry and cattle-rustling, with dire implications for sustainable food security." The conflict is therefore, more complicated than simply an issue dealing with farmer-pastoralist relations. It is complex and multifaceted, with several dimensions and levels. Momale (2015) identifies cattle-rustling as the major triggers of conflict. In itself, Momale (2015) argues, the practice of cattle rustling, is driven by different

of a pastoralist herds, means depletion of household income and communal resource of the herding community. Importantly, cattle-rustling impacts on livestock production. Livestock production is not only a significant aspect of agriculture in Nigeria's quest to diversify its economy, it also remains crucial to the overall wellbeing of pastoralist communities, particularly the nomadic Fulani herders. Therefore, the pastoralist considers a loss of his herd as a loss of self-respect

identified. The study conducted by CEDDERT (2017) identified five (5) dimensions of the conflicts: farmer-herders crisis; cattle-rustling and armed banditry; ethnicisation of the conflict; nationalization of the conflict and; internationalization of the conflict. The dimension of what today is seen as farmer-herders conflict also has several levels. The first relates to disagreements and animosity over incursions of cattle onto farmlands on one hand and incursions by farmers onto cattle routes, on the other. In the past such disagreements are usually settled peacefully, with costs or fines paid. Today that has changed. The second level involves more serious disagreements between farmers and non-resident pastoralists on the move (the *Bokolo/Bororo*).



Alh. Muhammad Badaru Abubakar, Governor of Jigawa State

needs, which may include need for cash, some ethnic groups' need for meat, or as a means of revenge for damaged crops. Local herder's could engage in rustling just to increase their herd or for quick cash. This has been an established venture going on for several decades. The recent drivers of rustling for meat and/or as a means of revenge is the more worrisome dimension of rustling that engendered the notorious armed banditry that we are contending today. The rustling

and esteem and can necessitate any action including banditry. The farmer considers the destruction of his farm produce as threat to his survival and therefore, justifies his rustling of herds for meat or for cash. Evidently, what plays out as farmer-pastoralist conflict, is effectively, a by-product of rustling and banditry.

Beyond the issue of cattle-rustling, other dimensions of the conflict ravaging the northern region have been

It is alleged that these pastoralists are very aggressive and that they deliberately move their cattle into farms and refuse to pay for damages. In the past, some of these were armed with swords and knives but now some of them carry rifles and even attack and kill farmers when confronted. Yet another level relates to pastoralists on the annual harvest season practice of *kwargo*. Usually, this involves Fulani youth who move

southwards from northern fringe areas in search of harvested grain stalks. Since they move without families and the responsibility this entails on their behavior, they could turn rogue and get involved in criminal activities such as feeding their cattle on harvested produce and even rustling.

A second dimension to the conflict relates to the phenomenon of cattle-rustling by armed bandits. Cattle rustling is regarded as a form of armed banditry. It refers to the practice of stealing cattle and animals from herders, or the raiding of cattle from the ranches (Egwu, 2015). Armed banditry on the other hand includes different forms of crimes such as highway robbery and gang-like invasion of settlements to confiscate wealth and properties (Cheserek, et. al. 2012). Rural banditry thrives as a means of 'primitive' accumulation of cowherds in the context of subsistence and commercial pastoralism.

The most disturbing effect of this banditry is the unsettling of pastoralist transhumance activities. This dimension to the problem has four levels. The first is the possibility of connivance between local Fulani elements and the rustlers. The second is a tendency among certain elements in the non-Fulani population to feed the rustlers with intelligence and also connive in marketing the rustled animals. The third level

relates to the nouveaux riche that have acquired cattle and have illegally armed their hired Fulani herders with rifles for the protection of the herds. It is claimed that such arms have found their ways into cattle-rustling. The fourth level is the imposition of a regime of terror in the countryside similar to the Boko Haram terror in the northeast, by armed bandits living in camps inside the forests. This terror is mainly characterized by armed robbery, killings, raping and kidnapping.

The third dimension to the conflict is its emerging ethnicisation, partly due to the activity of vigilante/militia groups and partly due to deliberate strategy pursued by the bandits. The trends and peculiarities associated with cattle rustling vary in different parts of Nigeria. In the North-Central geopolitical zone, especially in Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue, and Taraba States, the problem of cattle-rustling and rural banditry is framed around wider identity issues, including ethnic differences, ethnicity (minority/majority divide), religious difference and the indigene/settler split; these are linked to struggles over land and water resources (Egwu, 2015). This has led to the press misreporting a misunderstood perspective of the conflict as a narrative of one ethnic group against the other. Evidence from a study conducted by CDD supported by NSRP (2015), contradicts this popular

notion that nomadic herdsmen are the major perpetrators of cattle-rustling. The study found that 50% of respondents identified indigenes as the culpable parties. The remainder was evenly split, with 25% identifying criminal gangs and 25% identifying Fulani herdsmen as the perpetrators. The evidence suggests that cattle-rustling is a major rural crime, and is sustained by a carefully networked gang of armed rustlers, which operates under the control of gang leaders.

There are also ethnic profiling of victims of violence, which portrays the Fulani herdsmen as only perpetrators and other ethnic groups as victims. Evidence from the field contradicts this notion also. According to Dr. Garus Gololo, secretary of the Benue State branch of the Myeti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), about 28,000 cows were rustled in Plateau; 25,000 in Nasarawa; 8,680 in Benue; 1,650 in Kwara; and 1,500 in the FCT. He further states that the human casualties include 2,500 herdsmen in Benue; 264 in Plateau; 150 in Kwara; 70 in Nasarawa; and 7 in the FCT (*Weekly Trust*, May 16, 2015).

Based on the erroneous presumption of ethnic coloration, vigilante/militia groups in the major farming communities tend to regard all Fulani as bandits and treat them as such. Many innocent Fulani have lost their lives this way.

On the other hand, the bandits cash in on this situation, under the pretext that they are defending Fulani interests. They demand that all Fulani households should either enlist one of their members into the cause or pay a contribution in kind. The bloodletting continues.

The fourth dimension to the conflict is its nationalization. The study by CEDDERT (2017) found out that as the rustling and kidnapping activities of the bandits intensified, many settled pastoralists were forced to flee for safety to unfamiliar terrains in the Niger-Benue confluence area and the southern states, in the process igniting new conflicts with farmers along their flightpaths. The situation took on a new complexity when the armed bandits started pursuing the herdsmen to the south. It got worse with the military operations first in Kaduna State and later after the start of Operation *Sharan Daji*, when the Army and the Air Force moved in against the bandits on a massive scale. Many of the bandits simply fled southwards too and set up camps near the fleeing nomads. It is these well-armed bandits that appear to be attacking communities in the South and in the process opening up new national conflict faultlines.

The fifth dimension relates to the internationalization of the conflict. From the physique, language, mannerisms as well

as the evidence supplied by rape and kidnapping victims, many of the armed bandits appear to belong to Fulbe groups from beyond Nigeria's borders. There are indications that some of the atrocities presumed to be perpetrated by local Fulani herdsmen were actually executed by soldiers of fortune. Only recently, President Muhammadu Buahri insinuated the connection



Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Tukur Yusuf Buratai

between proliferations of arms and increase in attacks to the rebel forces of the defeated Muammar Gaddafi of Libya as well as armed gunmen identified as remnants of rebel forces from years of civil war in Chad.

The Underlying Causes of Violent Conflict

Although Nigeria is chiefly known for its oil and gas production, agriculture

employs about 70 per cent of its labor force. Small-holders in the country's middle belt and south, harvest most of the country's tuber and vegetable crops while pastoralists in the north raise most of its grains and livestock. Over 90 per cent of pastoralists reportedly are Fulani (Momale, 2015). Pastoralists own approximately 90 per cent of the national herd, estimated at 19.5 million cattle, about 975,000 donkeys, 28,000 camels, 72.5 million goats and 41.3 million sheep.

Livestock represents between 20 and 30 per cent of total agricultural production and about 6 to 8 per cent of overall Gross Domestic Production (GDP), (Momale, 2015). Traditionally, the farmers and pastoralists were adept to an interdependent social and economic life, which is mutually beneficial to both groups. The farmer allowed the pastoralist access to his harvested farm-land and during cropping season, the pastoralist vacates a land which is rich in organic manure for the farmer's cultivation. With this great prospects and warm interdependent relationship between the pastoralist and the farmer of the past, what is responsible for the farmer-pastoralist conflict? Several factors such as: increased desertification, urbanization and expansion in infrastructure, poverty occasioned by bad governance, land dispute, lack of alternative grazing areas and

ethnic assertiveness as well as collapse of communal conflict mediation mechanisms combined to serve as underlying causes of conflict.

According to the a report by the Federal Ministry of Environment (2008), in the last six decades, over 350,000 sq. km of the already arid region turned to desert or desert-like conditions, a phenomenon progressing southward at the rate of 0.6km per year. The report further claims that estimates in Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara states, suggest that 50-75 per cent of the land area is becoming desert. These environmental changes have wrecked agriculture and human livelihoods, forcing millions of pastoralists and others to migrate south, in search of grassland and water for their

herds. Herders migrating into the savannah and rain forests of the middle-belt and southern states are moving into regions where high population growth over the last four decades has heightened pressure on farmland, increasing the frequency of disputes over crop damage, water pollution and cattle theft.

The growth of human settlements, expansion of public infrastructure and acquisition of land by large-scale farmers and other private commercial interests, have deprived herders of grazing reserves designated by the post-independence government of the former Northern region. According to a report by International Crisis Group (2017), most of the 415 grazing reserves established by the northern regional government in the 1960s have since been lost. Only 114 were formally documented or demarcated, though the government failed to back these agreements with legislation guaranteeing exclusive usage or take active measures to prevent encroachment. The rest succumbed to pressure from rapid population growth and the associated demand for farmland, were overrun by urban and other infrastructure, or appropriated by private commercial interest.

Similarly, a study conducted by CEDDERT (2017) revealed that central to the problem between farmer and herder has been the decision of Zamfara State and other state governments to convert parts or whole forest and grazing reserves into private farms or settlements. The study (CEDDERT, 2017) highlighted the attrition between pastoralists and high political office holders on the changing use of forestlands and grazing reserves that the pastoralists have used for hundreds of years as grazing lands for livestock and only in the last 10 years to be converted for use as farmlands in Zamfara and other states of the north.

The ensuing reaction of the pastoralists as well as government led to political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of non-combatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). This brought to the fore the centrality of power and influence by those involved in the use of terror to achieve their aims at all cost. Thus the pastoralists-farmers conflict has been used to denote forms of unconventional, illegitimate violence targeted by a group at the state or society, or any section of the population thereof. As could be seen the pastoralists were gradually shifting from victims to bandits and then armed groups that at most times operated under



Chief of Defence Staff, Gen AG Olonisakin

collateral damage principle. This specter of the conflict indicated that anybody or group of persons can be victims of a terror attack. Conflict equally has a sectarian cloak. Usually a sect or sub-group with obnoxious political, religious or ideological philosophy uses terror to convey such misguided views.

The interconnection between poverty and insecurity is well-established in the literature. The assertion that a lack of basic security is the absence of one or more factors that enable individuals and families to assume basic responsibilities and to enjoy fundamental rights signifies the interconnection. The level of poverty, squalor, deprivations and other forms of social exclusions, across the states in the northern region is unprecedented. A national poverty survey (UN Report, 2016) based on data collected between 2004 and 2014, indicates that poverty is not equally felt across the geo-political regions in the country. The report indicates that all the states in the southern part of Nigeria, except Ebonyi state, fall below the national poverty average. Lagos has the lowest incidence of poverty with 8.5%. On the other hand all the states in the northern part of Nigeria except Kogi and Kwara, recorded poverty incidence higher than the national average. The poverty level for Sokoto state is 85.3% a little less than Zamfara state (91.9%) that recorded the highest poverty incidence in Nigeria.

The conclusion deducible from this report is that the southern part of Nigeria has moderate poverty while the northern region is mostly affected by high poverty incidence. This has brought about serious security implications for the region.

Furthermore, the resort to anti-grazing legislation has achieved the opposite of what it was intended to: it has further escalated the conflict rather than ameliorate it. In Benue and Taraba states, the killings that followed the implementation of the anti-grazing law enacted by the State Houses of Assemblies more than doubled. The herders see the law as a direct act of intimidation, harassment and marginalization. The local farmers sees it as the only panacea for achieving peace.

The contradiction inherent in the anti-grazing laws, proposing ranches as the only solution while at the same time making access to land for ranching impossible, gave birth to the controversy and suspicion. While it is acknowledged worldwide that ranching is standard model of pastoralism, the anti-grazing laws focus more on stopping herders from grazing and pays little attention to the establishment of ranches as alternative to grazing. The arrest and killings of cattle and herders by agents of the 'forest guards' led to heightened attacks by the herders.

In the absence of mutually

accepted mediation mechanisms, these disagreements increasingly turn violent. The reaction from Nigeria's federal and state authorities, so far, has been wanting. Aside from the recent push against Boko Haram and military operations against cattle-rustling, they have done little else to address rural insecurity in the north. Federal security and law enforcement agencies have established neither early-warning nor rapid response mechanisms; they have not arrested and prosecuted perpetrators of violence or offered redress to victims. Until recently, officials have paid little if any attention to improving livestock management practices to minimize friction with agrarian communities. State governments' responses overall have been short-sighted; most have failed to encourage community-level dialogue. As a result, both herders and farmers are taking matters into their own hands, further aggravating conflicts.

Socio-Economic Impact of the conflict

The combined effect of violent conflicts in northern Nigeria has exacted huge burden on livelihood, infrastructural development and have equally exacted a heavy humanitarian toll with thousands killed and tens of thousands displaced. According to the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, from 2011 to 2015, bandits, cattle-rustlers and other criminals killed 1,135

people in Zamfara state alone (*Daily Trust*, 17 February, 2017). Similarly, Governor Samuel Ortom reports more than 1,878 people were killed between 2014 and 2016 in Benue state. From 2016 to date the attacks have become more fierce and deadly due to the sophistication of weapons and highly organized nature of attacks. For example, in a recent report released by the ICG (2018), it estimated that between January-July 2018, as many as 1300

Nigerians have been killed in Benue and Plateau states alone. The report further states that between Benue and Kaduna states, about 2000 persons were killed. In Zamfara state, according to the Speaker of Zamfara

State House of Assembly, within two months (June to July 2018), more than 370 persons have been killed from 18 villages of Zurmi Emirate Council. These attacks give credence to the ICG's report assertion that the pastoralists' attacks in 2018 are "six times more deadly" than the Boko Haram related attacks.

The impact of the conflict on livelihood is as frightening as it is devastating. Markets and

commercial activities have been severely affected resulting to low economic activities. As the figure above shows, in the communities of Birnin Gwari and Dansadau for example, due to rural banditry and cattle rustling, there was a 77% and 79% drop in agricultural production capacity of these two communities respectively. Livestock trading dropped by 48% and 29% respectively. Over 90% of pastoralist have deserted the two areas.



President Muhammadu Buhari

Consequently, a bag of maize which was hitherto N5,500.00 before the escalation of the conflict now costs N18,000.00. Jobs loss as a result of abandoned farms amount to 79% and 85% respectively. Other findings of the field research by CEDDERT indicates that all banking activities along the Birnin Gwari-Dansadau corridor have all collapsed as virtually all bank branches have been attacked and monies carted

away by bandits.

These violent attacks have also visited the region with huge humanitarian catastrophe. Social displacement from homes, villages, communities and states in the north, between 2011 and 2014, had risen to 140,000 people. From January 2015 to February 2017, at least 62,000 people were displaced in Kaduna, Benue and Plateau states. The problem of the IDPs is compounded by absence of

Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, making them seek shelter in other poor, rural communities, straining their already scarce resources. Recently, the Speaker of Zamfara State House of Assembly admitted that about 12,000

peace-loving citizens of Zamfara state, from 18 villages of Zurmi Emirate Council were displaced and rendered homeless due to the activities of armed banditry.

The impact on women and girls, is even more pathetic and magnified. As the study by CEDDERT (2017) on the conflict in Birnin Gwari, Dansadau and Sabuwa communities of Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara states


showed, the abduction of women and girls, arbitrary arrest of women by government security agents, use of women as pawns by bandits and similar groups, infliction of collective terror on women, use of women as conflict labor force, demoralization of women education and livelihood are the major outcomes of the conflicts in these areas.

Armed bandits have evolved the notorious tactics of kidnapping women, raping and impregnating them and waiting until pregnancy was at an advanced stage and then the bandits will release the women back to their families or communities. Rape, has been identified by psychologists as the most intrusive of traumatic events in the life of an individual. Rape's damage can be devastating because of the strong communal reaction

to the violation and pain stamped on entire families. The harm inflicted in such cases on a woman by a rapist is an attack on her family and culture, as in many societies women are viewed as repositories of a community's cultural and spiritual values. Sometimes the rape takes place within the community orchestrated to be witnessed by husbands and children and relations. The state of human insecurity in the region is not helped by allegations of sexual

exploitation and abuses leveled against managers of the camps of the IDPs. Sexual violation of women erodes the fabric of a community in a way that few weapons can. The implication was to inflict collective terror on women as a social group as well as dehumanize them. The fear of violence and sexual abuse trapped women in their homes and prevented them from engaging in important economic activities.

Challenges to Conflict Management Mechanisms



President Muhammadu Buhari discussing with some Service Chiefs at the President Wing of the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja

The Nigerian authorities' response to communal violence, in recent times, is totally inadequate, too slow and ineffective, and in some cases unlawful. In earlier decades, herders and community chiefs agreed on stock routes (*burti* or *butali*), sometimes under local government auspices (Momale, 2015). Disputes over wandering stock or damaged crops typically were resolved by village chiefs and herders' leaders (Ardos). Those that defied the decisions of these

community-level mediators were referred to local authorities. This system started crumbling in the 1970s, undermined by the involvement of the police and courts (CEDDERT, 2017). Pastoralists hated these new institutions: corrupt police at times extracted fines and bribes while alien and protracted court processes immobilized their herds. Furthermore, local political leaders have tended to favour sedentary farmers, whose votes they crave, over itinerant herders, who may not

be around at election time. Consequently, herders feel increasingly marginalized and are largely distrustful of local political leaders as conflict mediators. That the judicial (Judges) and security system (especially the Police) – were part of the problems rather than the solution. Vigilante

groups formed to combat bandits (variously known as *'Yan Banga*, *'Yan Sa Kai* and *Kato da Gora*) have compounded insecurity in some areas where the arrest and summary execution of rustlers sometimes has invited massive retaliatory violence. The deployment of military forces to quell crisis only achieve temporary results. The government must totally overhaul its response to these deadly clashes to avoid this crisis getting out of control.

They need to investigate and bring suspects to justice.

Conclusion

In conclusion, no doubt, the crises in northern Nigeria are multidimensional as well as multifaceted. In the same way, the solution must necessarily, be multidimensional and holistic. As has been shown much of the information about the crisis has been inaccurate, one-sided, deliberately misleading or does not give an accurate account of their genesis, causes, nature and patterns. There are a lot of media hype, inflaming anger through ethnicisation of the conflicts. This is rather dangerous to the search for peaceful resolution of the conflicts. The machinery of state at federal, state and local government, as well as the civil society must network to ensure quick resolution of this crises. As a way forward, this article recommends the following:

- The Federal Government, through the office of the National Security Adviser, should thoroughly examine all panel of enquiries, committees and investigative reports instituted by various levels of governments on all conflicts and potential conflicts in northern Nigeria with a view to better understand the peculiarities of each conflicts before any

decision is taken to resolve them.

- The Federal Government should take the lead and liaise with other ECOWAS member states to discuss the problem and find solutions as well as intensify efforts to recover light weapons in the hands of criminals.
- Where there are security problems, the state security committee should promptly invite relevant community leaders and stakeholders to discuss and resolve the problem.
- State governments need to be proactive in taking decisions, which have implications for security, in terms of land allocation, grazing areas etc.
- While efforts at establishing ranches in select states are on-going, there is an urgent need for state governments to restore and demarcate cattle routes and grazing reserves as short-term measures.
- State Governments should organize reconciliation of communities and people in the conflict-prone communities as wells as constantly mapping out potential

conflict areas as a way of bringing peace and stability to the communities.

- State ministries of agriculture should liaise with MTN and its partners to educate and sensitize pastoralists on the use of Animal Identification Management Systems as a solution for cattle branding, tracking and curbing cattle rusting.
- Civil society organizations such as the ethnic/tribal associations, religious groups, community associations and professional groups should continue to engage with farmers and pastoralists in affected areas to promote better understanding and reconciliation among groups in conflict.
- To avoid reporting on issues that inflame sentiments, the media should liaise with research organizations for training on how to report conflict so as to ensure investigative and evidence-based information for content-based journalism.

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND THE RISING POVERTY IN THE NORTH

Introduction

Statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that the number of Nigerians living on less than a \$1 a day has risen to almost 100 million people, as at 2010. The percentage of Nigerians living in absolute poverty rose from 54.7 percent in 2004 to 60.9 percent in 2010. The figure is much worse in the North where nearly 70 percent of the population is reported by the World Bank as living below the minimum threshold of \$1 a day, compared to the South with 57.3%. Despite the North's political dominance, the region had continued to lag in all social development indicators. For example, a *National Literacy Survey (2010)* by the NBS estimates that the adult literacy rate, which is essential for raising living standard for the next generation, in the North stood at 27.3 percent compared to 54.6 percent in the South. The North is further saddled with the highest number of out-of-school

children estimated at over five million (56 percent of the national average).

Admittedly, the last few decades unfurled a host of challenges and problems for the region, as well as the Nigerian economy. The most significant was Boko Haram that has systematically sought to destabilize the Nigerian state

aggressive military response to it threaten to create an endless cycle of violence, deprivation and pauperism. This write up highlights the plight of those directly affected by the insurgency and provides a critical assessment of the humanitarian response, both national and international, to it.

An Overview of the Insurgency

Boko Haram began its insurgency with assaults on members of the security services, politicians, civil servants and other authority figures in the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe. It



The leader of Boko Haram Insurgency posing in one of his recorded messages

and impose its brand of Sharia in the northeast of the country since 2009. It has been estimated that more than 20,000 civilians were killed since, and as many as 2.5 million displaced, with the highest number of attacks taking place in Borno State. The insurgency itself, the lack of effective support to those internally displaced, and the

started to expand its operations in 2010, when it bombed buildings in Jos, and subsequently acquired tanks, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and sub-machine guns (which it used to push further south, bombing police and UN offices in Abuja in 2011, and soft targets like markets, motor parks, schools, churches and places that sold

alcohol.

Following the imposition of a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in 2012, attacks on civilian targets increased dramatically. In July 2013, militants set fire to a student dormitory near Potiskum in Yobe state burning dozens of students alive and others shot as they tried to flee. Between 2013 and mid-2014, Boko Haram destroyed 211 schools in Borno state, killing an unknown number of students and teachers and leading to the closure of all state-funded education facilities there in March 2014. Over 1-11 January 2015, the number of casualties killed by Boko Haram stood at 2146. Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) estimates that the number of fatalities resulting from the insurgency may be over 1000 per month over the period 2015-2016.

The group have also abducted at least 1000 women and girls in

north-eastern Nigeria since 2009. The abduction of 276 teenage girls from Chibok in April 2014 has been the largest single incident so far and the most publicized. About 100 of those captured are still unaccounted for. At the time of the attack, the local population had been swollen by the arrival of IDPs fleeing Boko Haram violence in surrounding villages. The Chibok abductions emboldened the group to step up the tactic, both to instil terror and raise revenue from ransom demands. Another strategic evolution of the group was the seizure of territory, with the capture of Baga and the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) in early January 2014 been a highpoint for the insurgents. While the Nigerian military operation has succeeded in restoring security and pushing back the onslaught of Boko Haram in parts of the North East, isolated populations in rural areas,

which are far more difficult to secure, are now more vulnerable to attacks. The frequency and intensity of these attacks have intensified in recent years, leading to massive displacements, as vulnerable households in rural areas fled their homes pre-emptively.

Counting the Internally Displaced Persons

Once dubbed as the home of peace, Borno state is now besieged with fear with around two million internally displaced persons (IDPs). While information on people displaced and their coping strategies are scarce, cumulative figures for internal displacement provided by the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) reported that there were 3.3 million IDPs in the country as of 31 December 2013. The Presidential Initiative on the North-East (PINE) and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) on their part, reported that Boko Haram had displaced 1.5 million people in the north-east alone. However, the poor condition of roads and communications infrastructure continues to hamper the collection of data on displacement, which is only occasionally disaggregated by age, sex and location. The three main organisations, i.e. NEMA, NCFR, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which primarily collect data on IDPs have no official mechanism to standardise their data collection methodologies



One of the IDP camps being part of about 46,000 IDP's from Gwoza that took refuge in 9 villages as a result of Boko Haram Insurgency attack in Borno State

or present their findings. This dearth of accurate and reliable data has impeded effective planning and relief efforts.

Planning requires reliable information about the areas where displaced people seek to return or resettle, to minimize the challenges they face upon arrival. While it is important to gather credible information on the numbers and conditions of IDPs, it is also key to not jeopardize the security and freedom of movement of displaced populations. It is in view of this, that recent efforts in data collection by NEMA and NCFR, especially in areas affected by Boko Haram must be commended, as this has led to an improved understanding of displacement patterns. Three patterns emerge in such areas:

- IDPs flee to the neighbouring states of Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba, and to central Nigeria and the Middle Belt region. Many of these areas are also affected by conflict and violence, increasing competition for resources between IDPs and host communities in flashpoint areas.
- People flee from rural to urban areas within their home states, increasing population stress on towns and cities and raising further security concerns. IDPs and host communities fear Boko Haram incursions in areas outside the group's traditional areas of operation.

- IDPs and host communities affected by violence and a lack of access to basic needs including food, water and emergency shelter are forced into secondary displacement. The ongoing depletion of community resources and household coping mechanisms increases IDPs' risk and vulnerability with each cycle of displacement.

While data collection efforts focused on camps and camp-like settings, most IDPs found refuge with host families and communities. Despite the significant improvement in data collection, profiling and registration by international NGOs in 2014, there is almost no publicly available data or information on these IDPs or their hosts. There is still a lack of coordination among humanitarian agencies for the collation and analysis of independent data. Estimates

provided by government agencies of the number of people displaced during crises are sometimes produced by simply counting destroyed and damaged homes in places from where people have fled. Moreover, the government estimates rarely captured return movements, progress towards durable solutions or protracted displacement. Improving data collection and management during all phases of displacement and the complete profiling of displaced communities in need of emergency interventions in the northeast should, therefore, be prioritised. Otherwise, the mass displacement may further distort the picture of secondary and cyclical displacement caused by desertification, inter-communal violence, Boko Haram's activities and electoral violence.

The Humanitarian Costs of the Insurgency

The most tragic manifestation



Scene of destructions and human sufferings arising from the Boko Haram Insurgency

Table 1: Percentage distribution of poverty by using different poverty measures

Zones	food poor	Absolute Poor	relative poor	Dollar per day
Northwest	51.8	70.0	77.7	70.4
Northeast	51.5	69.0	76.3	69.1
North-central	38.6	59.5	67.5	59.7
Southwest	25.4	49.8	59.1	50.1
Southeast	41.0	58.7	67.0	59.2
South-South	35.5	55.9	63.8	56.1

Source: NBS, 2010

It can be easily noticed from the Table above that, the three regions fare worse than their southern counterparts in all four indices of poverty except in the percentage of those classified as food poor, where the northcentral is slightly above the southeast. The story is not different when we compare illiteracy rates, number of out-of-school children, crime rates and other social vices. But, why is there so much poverty in the north compared to the south? A perusal of research conducted

over the years indicates that there might be several factors at play. For example, while the Nigerian economy, until recently, has enjoyed an average of 7 percent growth rate per year in the last decade, the nature of this growth has worsened the patterns of regional inequality and social division between the north and south. Indeed, the high growth period witnessed during the past five years failed to reflect any improvement in the poverty situations in the north due

largely to the inability of the region to seize new opportunities created by Nigeria's booming economy. Moreover, the region's educational backwardness – barely one in five adults in the north are literate, compared to about 80 percent in the south – has further helped to exacerbate the widening gaps between the north and south. An analysis of the data on Nigeria's literacy rate by geopolitical zones reveals that the northwest and northeast are worst in English


Table 2: Literacy rates by geopolitical zones

Zones	Literacy in English		Literacy in any language			
	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both
Northwest	39.7	23.2	31.7	79.4	60.2	70.1
Northeast	49.8	33.4	42.0	73.1	51.4	62.8
North-central	65.1	47.3	56.4	70.4	52.8	61.9
Southwest	75.5	62.6	69.1	83.7	72.1	77.9
Southeast	80.7	67.5	73.8	81.6	69.3	75.1
South-South	81.1	66.7	74.0	82.3	68.2	75.4
National	65.1	50.6	57.9	79.3	63.7	71.6

Source: National Literacy Survey, 2010

While most educated youths in the north are struggling to find work in the collapsing northern economy, the poor and uneducated roam the street in search of food. There is also a growing competition over blue-collar jobs in the informal sector. Traditionally, the uneducated and poor workers engaged in informal activities are beginning to be crowded out by unemployed graduates who are now engaging in lowly informal works such as tailoring, hawkers and load

carriers. In addition, the opulent behaviour of the northern elites amidst widespread poverty



One of the IDP camps in Maiduguri, Borno State

have heightened the social tensions between the poor and northern leaders thereby unleashing a growing problem of distrust, political and social


dissatisfaction across northern Nigerian cities. Thus, at the tip of the northern Nigerian society, high unemployment rate, declining social capital, rising poverty incidence, and rapid rural-urban migration were already unravelling the communal support mechanisms that exist in the region prior to the onslaught of Boko Haram insurgence.

Boko Haram initially emerged as a protest against these social anomalies and poor governance. The group's open criticism of northern leaders

first attracted sympathies from the uneducated poor and middle class who were aggrieved with the existing order, but its move to terrorism after the death of Mohammed Yusuf reduced their support base. Nonetheless, it is imperative to highlight how Boko Haram's violent tactics have exacerbated the problems, which they sought to remedy in their formation stage.

Undeniably, the Boko Haram insurgency has disrupted livelihood activities of millions of people in Borno, as well as Yobe, Adamawa and Gombe states. Trade and mobility, which are essential for making a living in the North, have become almost impossible in the affected states. Staples and other basic commodities have also become scarcer while prices have risen, preventing internally displaced persons from buying basic foodstuffs thus increasing the percentage of those who are food insecure. An inter-agency humanitarian needs assessment carried out in the north-east in mid-2014 found that it was common practice for households to ration food portions as a means of survival. IDPs are often

unable to exercise their basic rights to food and essential household items such as sleeping mats, mosquito nets, jerry cans, soap and cooking utensils. They usually lose access to their sources of revenue when they flee. The destruction of property, crops and stores of food at the time of displacement is a major driver of food insecurity among IDPs.



Scene of destructions and human sufferings arising from the Boko Haram Insurgency

During the early phases of displacement, state governments and aid agencies provide basic food items through SEMAs, but supplies are often quickly exhausted. State security measures aimed at dismantling the terrorists' supplies, trade and income have also stifled economic activities and made producing and accessing food more difficult for all those living in and close to Boko Haram-held areas. Additionally, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), an organisation which responds to

the world's worst humanitarian crises, reported that the insurgents have destroyed about 788 health facilities and killed more than 150 health workers. This means that the insurgency has also disrupted health services in the northeast. Prior to the crisis, a weak health system marked by inadequate health facilities and a dearth of skilled health workers were the

hallmarks of the health sector in northern Nigeria. To date, the crisis-hit northeast region has lost up to 40 percent of its health facilities and more than 35 percent of doctors have fled to other states. Indeed, most health

facilities in areas of the northeast affected by conflict were closed as of mid-2014 as a result of insecurity and the displacement of staff, while, as of March 2014, only 37 per cent of facilities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states were functional. These have several health consequences for the teeming population in the northeast, and in particular, those who are internally displaced by the insurgency. Overcrowding and poor hygiene have made the IDPs' camps potential spot for the

outbreak of diseases such as cholera, meningitis, etc. The United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported that between January – November 2014, there were 35,909 cases of cholera, resulting in about 2.1 percent fatality rate (i.e. about 753 deaths). Also, 29 cases of vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 were reported during the same period, with 72 percent of cases recorded in northeast states of Borno and Yobe.

In some communities, especially those without health programmes run by international NGOs, many IDPs have no access to healthcare while only a few IDPs have minimal access to health services. The primary obstacle in accessing health care for many IDPs is their lack of resources, including paying for transport to the nearest facilities, which can be some distance away. Although, some of the State Governments ordered hospitals to treat IDPs free of charge on receipt of a SEMA letter authorising their expenses, the inability of the state emergency agencies to reimburse hospitals, has led them to refuse to accept the

organisation's letters in lieu of payment. This has effectively priced IDPs out of medical treatment, given that they have to pay an initial registration fee of 500 Naira (\$1.80) plus their consultations and medication costs.

The insurgency has also led to a plunge in access to education, particularly girl-child in the northeast. The group's atrocious attacks on schools

were destroyed across the state. Attendance rates have also declined dramatically, as the fear of abduction has made parents wary of sending their children to school. With the abduction of Chibok girls and subsequent attacks on schools by the insurgents, attendance rates in both public and private schools fell drastically in the north-eastern states. Displaced children's access to education

varies from state to state. They are often refused attendance at host community schools that do not have the facilities or staff to take on more students. During the first half of 2014, admission was denied to many IDP children

because the school year had already started. In Gombe state, schools have reportedly been largely unaffected by the influxes of IDPs, but some displaced children were still refused admission.

The above analysis succinctly captures how the Boko Haram crisis has worsened the poverty level in the north. By dismantling livelihood opportunities, hindering commercial and agricultural activities and disrupting children's access to education



Nigerian soldiers parading captured tank

and communities since 2012 and state governments' closure of facilities in the worst affected areas, such as Borno state, have drastically decreased access. All schools in the towns of Baga, Bama, Jajeri, Umarari Garnam, Mai Malari, Mungono and Gamboru were forced to close between February 2012 and June 2013. Unidentified gunmen destroyed 14 schools in the Borno state capital of Maiduguri between January and April 2013, and at least 256


and health services, the insurgency is devastating the wider northern Nigerian economy and entrenching a vicious cycle of poverty and deprivation in the region.

What is the Social Security Net Available for the IDPs?

An assessment of Nigeria's development policies since independence hardly inspires confidence that an explicit pro-poor social program was ever initiated despite such objectives being reflected in various policy documents. A major hindrance to introducing one has been the lack of financial resources

and the necessary political will to implement a generalised social security system for the burgeoning population. Often, the pervasive self-employment and family-based enterprise systems have provided the needed safety nets for vulnerable households, thus absolving the government of any formal responsibility for the basic well-being of its members. Nevertheless, successive regimes have devised programs aimed at alleviating poverty as a by-product of rural development

and employment creation. These were, for instance, rural development programs such as – Operation Feed the Nation in 1979, establishment of Peoples' Bank, National Directorate of Employment, National Poverty Eradication Program, Youth Empowerment Scheme, Rural Infrastructures Development Scheme, and other similar programs. Despite these efforts,



Scene of destructions and human sufferings arising from the Boko Haram Insurgency

the level of poverty in the country remains high and even much worse in the northern regions. While there have been no evaluative studies to document the totality of impact of these programs on poverty alleviation, anecdotal evidence suggests that the lack of a sound monitoring system, inefficiency in resource use, mis-governance and political patronage have hampered its effectiveness in reducing poverty. The failure of these programs to tackle poverty and the increasing devastation of

the wider economy have helped entrench citizen's dissatisfaction and grievances against the Nigerian government. In the north, nearly all the interventions and measures envisaged to provide social safety nets have proved totally ineffective and weak. Millions of wandering Qur'anic education students popularly called "almajiri" are subjected to increasing deprivation and neglect, and in most cases, roam the street in search of food to eat. At the same time, membership of youth gangs has flourished, while many unemployed graduates have taken to menial jobs to survive.

This has unleashed significant resentment against northern elites thus providing a fertile ground for Boko Haram.

The national efforts to respond to displacement and mitigate its long-term effects on those internally displaced by the insurgency have been hampered by resource constraints and multiple security challenges. The country is facing an increasing violence involving farmers and pastoralist over grazing routes, a resurgent rebellion in the Niger-Delta area, separatist

agitation in the southeast, as well as severe budgetary and economic crisis. In addition, government attempts to initiate a credible response mechanism have lagged. The Presidential Initiative on North East (PINE) and the Victim Support Fund (VSF) are constrained by insufficient funds and the lack of clarity in the country's overall framework for humanitarian response.

often compete with each other for the limited funding available.

International humanitarian assistance, especially from implementation partners of the UN agencies, tends to be inadequate to address the myriad of challenges confronting the IDPs' camps. For example, only about 20 percent of the \$248 million dollars needed for emergency

military, who are currently overstretched, for protection, assessments of local security conditions and even humanitarian service delivery.

What Should Be Done

Given the complexities of the Boko Haram crises and the failure of the ongoing military operations to address the roots of the crisis in the northeast, the Nigerian government and development partners must evolve a longer-term humanitarian response to aid the return, resettlement or local integration of those displaced by the insurgency. To that purpose, the following policy interventions could aid the return and resettlement of the IDPs and help tackle the current humanitarian emergency.

Return and Resettlement Options

Return and resettlement of IDPs are a condition in which all individuals displaced from their homes during a conflict are assured the option for a voluntary, safe, and dignified return to their homes or resettlement into new homes and communities. Once they reach their destinations, returnees should have recourse for property restitution or compensation and should receive strong reintegration and rehabilitation support to build their livelihoods and contribute to long-term economic and political development. With proper support, displaced persons can serve as critical and essential human resources toward the rebuilding of the host communities. Return and



Scene of destructions and human sufferings arising from the Boko Haram Insurgency

Besides, government agencies, i.e. both national and state emergency management agencies have typically struggled to respond to large-scale humanitarian crises, and in many instances, their response tends to be fragmented, uncoordinated and inadequate. There is no law or policy framework setting out responsibilities in terms of IDPs' protection and assistance beyond the initial phase of displacement. In the absence of clear roles for the ministries, departments and agencies involved in any response, they

response was raised in 2016, while the World Food program (WFP) were only able to support about 50,000 IDPs as at May 2016 (ICRC, 2016). This falls short of the assistance required to tackle malnutrition in Maiduguri environs, which shelters about 1.5 million IDPs. Besides, it is extremely challenging for international agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations to navigate through the dreary northeast terrains, thus making it difficult to access remote areas of the crisis. In many cases, they rely on the Nigerian



A burnt home in Lake Chad area of
 Borno State

in the north, particularly in the northeast region, that is worst hit by the insurgency. The social action programs should focus on four major areas – primary and secondary education, basic healthcare, potable water supply and rural sanitation and population welfare. The provision of primary and secondary educational services is critical to the resettlement process. Children and young people who have been unable to access educational services are more likely to be enlisted into the terrorists' group, and

this could in turn fuel the insurgency or contribute to a greater use of child fighters by the insurgents. Thus, it is important to design a social action program that reflects the varied needs and skills of those more vulnerable to radicalisation. In addition to the four thematic areas outlined above, the government could as well launch public works programs and social welfare support programs for the uneducated poor and unemployed graduates, including technical training and agricultural development programs, to provide dignified livelihoods to those affected by the insurgency. To that purpose, the government and international partners, must work together to reorganize or rethink the various youth empowerment and employment schemes that channel unemployed graduates

resettlement can represent a visible end to violent conflict; legitimize the new political order and restore normal life for the conflict-affected population. Moreover, support for programs to compensate and resettle those displaced by Boko Haram and military violence would help to rebuild confidence in the state and nip resentment and desperation while avoiding the perverse incentives of targeting assistance on perpetrators rather than victims of violence. The return and resettlement processes should also focus on providing safe passage for displaced populations as they return to their homes or community of origin. Upon return or relocation, displaced persons should still receive protection from continued threats of violence, harassment, intimidation, or persecution. While it is the responsibility of the host government to provide this protection, international

actors may have to help maximize equal access for returnees to security, health, and other public services, along with providing judicial or legal recourse when needed. In addition, the Nigerian government and international partners should work together to increase their humanitarian response, including mobilising international support aimed to bring assistance closer to the IDPs. A high-powered forum, comprising of the UN and partnering agencies, NGOs, as well as security agencies should be formed to provide a platform for all to actors to share knowledge and improve working relations.

Social Action Programs

There is an urgent need for the Nigerian government, in collaboration with international donors to initiate new social action programs to improve human development indicators

into an already saturated informal economy, crowding out uneducated and less-resourced informal actors.

Equally, the government needs to be more proactive in its handling of the humanitarian crisis. There is need for a clear framework on government's medium to long-term development strategy in the northeast, and public officials need to declare the unfolding humanitarian crisis as a first-order priority. This is necessary to facilitate resource mobilization as well as provide emergency relief to rebuild the region. As an immediate measure, the Federal

Government should institute periodic visits by senior officials to the major communities hosting IDPs to assure victims of the insurgency of government commitments to help re-build the communities and improve the well-being of citizens. It is also essential for the government to facilitate the collection of robust data and demographic information that will aid independent local and

international reporting and assessment of the humanitarian crisis, as this will also help mobilise international support.

Concluding Remarks

An inordinately high level of poverty, inexorable security challenges accompanied by a reeling humanitarian crisis and non-existent social safety nets are the inter-related major distinguishing features



Scene of destructions and human sufferings arising from the Boko Haram Insurgency

plaguing northern Nigeria. Worse still, there seems to be limited policy options for the region's leaders to address these issues due mainly to the ravaging Boko Haram insurgency. The insurgency has not only disrupted livelihood activities and health services, but also led to a plunge in access to education, particularly girl-child in northeast states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and

Gombe. To prevent the current humanitarian crisis from worsening and thus, prolonging the conflict in the region, policy-makers must act decisively in addressing the immediate needs of the internally displaced persons and mobilising international support to rebuild the region. While it is premature to speculate about the impact of recent efforts such as the

establishment of the Victims Support Fund and the Presidential Initiative on North East, to improve government response to the humanitarian emergency, it is important to stress that a clean departure from the past,

where political patronage is the main determinant of “who gets what, when and how,” must be embraced by politicians and public officials. This would certainly necessitate that agents of change will have to become also the subject of change!

LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1947-2018

By
Alkasum Abba
History Department, ABU, Zaria

When we look at Nigeria today we find out that the Northern States are at the bottom of almost every statistics of human development index. From nutrition to education, health to housing the North is far behind the rest of the county, in spite of the vast agricultural, mineral and other valuable resources found in the North. This is quite worrisome. But perhaps what is even more worrisome is increasing inability to resolve internal conflicts, peacefully. The big question is what is responsible for all these problems?

Indeed, many attribute these shortcomings to the increasing decline of political and inspirational leadership, such as exhibited by Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Joseph Tarka, Ibrahim Imam, Mallam Aminu Kano and many others, who were essentially committed to improving the living conditions of their people, both at the National and Local levels. The question is; what is responsible for the current serious shortcomings?

As a History teacher, I think it may be a good idea to take us back to the time when

representative government was introduced in Northern Nigeria by the British colonial government in 1947 in order to see how political recruitment started and the impact of that process on the quality of leadership and governance. Since the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates by the British

colonial government on 1st January 1914 to create Nigeria, Northern Nigeria did not participate at the Lagos based Legislative Council of Nigeria, which was created by the Clifford Constitution of 1922 beyond its senior colonial officials attending as Official Members. This Council was made up of 46 members with 27 as officials, 15 nominated unofficial members and 4 elected from Lagos and Calabar. All the 4 elected and 15



Prof. Alkasum Abba
delivering his keynote address

nominated members were selected from the elite of the Southern Protectorate of Nigeria and also among the European trading community in Lagos. The elite of Northern Nigeria were left out until the introduction of the Richards' Constitution in 1946, which created a Central Legislature in Lagos and Regional Legislatures in Kaduna, Enugu and Ibadan. The provision of the election of 4 members for the elite of Lagos and Calabar

in 1922 facilitated the establishment, in Lagos of political parties, namely the Nigerian National Democratic Party, NNDP, in 1923, the Nigerian Youth Movement, NYM, in 1938 and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons, NCNC, in 1944. These parties became actively involved in political activities, mobilization and elections, in Lagos since 1923. Calabar was given one out of the four seats but it elected its representative based on individual merit rather than on the platform of political parties.

Members of the first legislature in Northern Nigeria were selected by Government and endorsed by the Native Authorities. They were all staff of the Native Authorities, NA. This was largely because when the British came they established Government based on the Emirate system, which they found, modified and called the Native Authority. Given that a limited number of western education schools were established and that all their products became staff of the NA, the NA system became the focal point of selecting, screening and training of future political leaders for Northern Nigeria. Since the elite were very few, the British administrative officers knew each and every one of them; their strengths and weaknesses.

It was through this system leaders like Sir Ahmadu Bello,

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Sir Kashim Ibrahim, Mahmud Ribadu and others were nominated, selected, processed and incorporated into politics, irrespective of their social origin. However, they had behind them vast administrative experience in the NA either as district heads, headmasters or as senior personnel in the Native Administrative system. Thus although they did not possess University degrees, the British had made sure that many of them had acquired some form of training in the UK University system where they obtained Diploma in one field or the other. However, the NA system was, in fact, the basic training ground for them. While Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Sir Kashim Ibrahim and Mahmud Ribadu were nominated in 1947, the Sardauna came into the Legislature in December 1948 after the death of Waziri Abbas, one of the two representatives of the Sokoto NA. In fact Sardauna's nominations was reinforced by the intervention of the Chief Commissioner for Northern Nigeria, Sir Eric Thompstone.

It is important to note that this crop of Northern Political leaders were produced through a systematic recruitment and training political culture. But what is even more important is the quality of the products as the First generation politicians of Northern Nigeria, whether in Government or Opposition

were quite successful as political leaders not only because of what they have achieved but perhaps more importantly the legacy they left behind of selflessness; that is public service without stealing public money. This became well known and appreciated not in their life-time but after their death, when it was realized that they left nothing for their families, in spite of the big offices they held for more than 10 years. One of the important reasons why they were selfless had to do not just with the code of conduct which impelled them to be transparent but that they themselves, believed in it, accepted it and operated within it. It is also important to acknowledge that the culture and norms of our society of those days abhorred public officers living above their incomes; the Government queries them, their colleagues ridicule them and wider society frowned at them.

I want to cite just one example of the experience of a young middle level senior civil servant, an Assistant District Officer at Kano in 1959. He is Alhaji Yahaya Kwande. In his autobiography, *The Making of a Northern Nigerian*, he related how a gift of a brand new car from Sarkin Kano Muhammadu Sanusi put him in great difficulties. This gift came about as a result of the breakdown of his car and its obstruction of the emir, right inside the Palace when he went

to attend Council meeting. This is how he related the story:

With the end of the Council meeting, I set out to wipe memory of the whole ugly incident from my mind. But I was not allowed to even begin. Less than one hour after I got back to my office from the palace, the Kano UTC Branch Manager, Alhaji Haliru Kafur, sent for me to come and take delivery of a brand-new Opel Kapitán, which he said was a gift from the Emir. That got me dumb-founded. Car gift, from a traditional Head to a civil servant? Immediately the terms “corruption” and “receiving of gratification” jumped to my mind – I knew how grievously any civil servant who was guilty of it was punished. So I declined to accept the gift, but my friends told me I could not do that. My refusal of the gift, they said, would be considered as an affront and a mark of disloyalty not only to the person of the Emir but to the very throne of Kano itself. I thought about it, and then remembered “tukuichi”... However, the kind of “tukuichi”- giving that we have been mandated

to practice was not purely the traditional type where you gave only a token present in return. Our senior officers had directed us to give the full money equivalent of any gift. An Opel Kapitán cost about £1,250 at that time and, even if in the last five years I had been saving without feeding, I would still not have been able to save that kind of money. In summary, I did not have the tukuichi to give Alhaji Haliru Kafur for the Emir's gift – and rejecting the gift and resting my mind was out of the question.

My dilemma was a big one. After racking my brains almost to the point of losing my mind, I came up with the idea of Government car loan as the only way out of my double jeopardy. I applied for it immediately to the Premier's Office in Kaduna giving chassis and engine number of the car. The loan entitlement for civil servants of my Grade Level then was £950. Mercifully, I got approval for the loan- which was remitted by my office straight to the motor company; but then I still needed to work out a means of

being able to explain away how I had come by the rest of the total sum that would make up the price of an Opel Kapitán, in order not to fall foul of the offence of living above one's income; so I sold my old Vauxhall Cresta to Clement Dechi, a Football Club Coach at £300.

Finally, with great relief, I was able to send to the Kano UTC Branch Manager the balance of the price of the car. But almost immediately, the man sent the whole sum of £1,250 back to me with a message that he did not have the Emir's instruction to sell the car but to give it to me.

I did not dare to start using the car until after all that [has been resolved]. But still because of the stringent discipline in the Civil Service those days, I felt very uncomfortable with that car for a very long time to come, what with all the remarks from my colleagues- some in jest and others in spiteful earnestness- about “The junior admin officer with the big car”. (pp.160-163)

All this high level discipline of the civil servants was possible only because the political

leaders of the North were themselves disciplined and had lived above board. This is what is lacking today. What is common is that some public officers openly solicit for such gifts and misuse their powers when denied.

The process of training political leadership continued with subsequent elections. By 1951 when the first Regional election was conducted the representatives of the NA system who had been serving as legislators since 1947 created their political party, called the Northern People's Congress, NPC. This party continued to draw its membership and leadership from the Native Authorities but soon they started facing challenges from the other political parties, namely the Northern Elements Progressive Union, NEPU and the United Middle Belt Congress, UMBC. The NEPU represented the *talakawa* from Emirates while UMBC represented the Northern minorities whose interests were not represented by the NPC. These two parties started to bring into the political fold non-emirate elite into the political system, made up of missionary educated elite from the minority areas. The *talakawa* from the emirate, like tailors, cobblers, carpenters, traders not only as party leaders but also as candidates for election into the Northern Region House of Assembly. Elections and participation in governance

either as the ruling party or the opposition became important channels of political training. In addition, the incursion of the Southern Nigeria based political parties like the NCNC and the Action Group, AG, which aligned with the opposition parties of the Northern Region created a vibrant political environment for leadership training.

The opposition parties started to become active political players soon after the 1951 Regional elections and the subsequent ones of 1956, 1961 and 1965. Elections and governance were important means of leadership training, public mobilization and enlightenment. This was not quite difficult in the First Republic because politics was not as rigid and stringent as it is today. For example no restriction was placed on the formation of political parties and that no registration was required for them to participate in elections and other political activities. So, the political space was wide open for everyone. However, all that political parties were required to do to contest elections was to register their logo with the election body so that they could be on the ballot box.

The coup of 15th January 1966 changed everything from a political point of view. Apart from undermining the right of the people to elect their leaders from time to time it has also

discontinued the process of political training through elections and participation in governance through democratic means. Although the General Gowon Regime of 1966-1975 re-mobilized politicians at the Federal and State Government levels to participate in the governance process, this was not a product of popular elections. The political lacuna of the period 1966-1979, disrupted the process of political training. For the first time, since 1954 Ministers were not accountable either to a political party, an electorate or the Parliament because politicians held high office at the mercy of military officers. Thus Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the banned Action Group was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council, Chief Joseph Tarka, the leader of the banned UMBC, Mallam Aminu Kano, the leader of the banned NEPU and Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the banned NPC were all appointed Federal Ministers by the General Gowon led Military Government. When 12 States were created by General Gowon in 1967, all the Executive Councils of the six States in the North were filled with politicians representing the banned political parties.

Although, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, 1975-1979, handed over political power to civilians in 1979, the 13 years of military

dislocation of political party activities created a gap in the process of political training. It is therefore, not surprising that the political leaders of the Second Republic both at Government and party levels were, basically the same politicians of the colonial era and the First Republic. The collapse of the Second Republic in December 1983 and the subsequent prolonged military rule covering the period 1984-1999 marked the final demise of the old politicians. Unfortunately no new politicians were trained to replace them in the political culture and traditions of colonial, First and Second Republics.

We have therefore, ended up with the “New Breed” who lacked the experience, patience, tolerance, modesty, vision, commitment and decorum of the old politicians. Unfortunately, the civil service, which used to be the pillar of good governance, supporting and controlling the politicians suffered from discontinuation and the training of the new by the old as a result of the break-up of the civil service of Northern Nigeria. The creation of States, therefore catapulted many small officers into big officers at the State level and the culture of obeying military Governors without recourse to rules and regulations made the situation complicated.

This is the situation we have

found ourselves in since 1999. The problem is however complicated by the fact that we have been enjoying civilian rule without democracy. This is because throughout the duration of the PDP rule, parties were not democratic and elections were more often rigged than won. This lack of democracy at party levels and free and fair elections made political leaders arrogant and disdainful of the electorate. Hence the saying, since I can get “elected” without your votes, why should I be accountable to you?

Is the situation hopeless? No it is not. Relatively, the conduct of fairly acceptable by INEC in 2015 can be built to re-invent ideological politics in Nigeria, where the North had comparatively been competitive. With free and fair elections, all that we need to do is to develop a salable, detailed economic programme to move the region and Nigeria forward and ensure the election of candidates who believe in them at various levels of government. It had been attempted by the People's Redemption Party, PRP, in the Second Republic. We can now move beyond that. Alternatively, political parties need to be rejuvenated to become more ideological, at least to embrace social democracy, with clear goals and objectives. This will help us to re-start the process of leadership training through,

democratic practical experience.

I believe the discursion panels and other participants will take up all issues and challenges of leadership facing politics in the Northern States in particular and Nigeria in general. I also believe that the organizers will continue with the debate about the paucity of quality leadership in the North beyond this conference.

Thank you very much for listening. May Almighty give us the wisdom and strength to navigate and follow through the right way forward..

(Been a key note address delivered at the Conference on the North and the Challenge of Leadership Organized by Sir Ahmadu Bello Memorial Foundation and Arewa Initiative for Good Governance. Monday 15th January 2018 at Sir Ahmadu Bello Memorial Foundation 21 Race Course Road, Kaduna)

REPORT OF THE ONE-DAY CONFERENCE ON “THE NORTH AND THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP”

Opening Session

The conference started at about 10:25 am with an opening prayers by Mr. Anthony Sani (ACF Secretary General). The Session was chaired by former Inspector General of



The late Alh. Ibrahim Coomassie, the Chairman of the Opening Session giving his address. On his right is Malam Ibrahim Shekarau and Justice Mamman Nasir on his left.

Police, Alhaji Ibrahim Coomassie (Sardaunan Katsina and Chairman, ACF). On the high table are personalities such as; Mallam Ibrahim Shakarau (Sardaunan Kano), Professor Ango Abdullahi, (Representative of Northern Elders Forum), Justice Mamman Nasir, and Dr. Usman Bugaje (Convener, ARDP). Others include Dr Shetima A. Ali (MD. SABMF), Prof. Alkasum Abba and Dr Yima Sen.

Welcome Address

The Secretary of the SABMF BoT, H.E. Ibrahim Shekarau gave the welcome address on behalf of the SABMF BoT Chairman, H.E. Dr. Muazu Babangida Aliyu. In his address, he welcomed participants to the conference

and conveyed the apologies of the BoT chairman, Dr. Babangida Mu'azu Aliyu for his unavoidable absence. While expressing the best wishes of the Board and Advisory Council of the SABMF, he commended the organizers for the choice of the conference topic, “the North and the Challenges of Leadership”, which he described as very auspicious. He further commended the SABMF and ARDP for their contributions towards the development of the north in particular and Nigeria in general. He emphasized the need for the north to retrace its steps towards a purposeful leadership. He expressed optimism that the conference will be another stepping stone in the quest to move the north

towards positive leadership. He argued that except the north get together and rediscover itself, it will remain where it is. He however expressed optimism that contributions and discussions

from the conference will help come up with decisions that would move the north forward. While wishing the conference a qualitative and constructive deliberations, he declared the conference open.

Chairman's Opening Remarks

The chairman of the occasion Alh. Ibrahim Coomasie (Sardaunan Katsina), noted that the conference is holding on the anniversary of the day that the most revered political leaders of northern Nigeria were massacred, 52 years ago, in an ethnically motivated military coup d'état that truncated Nigeria's first democratic experience. He eulogized their virtues in building a united northern Nigeria and regretted the inability of their successors

to build on what they left behind. Northern progress and unity, the Sarduanan Katsina contended, were uppermost in the thoughts of Sir. Ahmadu Bello, Sir. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and all the other northern notable first republic politicians and civil servants. They ensured even development, justice and fair play for all citizens of the region, irrespective of ethnic and religious differences. He described their time as a period devoid of religious or ethnic bigotry; where people from the diverse ethnic nationalities and creeds held each other with mutual trust and respect. The former Inspector General of

police observes that in the first republic, corrupt practices by both politicians and civil servants in the north were very minimal - inflation of contracts, nepotism and favoritism in the award of contracts were virtually non-existence. Furthermore, he pointed out that bogus or white elephant projects, with no economic or social or any developmental benefit to the people were avoided. This, he posited, is contrary to the recent practices by northern states where contracts worth billions of naira for airports and houses; while their people live in wanton poverty and squalor. Careful and serious planning, he

intended in creating federal resourceful units out of the old northern region. He attributed the low or lack of progress in the region to corrupt practices such as contract inflation, nepotism as endemic in the land. He further attributed the recurrent farmers/herders crisis in parts of the north to the activities of land grabbers in conjunction with states and Local Government actors who have acquired cattle grazing routes as farm lands and consequently deprived a portion of the Nigerian citizens their economic activities, which he said contributed in fanning the ember of hatred between farmers and herders.

Key Note Address by Prof. Alkasum Abba

argued, was the central feature of the northern administration. The Chairman then queried the inability of the 19 northern states to bring good governance to the grassroots, which he said could not achieve the purpose

The keynote address was delivered by Professor Alkasum Abba of the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. In his keynote address, Prof Alkasum noted that the struggle for independence was not a political party affairs alone. The whole gamut of Nigerian elites, civil servants, professionals, academics/teachers and market women, etc, were involved. He explained that Sir. Ahmadu Bello was a man of an independent opinion on many issue that affects his people and was not ready to submit himself to British colonial masters. He further explains that contrary to the general feeling, the British never liked Sir Ahmadu Bello because he was one man who stood against their opinions



Hon. Hajiya Saudatu Sani making her contributions

most often. This, Prof Alkasum argued, always set him against the colonial government. The Sardauna, Prof Alkasum observed, believed in given the young people opportunity to become what they wanted to be in life. During the first republic, he further observed, leadership recruitment was bottom-top and is based on merit. The political parties often throw up their best for any position. As such even the colonial masters nominate or select appointees based on merit. Therefore, he contended that the leadership selection process that brought up the first republic political leadership was substantially based on merit and productivity as such, corruption was seriously curtailed. Furthermore, he observed that the 2nd Republic political leadership were the same people that dominated the 1st republic due largely to the inability of the military junta to maintain the leadership recruitment process. With the collapse of the 2nd republic and the returned to military rule, the system of leadership recruitment as seen in the first republic continued to be hampered. What happened, he pointed out, was that the old politicians had to give way either by death or by shear old age. This, he asserted, created leadership vacuum which was eventually filled by what the military tagged “new breed” politicians. He therefore posited that the present North is far behind in all social ramifications, especially, the inability of the present political

leadership to manage the challenges of diversity in the region. Political leaders of the past, he argued, left behind selfless legacies worthy of emulation. He remembered with nostalgia those days when loans collected were used solely for the purpose it was given. The selfless service of our past leaders, he pointed out, can be seen from how, in spite the big offices they occupied, they left nothing, materially and financially, for their families. This, he said is a complete departure from the norms and values that characterized the public service of the present time. Concluding his address, he called on the northern leaders to embrace the ideals of political ideology of service to humanity and disciplined civil service orientation.

GOODWILL MESSAGES

Mr. Anthony Sani, Secretary ACF

Presenting a goodwill message,



Prof. Jibrin Ibrahim making his contributions

Mr. Anthony Sani, Secretary, Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) described the event as timely and congratulated the organizers for the choice of topic. He said the late Premier never envisaged a north without challenges but was ready to accommodate all sheds of opinions. He called for dialogue and compromise. According to him only with dialogue and compromise will peace reign in the region. With hard work, the north can be strong again. He called on the youth to rise up to the challenge and hold leaders accountable. He revealed the on-going efforts by the ACF to harmonize all the various northern positions on various

Saudatu Sani informed the gathering that the JMA was established on 17th May, 1963 and supported by the Premier until his death. She deplored the current attitude of neglecting the women in all issues of development in the North. She argued that one of the reasons the North is behind other regions, in terms of education and economic prosperity, is largely due to the inadequate investment on women education. She equated the neglect of the girl-child education as a crime against humanity. She therefore advocated for deliberate efforts towards increasing and improving access and quality of education to the girl child as well as widen the window of women participation, empowerment and inclusion in developmental activities of the region.

**Panel Discussion One:
 Consequences of Poor
 Leadership Chaired By Prof.
 Ango Abdullahi**

**Prof. Jibrin Ibrahim, Senior
 Fellow at Center for
 Democracy and
 Development.**

In his presentation, Prof Jibrin Ibrahim made the following submissions:

- To understand the challenges of leadership in northern Nigeria there is the need to first understand the type of system that produced these challenges.
- Political

systems develop leaders that conform to its democratic values. When citizens become passive and unconcern about the system, it creates huge challenge.


- The nature of our politics is transactional. This means there is excessive monetization of the political system. Is such transactional relationship, where money is used to buy votes, politicians are only concern about making more money through public office.

- There is no any

integrity coefficient to attain power. Most of those who got to power today, lack the integrity of the presidential candidate they rode on his back to various elective offices.

- In future elections, people should pay more attention on the integrity and antecedents of candidates they elect into positions of authority.

Hajiya Hanwa Atanwa, El-Yakub Representative of Hajiya Aisha Dan Kani



Hajiya Binta El-Yakub making her contributions



A participant making contributions

- The current political leadership in the north is responsible for most of the challenges we found ourselves confronting.
- There is poor leadership and poor leadership breeds social problems.
- Poor leadership is directly responsible for the insurgency that have dislocated every economic activities in northern Nigeria toady.
- Apart from insurgency, the number of youths turning to drugs is becoming alarming. The most frightening aspect is the number of women drug addicts – this include married and unmarried women.
- Gender inequity

is also a big challenge which need to be address squarely. Women in northern Nigeria are solely dependent and lack any meaningful self-economic support.

- Rape is now in the increase in northern Nigeria and has become a major challenge.
- The system of Almajiri educational system has largely compounded the educational and social structure of the northern society. Apart from engaging in street begging they now take part in several vices in their environment for survival.
- What should we do? Do we allow

incompetent leaders to continue because they are from the North?

- The answer is definitely no. We must hold elected leaders accountable and we must insist on good governance.

- Once our leaders fail to perform, we should not hesitate to initiate a recall or during next elections vote them out of power.

**Dr. Shettima A. Ali.,
 Managing Director SABMF**

In his submission, Dr. Shettima Ali made the following observations:

- One of the legacies of Sir. Ahmadu Bello, which is the unity of the north, is now a thing of the past.
- Since the death of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the leadership recruitment and training process in the north has been truncated and this have resulted in the north earning the reputation of being the least develop. We have

collapse infrastructure.

- What today manifest in terms of poor leadership is invariably, the product of the faulty recruitment process.
- The political engineering of the IBB's days makes genuine political elites lose interest in the political system. Today, political demi gods have taken over political leadership with lies, deceit and nothing to show for it.

Mr. Tom Mataimaki Maiyashi

In his presentation, Mr Tom Maiyashi argued that the consequences of poor leadership can easily be seen on the quality of education in the region. He posited that it has been acknowledged that of all services to human kind, education is the most important. He said it is easy to access the quality of education, which include access, governance, funding, quality and accountability. Today, he argued, education is no longer accessible, gender parity is very high, teachers teaches without curriculum and teaching plan. Quality is at the root of good education, today, majority of people do not take their wards to public schools because of the quality of personnel and infrastructure. Accountability, he said, has suffered the most in our educational structure. There is therefore the need to

develop strong accountability mechanism to check leaders if they must deliver quality governance. Therefore, the quality of our education, he contended, is directly proportional to the quality of leadership we get. We therefore, must look at the problems of education.

**H.E. Ibrahim Shakarau
 Former Governor of Kano State**

Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau sought permission to comment on the issues at stake. In his comments, he observed that falling into a ditch only require a jump but pulling out of the ditch, will require several jumps. He therefore advised against lamentations as it cannot bring us out of our predicaments. Instead, he said we must think positively and stop the lamentation. He said people often complain that conferences decisions are mostly not implemented but the



Prof. Iyorwuese Hagher making his contributions

question to ask ourselves is, at individual level, what have we done, personally, to implement outcome of conferences we participate in? He argued that it is time to begin to look inward and access our contributions towards changing our situation. He further argued that out of the about 180 million people in Nigeria only about 11,000 are elected officers. Majority of these elected officers come from the legislature. It is therefore, high time we begin to pay more attention to our elected representatives. The problem we have is that we don't pay attention to our legislators or we don't really care who get to represent us. Perhaps we can star from there.

We must ensure that in our communities we join party politics and engage the system. To show how possible it is to achieve in politics, he said between the day he register with a political party and sworn in as governor took only 8 months. At that time he further said, he was so poor that he could not tour the 44 LGA. The issue of 'SAK', Shakarau argued, brought about the problem of leadership today. Therefore, he admonished that the process of selecting leaders should be taken more seriously other than wait after the damage, to start thinking about change. Finally, he said let us change the situation by being politically viable in our society.

Chairman of Panel, Prof. Ango Abdullahi

Closing the panel discussion, the chair of the panel observed that there is need for system and content change in our politics. He advised Nigerians to often ask questions and not be treated like slaves. Changing the system, he said, means contributing to the leadership recruitment system.

To achieve that he said we must take seriously our educational structures.

Panel Discussion Two: The Way Forward Chaired by Hajiya Saudatu Sani Dr. Lydia Umar



Mr. Mataimaki Tom Maiyashi making his contributions

Women are generally recognized internationally as hardworking and intelligent, why is it that in Nigeria, especially in the north, the woman is not recognize. Women needs to be given their due position – negative

perceptions about the woman must change. What is evident in northern Nigeria, Lydia noted, is the exclusion of women in both theory and practice in economic activities. She recommended that people in leadership position should begin to harness the vast pool of quality and credible women into leadership position. She advocated massive women empowerment through entrepreneurial support and mentorship. Women she said need psychological empowerment to improve their self-esteem. To fully support women empowerment, she concluded, there is the need for affirmative action and promotion of gender equity.

Dr. Yima Sen, Department of Political Science, University of

Abuja.

Dr. Yima Sen approached the leadership question from the position of political leadership. In comparative terms, he argued, the political leaders that pull Africa out of colonialism,

through independence, made better leaders than we currently have today. The leaders of the past, he observed, were groomed, had clear vision and mission of where they want Africa to be and had the inherent commitment that is orientated towards positive leadership. He submitted that to progress we must have a kind of education that has organic link with our society. As such, he said we must now begin to educate followers on their responsibilities to reject leaders who do not deliver good leadership. Our leaders, he continued, must give us certain basic necessary infrastructure – roads, hospital, education, etc. It is in history that the north has been at the forefront of providing political leadership in Nigeria. Therefore, if leadership have failed, it is the north that have failed.

Ambassador Abdullahi Omaki

Amb. Omaki reiterated the importance of transparency if we want to overcome our leadership challenges. Secondly, he contended that good leadership must be anchored on sound education. He further called for political reform to sanitize the political recruitment system. According to Omaki, we need all the groups in the north to come together and synergize on all issues relating to good governance. The youth, he said, also need to reassess their role and position and assert their influence towards positive

growth and development. Harnessing the potentials of the north can be the first step towards positive leadership. Above all politicians must recognize the fact that not all those who publicly supported them into power necessarily possessed the capacity to deliver services. He insist we must begin to differentiate between government and private institution. Therefore, professionals can be leveraged by governments across the levels to move the society forward. Northern groups must present position papers to rejig government in the north. Youths must demand for accountability. Sardauna met only 2 secondary school Katsina College and Keffi. But left 36 in seven years and climaxed it with ABU Zaria

**D r .
 Mohamm e d
 Abubakar
 Siddique,
 Departme n t o f
 Political
 Science,
 A B U ,
 Zaria**
 For any society to m a k e

progress, Dr Abubakar Siddique contends, leaders must always examine where they are coming from, where they are presently and where they are heading to. We therefore must have a vision of where we want to be in the nearest future. What this means is that leaders must always be above the people they lead. This is because the responsibility of thinking and shaping a direction for the people cannot be left to irresponsible people. We need to look at how leaders are selected. He cited Mahmud Tukur in one of his books where he said we cannot leave the political spheres to the charlatans, we must get



Prof. Abubakar S. Mohammed making his contributions

involved. The problem with Nigeria he argued, is fundamental: even the legal system as presently constituted is a hindrance to peace and development and must be changed.


According to him, we must begin mass mobilization towards a new political orientation; we have to change our education and emphasize civic

education and accountability and; we need to take a hard look at the society.

Prof. Hagher Iyorwuese, President, African Leadership Institution

He started by saying he is proud of northern Nigeria. He then observed that the northern region is the largest (in terms of population and geographical size) part of Nigeria and yet the most marginalized. In our politics, he advised citizens to be more concerned with character and integrity and avoid people of questionable character assuming political responsibilities. He emphasized that the character

he meant is such that only people of integrity are allowed to govern while the greedy are mobilized into businesses. According to him their greediness will guide and



Prof. Ango Abdullahi making his contributions

propel them towards building virile businesses. He also emphasized political education as very essential for attaining peace and progress. To be a good leader, he asserted, one must necessarily be a good follower. Today, he observed, the followership is more powerful than the leadership. What is happening is that people occupy political offices without knowing the responsibilities of the office. He therefore advised the youth to mobilize the masses not to vote for people without vision and plan for the future. The north, he said, can continue to produce the country's leadership as long as it wants but we should focus

more on providing quality education to our people. There will be no vision for Nigeria's future, without a framing the youths into the broad spectrum of events. The north does not

need to beg, it has the number to make all the required changes.

Vote of thanks was delivered by Dr. Shettima A. Ali, M.D. SABMF. A draft communiqué was read by

Dr. Tom Mataimaki Maiyashi, Garkuwan Kajuru.

Special prayers by Mr. Isaiah Benjamin (Christian) and Alh. Imrana Garba Nas (Muslim).were offered for the repose of past northern leaders. The Conference close at 4:00pm.

(A Conference jointly organized by Sir Ahmadu Bello Memorial Foundation (SABMF) and Arewa Research and Development Project (ARDP) on 15th January, 2018 at the SABMF Conference Hall, Kaduna.)

CONFERENCE ON “THE NORTH AND THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP” IN PIX



CONFERENCE ON “THE NORTH AND THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP” IN PIX



NIGERIAN POLITICS AND THE CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP

By Usman Bugaje



Dr. Usman Bugaje
 Convener, ARDP

In the last two decades or so, we have seen a lot but apparently learnt very little. Admittedly, the euphoria of return to a democracy after 16 years of military rule, did not allowed for a more reflective and thorough choice of leaders. Indeed the tantalizing nature of the transition, thanks to the military, meant that only those with no stable and promising jobs became largely available for politics. Worse still, the lackeys of the military, who prostituted all over the place, soon their way back into new parties. Before we knew it these pedestrian ‘democracy’ have hijacked our politics and went ahead to create a political

culture that was inimical to development of viable polity. Since then every four-year circle of tenure has left us worse than we were before. Even when we made unprecedented revenue from oil, it did not translate to social development; as poverty only doubled during the same period. The violence associated with our elections has been on the increase. Political parties have lost their character and their conscience are not distinguishable from one another, while politics itself has become mercantile that only those who have access to huge fortunes from public stolen funds dare participate.

Already we are going through one of the worst insurgencies in our history, causing tens of thousands of death and displacing millions of families. Kidnapping, cattle rustling, rural banditry, ethnic religious clashes, drug epidemic, mention it, have all reached frightening proportions. In the face all these, all the three tiers

of government are looking increasingly impotent, helpless, and even clueless. If we extrapolate this trajectory for the next decade, when the over 12 million, out-of-school children would have become fully grown adults, our population will be approaching 300 million while our debt profile would have doubled and we would need more than half our budget to service debts. I am not sure of what will be left of the country called Nigeria.

Meanwhile our peers have been making progress even if they often stumble and rise again. Brazil for example is today producing over 120,000 megawatts of electricity while we are still struggling with 4,000. In the seventies we established defense industry corporations, today our co-pairs such as Brazil produces fighter jets and nuclear submarines while we are producing furniture. Nearer home, Ghana, next door, commands better democratic credentials and enjoys better international recognition and investors' confidence than us. Rwanda, which went through the worst genocide in Africa, is able to recover in just two decades and today has one of the fastest growing economy in Africa. [Kigali is easily the cleanest and safest city in Africa] Morocco has made astonishing strides in solar energy and fertilizer production and through curriculum reform

has pre-empted violent religious extremism, even as it remains a monarchy. One could go on, but the point has been made that something is clearly wrong with our political institutions and processes.

During the last two decades our country has continued to be defined by weak and failing institutions, pervasive and abject poverty, stinking corruption, deplorable social services, ever deepening and widening social conflicts, erosion of social and moral values, stagnating economy and absence of jobs, poor appreciation of the future, lack of the prioritization of knowledge and the consequent pursuit of parochial and ethnic agendas, and all fueled by a mercantile (cash and carry) politics. Citizen's lack of trust in some of the most critical institutions like the police, the judiciary and the National Assembly, summarizes the state of our nation. Recent reports have consistently perceived some of these institutions to be overwhelmingly corrupt and fail to deliver on the expectations of citizens. The word Nigeria is becoming synonymous with corruption and it is not too far off the mark when one recalls the fact that within 8 years (1999-2007) the nation spent over \$16B on the power sector without a single increase in any megawatt of electricity and no one has gone to jail. Also within the same period and in spite of unprecedented revenue from oil

poverty doubled from 35% to 70%, says so much about the etiology of our poverty and fiasco that has come to be our mode of governance. That we are still dependent on, and obsessed with, oil shows our poor appreciation of the future. That our religiosity has not helped us much during this period, it only exposes our collective hypocrisy and the level of the decomposition of our society. That our political leadership doesn't find anything wrong with all these, much less make any visible efforts to change, speaks volumes about the quality or lack of it as it were.

It is absolutely crucial to ask the questions, how do we survive and thrive in the 21st century? Where do we want to be in the next 25 or 50 year? For as the old line goes, "no winds are favorable until one knows to which port one is sailing." At our current rate of population growth of over 3% per annum we are expected to be well over 250million by 2030, just a dozen years away. The children out of school may come to about 20 million, jobless graduates may come to about 25 million etc. So how do we find schools for this teeming population? How do we create jobs for the youth bulge? How do we feed this growing population when we are still importing food. Where do we find the resources to do all this? How do we encourage and promote a post oil economy? What kind of institutions do we need to ensure our

competitiveness? How do we plan for this future in a century where knowledge is the greatest capital? Where do we find the leadership to conceive all these and drive the implementation of the plan, when the minimum qualification for the highest office in the land has remained a secondary school certificate or equivalent?

The issues?

In these depressing, some would say frightening realities, we are compelled to carry out a proper diagnosis, beyond the symptoms that meet the eye which have been the subject of our daily lamentations. Indeed we need concrete diagnosis, so that we do not confuse one disease with another. But the scope and space for this article will not allow us an extensive discourse. We may therefore look around Africa and elsewhere for countries that rose from the ashes and held their steam surviving and thriving. We easily recall how Ghana rose under Rawlings from its abyss and have since continued to grow and make progress. We look at how Rwanda under Kagame rose from the ruins of a genocide and rose to become a flourishing society, where you can no longer tell who is Hutu and who is Tutsi, with a booming economy, at the cutting edge of technology. We recall the recent changes in Ethiopia, where the new Prime Minister Abey Ahmed has restored hope, freed opposition from detention, ended the twenty year conflict with Eritria, unblocked blogs

and created freedom and finding a new direction for his country. In Malaysia Mahathir returned from his retirement in his 90s reconciled with his political enemies and took over power and within one week arrested all the looters and recovered the loots and gave his country a new direction. In Pakistan Imran Khan is performing a similar, if more dramatic feat, bringing monumental changes to the delight of citizens. All these living examples point to one obvious, if fundamental fact that leadership is key to any salvage or transformation of society. It is the starting point, it defines the direction and it sustains the steam for transformation.

It is therefore necessary to ask some searching questions: What exactly is wrong with our political institutions? Why do our leaders seem to have neither the vision, nor the competence, the courage and the conscience, indeed, the gravitas to pull us out of the abyss we are in? Put in other words, can leaders emanating from our institutions and processes salvage our society? What is it, in our politics that is so crippling that we seem not to be able to do anything good for our beleaguered society? When and how did we sink into this political culture which is

clearly entrenched in a mercantile politics which is ridden violence and has surpassed the feeble capacity of our law enforcement agents? Is governance sustainable in these circumstances? Is it redeemable? Are we really serious it will keep repeating the same routine and expect

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things to change? A social definition of insanity is to keep doing the same thing and yet expect different results.

In fact, our leadership recruitment mechanism both in the political parties as well as the civil service has broken down and does not appear capable of producing the kind of leaders that can salvage our decomposing society. Indeed,

since 1999, the four-year election cycles produce leaders who are defined not by their character or competence or conscience, but by their wealth or their connections or their political thuggery. Of course, these generalizations, like all generalizations, provide for a few good exceptions, but for now they are too few to count the exception rather than the rule. For us to get the kind of leadership that can salvage our country we have to first reform the leadership recruitment mechanism in both our political parties as well as the civil service. In other words we can't fix our country until we can fix our politics; we can't fix our politics until we can fix our political parties; we can't fix our political parties until we fix our political culture; this can only come about when we reconstruct our political parties on content and elected their leadership on the basis of competence and

character. Yes, a tall order perhaps. But I see no other way, as it is historically validated by countries that were able to recover from the abyss had to reform their parties and change the political culture. Let us now focus on the political parties.

The Political Parties

Political parties, are supposed to be platforms for the aggregation of views and ideas

of citizens and providing popular participation for the acquisition of power for governance, the essence of which is to provide for the security and welfare of society. Political parties operate within the framework of the modern state, rule of law and democratic accountability. Political parties are, therefore, supposed to anchor and operationalize the social contract, which from the Greeks to date had defined the organized human societies. Political parties form the essential component of the electoral process that confirms legitimacy to power. Political party being the platform on which candidates canvass for votes and ride to power ought to be able to set clear goals for that power and ensure that those goals set are pursued in government, for only then can they justify their existence.

In Nigeria's first and second republics, parties were owned by their members, who paid membership dues, from which the activities of parties were funded. Parties were distinct in their contents and their programs while different structures of the parties functioned as per their constitutions. Parties were reasonably independent of the government they form and were therefore able to discipline their members and speak truth to power. The Chairs were unmistakably the leaders of the parties; parties had National Chairmen who were automatically their National

leaders. By and large, appointments to party positions were properly considered and there were standards that ensured a certain level of competence. Because of respect for processes, parties were strong and therefore doubtful or oblivious characters never had a chance to emerge as leaders. Unfortunately our political parties today are something else and perhaps I should not waste time and source on what our political parties are not.

Our political parties today are largely patrimonial, owned, not by the members but by the money-bags that fund them. In the words of Fukuyama, they are seen as species of private property. They have lost so much content and character that you would be forgiven if you thought that their constitutions were written by the same author. They are known and referred to more by the personalities that fund them rather than by their position on the ideological spectrum or by their programs. In other words they are defined neither by their contents, nor by their competence, nor indeed by their conscience, but more by what they covert and the rapacious methods they employ to get it. In these kind of circumstances, the leadership recruitment process cannot but be the chaos that it is. Let me be a little more specific and in doing so let me use my party the APC, to illustrate.

After the merger, the congress,

which held to elect holders of party position for the most part paid no attention to competence or even demonstrated commitment to the party ideals, rather leaders (read funders) of the party, got their lackeys to positions that will give them advantage over their potential competitors, in a typical patrimonial manner. At the local level the delegates (who were also the 'elected' officials of the party) that ended up voting at the primaries could not observe the requirements of secret ballot, because more than half of them were illiterate and had to get someone to write the names of the candidate for them in open air. That in the 21st century, where knowledge is the greatest capital, a political party will stuff its offices with people who can't read and write, speak volumes of their readiness and competence to deliver on the expectations of a modern society.

When those who want to contest elections under the platform of the party were screened, as far as I know, the committee did not carry out any due diligence on the character or competence of the candidate, nor did it investigate criminal records of these candidates. It leaves you with the inevitable conclusion that for the party there are no standards, qualifications or requirements to hold any position in the country beyond the constitutional requirements of a secondary school certificate or its equivalents. Governance in the 21st century is corporate

scientific business and to have leadership recruitment system that makes no demand on competence and character is the most reckless and irresponsible thing that any institution can do. Precisely because there are no standards and no due diligence, and money is the only factor which counts, the recruitment system is consciously or inadvertently encouraging mediocrity, making it easier for criminals and sycophants to find their way. We in the APC spent a good part of our campaign deriding the Jonathan Administration as being incompetent, rightly so, but we have ourselves failed to prioritize competence, both in the party and in government. And because of the conscience deficit in the system we are able to walk the streets without any qualms. Any surprise that as political elite on all the sides of the political divide we are not making the impact we claim to be capable of. In the more eloquent words of Prof. Lumumba, “we elect hyenas to take care of goats and when the goats are consumed we are surprised?”

If today any one wishes to contest for an elective post and goes to any political party to announce their intention, the first question he will be asked is not going to be on his competence, or his character or his understanding of the ideological position of the party, (if it has any), but “do you have the money?” Now tell me how a leadership recruitment system that hinges itself

entirely on money and ignores competence and character can produce leaders who can deliver on anything other than deliver the treasury to their pockets. The tragedy to be sure is not so much the failure of our leadership recruitment system but the silence over this failure. What a tragedy indeed.

The Way Forward

We certainly need to reinvent our parties and redesign our leadership recruitment system if we are to salvage our society from the abyss it has fallen. The tendency is to wait complacently until the bubble bursts and there is some kind of uprising of the yellow, blue or red revolution. But these revolutions don't quite solve the problem, even after the revolution the work has to be done, the Ukraine's example makes this point amply. “Ukraine's Orange revolution in 2004 looked to be a great victory for democracy when it prevented Viktor Yanukovich from stealing an election, but the new democratic Orange Coalition was itself divided, corrupt, and incompetent, with the result

that Yanukovich was returned to power in 2010 in a free and fair election.” While absence of legitimacy can make regimes crush very easily, failure to deliver on expected services can generate resentment, which also bring regimes down. In either case competence, or lack of it as it were, is at the core of the problem. In other words if we continue to hang on to patrimony and our strange concept of loyalty and fail to prioritize competence, we shall continue our vicious circle of hopes raised and dashed and raised again and dashed until the country itself goes down the

If today any one wishes to contest for an elective post and goes to any political party to announce their intention, the first question he will be asked is not going to be on his competence, or his character or his understanding of the ideological position of the party, (if it has any), but “do you have the money?”

drain.

There has to be a deliberate project to be designed and

pursued by a group of people, led by the few good men and women in politics, which will be aimed at giving content to politics, moving away from the politics of big men to the politics of big ideas, and prioritizing competence and character over loyalty and money. This is possible if those in politics for higher purpose of development rather than self-interests can come together and work together as a block within a big party or take over a smaller party create a model and allow it time to grow. Ironically if ACN had not gone into the merger to produce APC, ACN would have been a model. In 2007 ACN had only one State government, Lagos, but over just about 6years it came to have six States, the largest number of States as at the time of merger for ANP had only three and CPC only one. If it had allowed its gradual growth the ACN could have retained its content and improved on other areas, but it was in a hurry and today the APC is not too different from the PDP it came to replace.

The other alternative is to launch a movement on a political but non-partisan platform like the Arewa Initiative for Good Governance, AI2G. This movement would sensitize citizens, especially the youth, to the dangers of the current political culture and mobilize them to action. There are many ways these mobilized citizens could act. The youth can be mobilized to resist money

politics and to block agents of money politics from playing their role in the community. The community can be mobilized to demand accountability in ways that some developing societies of Asia and Latin America had done. Members of the platform can also join political parties, small of big and work as a block to bring internal changes. These are not exhaustive and could not be.

There must be a host of other alternatives. The most important is to realize that with the current political culture and the set of political parties our country is not going to develop. The last by-elections should be eye-openers, from Ekiti, to Kogi to Bauchi, to Daura, it was the same story votes were purchased openly and unashamedly. The contest was not about who was better but who was richer and cannot access the power. And PDP did this brazen vote buying we can say it is in all character. But that APC candidates did the same and the party of change did not as much admit this is wrong much less condemn it, then we are in trouble. If change has become hypocrisy, then who do we trust, and what exactly is the difference between the APC and the PDP? We may play the ostrich and pretend that this tragedy is not happening; we may sweep the uncomfortable truth under the carpet; we may dismiss what we are seeing as the mischief of the opposition of disloyal members or even anti-party, activity; but for how long? We have to wake up to the

fact that our bad politics is killing our country, putting our country into jeopardy and throwing it into another crisis, from which we have to struggle to escape. The choice ultimately is ours, we ignore the warning and flow with the current, which is a lot easier. We can also stand up to the charade of our politics, admittedly difficult as it may be but rewarding for we can salvage our country and bring it back to the path of growth and development. We can enjoy the peace and the dignity that comes with it. Whichever path we choose, we must not lose sight of its consequences and responsibility for them. Those who decide to take the plunge.

AZAZI: END OF A DREAM

By

Dr. Aliyu U. Tilde

The remnants of former security adviser, General Andrew Azazi, were committed to mother earth yesterday at Yenegoa, Bayelsa State. That was the last station of one of the chief players in the game of Nigeria's national security during the past decade.

I knew little about the late General before the publication of a Nigerian Army Intelligence Corp (NAIC) report that indicted him in the colossal theft of weapons from the military warehouses in Kaduna and Jaji when he was the GOC 1DIV. The report was titled "Investigation Report into the Theft and Sale of Arms to Niger Delta Gunrunner by an Officer and Some Soldiers of the 1 Base Ordinance Depot Kaduna. It was submitted to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS).

The report was published first by Sahara Reporters in 2010 and on it I wrote one of my longest commentaries in 2010 (<http://fridaydiscourse.blogspot.com/2010/11/discourse-340-nigeria-cannot-trust.html>). It was really interesting reading that article and the comments that followed it. Two years after it was leaked, Nigerian authorities have to date not denied anything about the report. Azazi was promptly sacked as the Chief of Army Staff and compulsorily retired

from the army by late President Yar'adua based on his role in the theft of the weapons.

Let me recapture a paragraph that summarized the report from that article:

"Briefly, the NAIC report contains details of how close to 7000 assorted weapons were stolen between 2000 and 2007 from the ordinance depots in Kaduna and Jaji. The theft was masterminded by one Maj. SA Akubo, who sold them to Niger Delta militants through Sunday Okar, the junior brother of Henry Oka, the MEND leader. It started with the discovery of the Jaji incident in February 2007, which renewed another inquiry into the theft that has been taking place in Kaduna when Gen. Azazi was the GOC of 1 D I V . Investigations revealed that the two incidents

were related. Maj Akubo, Sgt Mathias, LCpl Alexander, LCpl Moses and LCpl Nnamdi were the principal culprits in the incidents. The Kaduna theft was investigated and suppressed by SSS when Lt. KKK Are was its DG in collaboration with Azazi and one Maj Gen Adekhegba, then Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). Azazi continued to cover up the case, first in his capacity as GOC 1DIV, then later as COAS. It took the discovery of the Jaji theft in 2007 and the tenure of another DG of SSS to mount a conclusive investigation. None of the recommendations of the NAIC report were taken seriously except the court-martialling and

jailing of Maj. Akubo and the soldiers involved. Sunday Okar was freed and presently aiding Jonathan in the case of the October 1 Bombings against this brother Henry.”

Payment for the stolen weapons were extracted from the State Governors James Ibori and DSP Alamiyeseigha, said the report. Since the activity continued well through Jonathan's tenure as the Governor of Bayelsa State after Alamiyeseigha was impeached, it is safe to conclude that the caches delivered during his tenure as Governor were also paid by him. Only that the report fell short of mentioning his name since by the time it was submitted, he was already His Excellency, the Vice-President, but it strongly recommended that politicians involved in the scandal should be investigated to avoid a secessionist becoming the President of the country one day. Yar'adua was not swift enough, as usual. Before he could decide to probe Jonathan and other Niger Delta Governors that were involved in the scandal, his health deteriorated in a manner that remains secret. This time it was not his kidneys, we were told by reports then. Rather, it was his lungs. Some alleged that he was poisoned through a microphone, but the truth may

never be known, as the details of his illness are yet to be declassified by the Nigerian and Saudi authorities.

What is known, however, is that the fear of the military panel that indicted Azazi came to pass, unfortunately for Nigeria. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was sworn in as the President after the death of Yar'adua and the gates of the presidency and Nigerian security became automatically opened to General Azazi and his syndicate.

After General Aliyu Gusau (rtd) left the NSA office to pursue his presidential ambition, Jonathan did not go fishing for an NSA. Azazi was already waiting. He appointed him the NSA in spite of the report, or precisely because of it. Who can be safer than an Ijaw man shared the secrets of gun running activity before, the brain behind its militant struggle and the architect of its secessionist dream? And who could be a better choice of DG SSS? Guess: A Niger Delta loyalist, Ekpenyong.

The return of Azazi as the NSA witnessed the beginning of one the most violent phases of Nigerian history since after the civil war. First were the Independence Day bombings that were claimed by MEND. Despite the claim, the Jonathan political syndicate roped it on some northerners, principally Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, in a move that will start a series of security blackmails to undermine the North. The nation was entertained even

before any investigation would commence with this unbelievably awkward drama of the criminal on the one hand confessing “we did it” and the President on the other defending him by saying, “no you didn't”. Raymond Dokpesi, the person at the centre of the allegation, a Niger Deltan and Chief Manager of Babangida's campaign, would later be settled with a handsome payment of some billions of naira the government owed his media outfit. All the tales of the phone calls, and SMS linking him to the bombings was thrown into the dustbin.

Well, the office of the NSA, Azazi, took over the matter. Today, I cannot remember what became of it. It is one of the secrets that Azazi might have carried to his grave. But it might not be the only one sharing his grave. Along with this are those of several investigations involving illegal importation of weapons into the country and many ordinary matters that are within the jurisdiction of the Police or the Custom to handle which the NSA emasculated into his domain of influence.

Then came the goldmine. Boko Haram. Activities of the group resumed and took a very violent form. Bombs started exploding in various places; some claimed by Boko Haram, others still remaining a mystery. Among the mysterious is the 2010 Christmas eve bombing in Jos. From some eyewitness accounts, it is still doubtful whether Boko Haram carried out that attack. But like the

findings of every attack would be kept secret, nobody would be able to conclusively say what the truth is.

What is certain is how the office of the NSA became the centre of the fight against Boko Haram. Together with DG SSS, the duo would hijack the entire security operations in the country with the SSS, this time, competing with the police in claiming for arrests of Boko Haram suspects. For the first time in the history of the country, we saw the SSS holding press conferences on matters that are criminal.

The whole Boko Haram saga is seen by many in the North as a plan orchestrated to decimate the region, which actually informed the initial apathy of the Jonathan regime to the crisis until the group started to hit Abuja. Immediately that happened, the President panicked and obliged virtually to anything that Azazi would request. I think he only turned down the suggestion to arrest Buhari, for which Azazi scolded the President. We saw security share in our budget hiked to a whopping one quarter, for example, of which the office of the NSA would have the lion's share. While the SSS itself with thousands of its operatives and branches nationwide would be allocated

only N15billion, the NSA office with not more than 100 staff, most of them on secondment from different security outfits in the country, cornered N150billion.

While as the NSA, Azazi has successfully caged the President in the Villa. Hardly would the President visit anywhere in the country. Azazi



Late Gen. Owoye Andrew Azazi

has also helped to raise the alarm that the North is not a safe place, causing a number of Ambassadors to relocate to Lagos. The manner in which markets are burnt, how the military goes about extra-judicial killings of suspects and even recent assassination of Mamman Shuwa clearly indicate that there is a hidden hand behind Boko Haram in

addition to the *Yusufiya* members that are known to the public. Many believe that Azazi is the anchor of Boko Haram, though the allegation cannot be substantiated beyond the angle of inference.

Azazi tried hard to get the Americans to settle in the Niger Delta as part of its secessionist agenda. His call for strategic alliance with the Americans was politely turned down by the superpower. Judging through their long term strategic interest in the region, the Americans understood that an independent banana republic of Niger Delta would not be a better secured place for Nigerian oil nor would their presence in the Chad Basin add any value to their strategic interest at a time they are trying to extricate themselves from Afghanistan and other areas that bring their troops into direct contact with terrorists. America even refused to list Boko Haram among terrorist organizations, preferring to declare only three of its top leaders as terrorists. It did not stop there in punching Azazi's balloon. It blamed the crisis on how the north is becoming increasingly alienated in the political and economic schemes of the country. On its part, America opened a cultural centre in the old city of Kano as a confidence building measure

after the January 20 attacks by Boko Haram.

By early this year, the way Azazi was messing up was becoming very evident. Jonathan came under pressure to sack him especially after he publicly accused the ruling PDP of causing the Boko Haram crisis. The President sought to reassure the North by appointing Col. Sambo Dasuki (rtd) as the new NSA. I did not hide my reservations when I negatively commented on the appointment then. Now my point is clear because after his initial tour of the crises-ridden states of Borno, Yobe and Plateau, nothing is heard from the new NSA again.

The reason for the inaction of the new NSA had to do with the continuous presence of Azazi around the President. Until his death, Azazi was the de facto NSA; some would even say the de facto President. Jonathan could not extricate himself from him because of the elaborate network of Niger Delta terrorists and beneficiaries that have long held the President hostage. At the disposal of Azazi even after his sack were the privileges accorded every member of the President's kitchen cabinet, a fact that became clear after the helicopter crash that terminated his life and schemes, it is doubtful if the new NSA will have much say on the security of the country. The situation room of our internal security has long shifted from the NSA complex to the army headquarters.

Azazi has died as one of the richest generals in the country. He successfully made a number of leading militants billionaires through security contracts, including the concessioning of our maritime security. With his death too the allegations of his multi billion Naira properties in Abuja and elsewhere may be substantiated or disproved. He has also left behind the legacy of a conflict that only he understood. The Boko Haram insurgency will continue so long as it represents another tunnel through which our treasury would be looted massively, regardless of whom the bombs would kill – soldiers or civilians, Muslims or Christians. Despite its destructive nature, however, it can never break the North.

Azazi has also left behind a dream of building an independent Ijaw nation unaccomplished, though there still remains its army of 'pardoned' and 'rehabilitated' militants, many of whom, it is alleged, received additional military training officially under the amnesty program only to abscond thereafter. His departure has undoubtedly created a vacuum that few Ijaw would fill, more so if the road map to the realization of that dream was only in the custody of his brain.

However, that is not the end of the history. He is leaving behind Nigeria – and the North that he worked so much to destroy. Both the country and the region have survived greater machinations in the past. Both

of them will survive Boko Haram, the mutual hate induced crises in Plateau and Kaduna states, etc. The sun has set on Azazi but never will it set on this country the way some people think.

Like him or hate him Azazi is considered a hero by his people, understandably. He was buried at Ijaw Heroes Park in Yenogoa. In the military and post-Jonathan Nigeria, however, little of him would be remembered better than his hand in Okar's gunrunning activity that led to his compulsory retirement and sacking as CDS, his anchor of Niger Delta terrorism, his manipulation of Boko Haram, the unguarded utterances that led to his vacation of the NSA office, and then, his sad and violent end in a helicopter crash.

Perhaps Azazi is innocent of these allegations, after all. But the silence over many of them even when he was alive did not help to drive them away from the domain of public opinion. We hope the truth of whatever it was about his career will surface now that he is not in a position to help or harm anyone. This is a service we await his biographers to render this nation.

May God give his family to bear his departure. To them I extend my sincere condolences.

Long Live Nigeria.

30 December 2012

The Insights Article:

Friday, January 13, 2012

Who is sending the guns to Nigeria?

As Nigerians were on the street protesting over fuel subsidy removal, a British based man was being arraigned in UK over the shipping of 80,000 rifles and pistols and 32 million rounds of ammunition to Nigeria. The shipment included 40,000 AK47 assault rifles, 30,000 rifles and 10,000 9mm pistols.

According to a report by the BBC, the man whose name is Gary Hyde, shipped these huge arm cache without receiving permission from the relevant government department in the UK. Gary Hyde was not alone in this deal. It was carried out with his business partner Karl Kleber, a German national

based in Germany, the court was told.

The pair acted as middle men between two Polish companies acting for the Nigerian buyers and Chinese companies, the court heard, according to the BBC report. Both men received commission payments for the deals totalling around \$1.3m (£840,000) or N351 million.

The story apparently left several questions unanswered. Who were the Nigerian buyers? Were these guns really delivered to Nigeria eventually? It is also interesting that since this story broke out in the British media, the Nigerian government has not come out

with any specific statement on it. Were these weapons imported by the Nigerian government? If they were not imported by the Nigerian government, have they made any efforts to trace the importers of these large numbers of weapons into the country? Thirty two million rounds of ammunition are enough to kill thirty two million Nigerians, assuming each bullet will kill a Nigerian? This may be an exaggeration, but there is no doubt that if there is this amount of guns and ammunition out there outside the control of the government, then every Nigerian has a serious course to be worried at this time.



Gary Hyde (pic from The Observer/AP)

The reputation of Gary Hyde, the man at the centre of the storm shows that Nigerians have to be concerned that he has set his eyes on supplying arms to the country. A report in February 2011, in The Observer in UK shows that Hyde is also facing charges in the US for smuggling arms into the country. The Observer describes him as “Britain's very own lord of war; an international arms dealer, whose chief currency is the AK-47 assault rifle”

The Observer reports that US officials arrested Hyde in connection with the alleged illegal import into the US of 6,000 Chinese-produced AK-47 magazines, each capable of

holding up to 75 rounds of ammunition. The Observer also quotes a Wiki leaks release of confidential US embassy cables which shows that in 2008 York Guns, where Gary Hyde is a director, tried to ship 130,000 of the assault rifles to Libya. The WikiLeaks revelation shows that Gary Hyde through his company acted as an intermediary between an unidentified Ukrainian arms manufacturer and Libyan officials. “The size of the deal raised eyebrows in diplomatic circles, as Libya has only 70,000 ground-force troops and these would be unlikely to use a weapon as dated as the AK-47. The cable noted that the export licence was rejected because the "UK is

concerned that the intention may be to re-export the weapons, particularly to armed rebel factions backed by Khartoum and/or Ndjamena in the Chad/Sudan conflict". Kleber, Gary Hyde's German partner also has a reputation that does not sit well with the authorities. The Observer reports that “in 2008 the German federal police agency, the BKA, launched an investigation into Kleber to determine whether he had been involved in "the illegal sale of machine guns via Croatia to Iraq". This was in response to allegations that companies linked to Hyde had sold tens of thousands of guns to Ziad Cattani, the former head of military procurement at the Iraq



Defence Ministry, without an appropriate arm brokering licence. Cattan fled Iraq after a warrant was issued for his arrest amid allegations that he had siphoned off millions of dollars in corrupt deals.”

What emerges from these reports is that the two men now being named in connection with supply of arms to Nigeria should raise serious concerns in Nigeria. Have they supplied some other arms into the country, that the authorities are

not aware?

The concern becomes even more real considering the fact that at the same time Gary Hyde was being arraigned in UK, the Ghanaian authorities intercepted a truck loaded with arms and ammunitions heading to Nigeria. The ammunitions included pump action rifles and live rounds. These arrests are coming at time the Boko Haram insurgency is getting worse in Northern Nigeria as bombs explode on almost daily basis

and masked men go on killing spree with sophisticated weapons. The activities of Boko Haram, the continuous crisis in Jos is no doubt raising serious concerns and fears of retaliation from other ethnic groups. Could this inflow of arms be linked to ethnic groups arming themselves? Are they arming themselves to defend themselves or to go on the offensive?

This is a critical period in Nigeria's history and all people of goodwill must stand up and douse the rising intention. As I said in my earlier post, the Rwanda trip will be a dangerous place for Nigeria to go. The government must also act and act fast.

This is also the time the international community must come to the aid of Nigeria. It is clear that the Nigeria intelligence agencies do not have the capacity to deal with the emerging challenge. They must offer their help at this time. They cannot wait for a Rwandan type crisis to develop before they intervene. China, especially, should caution its business community. This is not the time to fuel the crisis in Nigeria for monetary gains. Nigeria is China's biggest market in Africa. An unstable Nigeria will not be good for China's long term economic interest.

All pictures sourced through google images.



FORMER US AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA ON THE MYTH ABOUT NIGERIA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Princeton N. Lyman, the former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria and South Africa

(PRINCETON N. LYMAN, THE FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, DELIVERED A VERY POIGNANT SPEECH ON THE PANEL TITLED "THE NIGERIAN STATE AND U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS" AT THE ACHEBE COLLOQUIUM AT BROWN UNIVERSITY. LYMAN SUGGESTS THAT RATHER THAN CONTINUALLY EMPHASIZE NIGERIA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, IT WOULD BEHOVE US TO CONSIDER ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT EVENTUALLY LEAD TO NIGERIA'S IRRELEVANCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE)

Transcript of speech (taken directly from the video speech):

Thank you very much Prof. Keller and thanks to the organizers of this conference. It is such a privilege to be here in a conference in honor of Prof. Achebe, an inspiration and teacher to all of us. I have a long connection to Nigeria. Not only was I Ambassador there, I have travelled to and from Nigeria for a number of years and have a deep and abiding vital

emotional attachment to the Nigerian people, their magnificence, their courage, artistic brilliance, their irony, sense of humor in the face of challenges etc.

And I hope that we keep that in mind when I say some things that I think are counter to what we normally say about Nigeria. And I say that with all due respect to Eric Silla who is doing a magnificent work at State Department and to our good friend from the

legislature, because I have a feeling that we both Nigerians and Americans may be doing Nigeria and Nigerians no favor by stressing Nigeria's strategic importance.

I know all the arguments: it is a major oil producer, it is the most populous country in Africa, it has made major contributions to Africa in peacekeeping, and of course negatively if Nigeria were to fall apart the ripple effects would be tremendous, etc.. But I wonder if all this emphasis on Nigeria's importance creates a tendency of inflate Nigeria's opinion of its own invulnerability.

Among much of the elite today, I have the feeling that there is a belief that Nigeria is too big to fail, too important to be ignored, and that Nigerians can go on ignoring some of the most fundamental challenges they have many of which we have talked about: disgraceful lack of infrastructure, the growing problems of unemployment, the failure to deal with the underlying problems in the Niger-Delta, the failure to consolidate democracy and somehow feel will remain important to everybody because of all those reasons that are strategically important.

And I am not sure that that is helpful.

Let me deconstruct those elements of Nigeria's importance, and ask whether they are as relevant as they have been.

We often hear that one in five Africans is a Nigerian. What

does it mean? Do we ever say one in five Asians is a Chinese? Chinese power comes not just for the fact that it has a lot of people but it has harnessed the entrepreneurial talent and economic capacity and all the other talents of China to make her a major economic force and political force.

What does it mean that one in five Africans is Nigeria? It does not mean anything to a Namibian or a South African. It is a kind of conceit. What makes it important is what is happening to the people of Nigerian. Are their talents being tapped? Are they becoming an economic force? Is all that potential being used? And the answer is "Not really."

And oil, yes, Nigeria is a major oil producer, but Brazil is now launching a 10-year program that is going to make it one of the major oil producers in the world. And every other country in Africa is now beginning to produce oil.

And Angola is rivalling Nigeria in oil production, and the United States has just discovered a huge gas reserve which is going to replace some of our dependence on imported energy. So if you look ahead ten years, is Nigeria really going to be that relevant as a major oil producer, or just another of the many oil producers while the world moves on to alternative sources of energy and other sources of supply. And what about its influence, its contributions to the continent? As our representative from the parliament talked about, there

is a great history of those contributions. But that is history.

Is Nigeria really playing a major role today in the crisis in Niger on its border, or in Guinea, or in Darfur, or after many many promises making any contributions to Somalia?

The answer is no, Nigeria is today NOT making a major impact, on its region, or on the African Union or on the big problems of Africa that it was making before.

What about its economic influence?

Well, as we have talked about earlier, there is a deindustrialization going on in Nigeria; lack of infrastructure, lack of power which means importing goods under globalization; Nigerian factories are closing, with more and more people becoming unemployed; and, Nigeria is becoming a kind of society that imports and only exports (and lives on the oil), which does not make it a significant economic entity.

Now, of course, on the negative side, the collapse of Nigeria would be enormous, but is that a point to make Nigeria strategically important?

Years ago, I worked as an Assistant Secretary of State who had the longest tenure in that job in the 1980s and I remember in one meeting a minister from a country not very friendly to the United States came in and was berating the Assistant Secretary on all the evils of the United States

and all its dire plots and in things in Africa and was going on and on and finally the Assistant Secretary cut him off and said: "You know, the biggest danger for your relationship with the United States is not our opposition but that we will find you irrelevant."

The point is that Nigeria can become much less relevant to the United States. We have already seen evidence of it. When President Obama went to Ghana and not to Nigeria, he was sending a message, that Ghana symbolized more of the significant trends, issues and importance that one wants to put on Africa than Nigeria.

And when I was asked by journalists why President Obama did not go to Nigeria, I said "what would he gain from going? Would Nigeria be a good model for democracy, would it be a model for good governance, would he obtain new commitments on Darfur or Somalia or strengthen the African Union or in Niger or elsewhere?" No, he would not, so he did not go. And when Secretary Clinton did go, indeed but she also went to Angola and who would have thought years ago that Angola would be the most stable country in the Gulf of Guinea and establish a binational commission in Angola. So the handwriting may already be on the wall, and that is a sad commentary.

Because what it means is that Nigeria's most important strategic importance in the end

could be that it has failed. And that is a sad sad conclusion. It does not have to happen, but I think that we ought to stop talking about what a great country it is, and how terribly important it is to us and talk about what it would take for Nigeria to be that important and great. And that takes an enormous amount of commitment. And you don't need saints, you don't need leaders like Nelson Mandela in every state, because you are not going to get them.

I served in South Korea in the middle of the 1960s and it was time when South Korea was poor and considered hopeless, but it was becoming to turn around, later to become to every person's amazement then the eleventh largest economy in the world. And I remember the economist in my mission saying, you know it did not bother him that the leading elites in the government of South Korea were taking 15 - 20 percent off the top of every project, as long as every project was a good one, and that was the difference. The leadership at the time was determined to solve the fundamental economic issues of South Korea economy and turn its economy around.

It has not happened in Nigeria today.

You don't need saints. It needs leaders who say "You know we could be becoming irrelevant, and we got to do something about it."

Thank you



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