

ARDP

Arewa Research & Development Project

Newsletter

Quarterly Publication of Arewa Research & Development Project

Vol. 2 No.3 APRIL - JUNE 2016



THE END OF OIL: AGRICULTURE AS AN ALTERNATIVE

INSIDE

- The End of Oil
- The IDP Crisis in North East Nigeria
- The Political Economy of Corruption in Nigeria
- An Outlook On 2016 Federal Government Budget



ARDP

Arewa Research & Development Project

EDITORIAL

Editor-in-Chief
Dr. Kabiru S. Chafe

EDITORIAL BOARD

Dr. Usman Bugaje
Chairman

Dr. Yima Sen
Member

Prof. Abdullahi M. Ashafa
Member

Prof. Nuhu Obaje
Member

Hajiya Rabi Adamu Eshak
Member

Mal. Isa Modibbo
Member

Mr. G.S. Pwul, SAN
Member

All Enquiries:

Arewa Research and Development Project

C/o Arewa House
Centre for Historical Documentation and Research,
Ahmadu Bello University,
No. 1 Rabah Road, Kaduna,
Kaduna State - Nigeria

Phone: 08034507400 (Text Only)

Website: www.ardp-ng.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

■ AGRO-INDUSTRIALIZATION OF NORTH-NIGERIA: NOSTALGIA, REALITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	03
■ AN OUTLOOK OF 2016 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	12
■ OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF 2016 BUDGET FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR	21
■ THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA	26
■ THE END OF OIL	30
■ AN ANALYSIS OF SOLID MINERAL RESOURCES INVENTORY OF NORTHERN NIGERIA	38
■ CHALLENGES OF EDUCATION IN THE NORTH: A NEW RESPONSE	52
■ THE IDP CRISIS IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA	57
■ REPORT ON AgVCF IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES CONFERENCE AND TOT ORGANIZED BY AFRACA, FAO AND CTA HELD AT KIGALI RWANDA BETWEEN 1ST -5TH AUGUST 2016	73
■ ONE DAY CAPACITY BUILDING WORKSHOP FOR YOUTH NGOS/CSOS ON MONITORING & EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAM FOR RECONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE NORTHEAST NIGERIA HELD ON 12TH JULY, 2016 AT CACTUS HOTELS, SHONGO HOUSING ESTATE, GOMBE, GOMBE STATE -REPORT	76
■ MANAGING CHANGE IN A MOMENT OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN NIGERIA	85
■ MARCH 15 IN NORTHERN NIGERIA: A HISTORICAL REFLECTION	95
■ OBITUARY: A SHINING LIGHT FLICKERS OUT	99
FOR THE RECORD	
BEING AN INTERVIEW WITH LATE MR. JOHN MARK SAMCHI ON THE LEADERSHIP QUALITIES OF THE LATE SIR AHMADU BELLO SARDAUNA OF SOKOTO	104

EDITORIAL

Nigeria, a country blessed with abundant arable land, 60% of which is still waiting to be put to use; abundant water resources, with the highest water density in West Africa; and commensurate manpower to turn this to wealth; has rather stupidly relied on oil as a source of foreign exchange for nearly half a century. The country and its people have been comfortable earning petro-dollars without lifting a finger and using the earnings to import consumer goods, as basic and ridiculous as toothpicks, from other countries. These years of free flow of money, have engendered national laziness, complacency and of course monumental corruption, which together have crippled governance, destroyed the values of hard work and honesty and consequently elicited all manners of crimes and crises of which, Boko Haram is only a specie. According to a recent report in the Vanguard, the country earned N96 trillion since 1958 from oil – N51 trillion under the government of Goodluck Jonathan alone. No government thought it necessary to invest in other viable sectors like agriculture and its allied industries.

With the recent collapse of oil prices, with the increasing environmental problems created by fossil fuel and more importantly with technological breakthroughs, which have made alternatives safer and cheaper, oil has no future. Thanks to the fall of oil we now have an opportunity to use our head, think hard, work hard and look forward to a clean environment to live and thrive. Undoubtedly the alternative to oil for countries as blessed as ours is agriculture. Even when the oil money was flowing agriculture remain in the lead in contribution to our GDP. Agriculture is our competitive advantage in the global economy. Many governments in the past have spoken about the need to diversify the economy by boosting agriculture, but it has consistently turned out to

be a farce, either for dearth of commitment or deficit in capacity or both. This government would appear to have the commitment but there appears to be a huge capacity deficit that is threatening to turn this pronouncements in to another farse. One does not need to look beyond the National budget to see the difficulties. Admittedly the 2016 National budget has been a national embarrassment and an unprecedented budgetary disaster. But in the States where agriculture actually takes place there is a clear absence of capacity and more importantly the understanding of the kind of modern agriculture that links up to global economy. Governors are still buying fertilizers which have not been tested to suit their soil and which never gets to famer at all and where it gets to the farmer, too often well after he has passed the stage, adding only the confusion that has been going on in the name of agriculture. Agricultural value chain financing, which is the modern agricultural model that links up to global agriculture is still greek to both farmers and agricultural officials. The knowledge gaps are huge, the funding arrangement is still not clear to many stakeholders and the post harvest management and marketing arrangement in disarray. If indeed the Federal and Sate Governments are committed to agriculture, the first stage is to learn how it works, then close the knowledge gaps, provide the enabling environments to allow the private sector to drive agriculture. Both Federal and State Governments should know that Agriculture is the only saving grace they have in this troubled socio-economic terrain they have to operate. These governments don't have time, given the level of desperation of the economy, especially the rural economy. The time to act is now!

Babayola M. Toungo

AGRO-INDUSTRIALIZATION OF NORTH-NIGERIA: NOSTALGIA, REALITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Prof. Sadiq Z. Abubakar, FNSE, FNIAE

National Agric. Extension and Research Liaison Services, Ahmadu Bello University,

Abstract

Agro-industrialization is rapidly becoming a topic of great attention in Nigeria due to the obvious challenges of diversification of the economy. Driven by fundamental economic forces, agro-industrialization is a must for Nigeria and need to develop definite targets starting from agric commodities with relatively easier requirements for processing and value addition to serve as pilot and provide encouragement to advance and cover a wide spectrum of the industrial segments in the agricultural sector. Selected value chains like livestock, poultry, fishery, horticulture, cotton, hides & skin, groundnut, etc can provide fertile grounds for the piloting stage. By changing the way agriculture does business, agro-industrialization will also bring change to public policy and agricultural institutions. There must be differentiation and harmonization in policies promoting agric commodities driven by production and policies promoting agri-products driven by industries in order to avoid conflicts and stalemate. As agro-industrialization blurs the lines between producers and processors, agric education, training, research and development institutions and the agric extension service

delivery system will face challenges assessing their clients and designing appropriate and relevant packages to them.

1. Introduction

Agro-industrialization has recently rapidly taken the stage of public attention and debate in the Country due to global economic down turns and urgent need to diversify the economy. The experiences of pursuing agro-industrialization is not new in Nigeria as the first political leaders who struggled for the nation's independence spoiled their hands as evidenced in the organized agricultural production, marketing and industries around Cotton, Cocoa, G/nut, Oil palm, Rubber and Hides & Skins. This result was impressive and pointed to the much-envisaged greatness of the nation but was sadly abandoned by the subsequent leaders. The discovery of oil, which gradually dominated the streams of foreign earnings, was the main reason. The attendant consequence was that the nation migrated from net exporter to a very vulnerable net importer of many cash and even foods crops. What seems to be propelling the revival of agro-industrialization in the country recently is the apparent success recorded in the promotion of poultry, fishery,

horticultural, rice and cassava value chains under the ATA programme in the last 6 years. Consolidation on these gains can provide incentive and encouragement to advance the campaigns to other strategic agro-industry segments of grains, except rice, that have long been viewed as quintessential commodities produced on family farms.

By changing the way that agriculture does business, agro-industrialization will carry enormous implications for the structure of the industry, for the rural economy, and for public policy. Agriculture in Nigeria was mainly developed as a commodity industry, and public policy has long been made on that premise. Thus, the validity of policy tools such as commodity programmes will increasingly be called into question as demonstrated by the radical changes made under the ATA programme. Whether agro-industrialization will equally challenge the 1999 constitutional provision (as amended) placing agriculture in the concurrent list remains to be seen, but its influence will only increase as time goes on.

This paper searches the outlook for agro-industrialization in Nigerian agriculture and the impacts it may have on public policy, institutional, legal and

regulatory framework. The first section defines agro-industrialization and examines why and how it is happening and the second section examines the implications of industrialization for public policy. The third section assesses effectiveness of the institutional, legal and regulatory framework to provide the much needed support to promote agro-industrialization in the northern states.

1.1 The Endowment of the North

Seventy-five percent (75%) of the country's land mass is in the north with more than 92% of arable land. The control and economic operation of this key resource (land) is however hindered by size where family holds an average of 2.5 – 5 hectares for rain-fed farming and irrigated farming with an average of 1.5 hectares, is the rule. Complimenting this is over 70% of the 171 dams of

various sizes and different purposes, with a total storage capacity of 36.7 billion m³ are located in the northern part of the country. Of particular interest are those that can support the irrigation of more than 1.4 million hectares. The impressive river system that characterized the north would support the cultivation of the of balance of 1.8 million hectares of fadama land under irrigation.

It is also true that the north is leading in population with consistent and increasing margin of nearing 10% of the total head in the country since the first head count conducted in the country. Derivable indices of youth population (15-45years age brackets) is an average of 56% while rural population is more than 65% of the total population in the north, both of which are highly mobile. These figures provide a direct clue on the availability of farm labour (unskilled and skilled) which is strongly

influenced by inadequate and low quality infrastructure in the rural compared to urban areas. The average unemployment rate in the country was put at more than 25% in 2014 with NE recording the highest of 34%.


The north also enjoys at least 5 different distinct climates (S-G Savannah, N-G Savannah, Mountain, Sudan-Savannah and Sahel) all of which are favorable for varied agricultural practices and enterprises.

2. Past Efforts and Glories

Nigeria's lost glory in the world trade of cash agricultural commodities for the North like groundnuts, cotton, hides & skins was unprecedented and non-comparable to any in the African continent. The nation was controlling up to 24% of the supply of shelled groundnut in 1961 which declined to 16% in 1970. By 1980 Nigeria became not only zero export but net importer of the erstwhile groundnut. The figures below illustrate the predicament better.



Share of world's shelled groundnut exports in 1961




Nigeria's Export (Thousands of metric tons)




Global Export: Nigeria's export volumes compared to global export volumes for shelled groundnut 1961 –

Since our fall in the groundnut prominence in 1970's largely due to priority change from agriculture to petroleum, our competitors in ground world trade strategically maintained their dominance due to strong marketing organizations that linked the farmers to markets and hence were able to meet new strict sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, particularly for aflatoxin, a serious food toxin. New technologies, Aflasafe, have been developed to enable Nigeria meet the new strict sanitary and phytosanitary requirements




Global market-share trend of Groundnut. (% of global trade).


Similar tragedy was witnessed in the second cash agricultural commodity for the North-Cotton.




Share of the world's cotton exports in



Global Export (Thousands of metric tons)



Nigeria's export volumes compared to global export





Global market-share trend of Cotton among key West African producers. (% of global trade of Cotton). Source: Doreo

By 1961, Nigeria was the major West African cotton exporter, however, its prominence has been eclipsed by Mali and Burkina Faso.

Our competitors maintained their dominance due to strong marketing organizations, which linked the farmers to markets and provided support in the form of improved planting materials and fertilizer and the ability to meet quality standards.

2.1 Foreign earning and job creation

The picture of the past in terms of the country's import bills, foreign earnings and job creation is a clear testimony that the nation is in the wrong path as per as the agenda for the development of the agric sector and growth of the economy therefrom is concern.



3. Steps taken by Successive leaders and the consequences

The successive leadership in the north after demise of the pioneers paid little attention to the sustenance of the blueprint on harnessing the great potentials of the region to develop a vibrant agricultural sector and the development of rural infrastructure that supports the agricultural sector. Specifically, the following key areas are discussed:

3.1 Sharp decline in manufacture of agric products:

A direct consequence of the low priority given to agric sector was, again, evident in not only the termination of expansion of the cottage and large industries for the manufacture of finished products needed by the teeming population but also the gradual decline in performance and shrinkage. These industries were essential in supporting the commodity and marketing segments of the agricultural sector, which provides occupation for more than 75% of Nigerians. Even the value addition activities for the key agricultural commodities to favorably compete at global level.

3.2 Disillusionment of applying subsidies at the appropriate points:

The erstwhile subsidy regimes provided to support the growth of the agric sector at different points also disappeared essentially based on advises from the Western World who

ironically do not practice what the preached. The complete withdrawal of subsidy at all points directly affected the capability of the commodity growers to break even at farm gate. This subsequently resulted in the shrinkage of production size or complete abandonment of the production segment and migration into the marketing segment which witnessed excessive and unprofessional competition. The consequence of this combined tragedy is the shrinkage of the total production of many agric commodities on one hand and the unjustifiable explosion of the marketing segment on the other hand, which manifested in excessive corrupt practices in the erstwhile efficient and effective Marketing Boards. These events obviously led to the collapse of the vibrant and young agro-industrial segment shortly after the demise of the first leaders.

3.3 Low priority accorded to AESD and Failure to link A-E-Training with real demand and needs

Pursuant of the land grant university system of Kansas of USA and the field technical support of USAID in the pre-independence effort sustained by the first leaders to pursue the dual-developmental and business agenda for agricultural sector was the noble achievement of high investment made in agricultural R & D. This saw the establishment of the nucleus of what are now known as IAR,

NAPRI, NVRI, NAERLS NITR. These were complimented with Colleges of agriculture located in Mando-Kaduna, Kabba, Samaru, Bakura, Yandev, Mokwa, Vom, etc all designed to provide a Research-Development-Education-Training (R-D-E-TA) framework for a sustained support to AESD with pilot enclaves at Gombe and Funtua. The erstwhile breakthroughs in the development of new crop varieties, animal breeds, improved production practices to curb outbreak of diseases for crops, livestock, etc was the handwork of the R & D centers. Similarly, effective dissemination and promotion led to high uptake and provided the need technical support to the policies is very evident across the entire northern region. The dynamic and vibrant Agric-Res-Ext-Training System (ARETS), which allow the north, maintain lead in the economic growth, was characterized, as the best in Sub-Saharan Africa by several development partners is now a history.

3.4 Failure to develop producer/processors organizations/cooperatives:

The initial blueprint provided by the first leaders for nurturing and developing of cooperative societies to handle each of the key agricultural segments-production, marketing and products-oriented industry was successful. This effort was aimed at empowering and building the technical, organizational and managerial

capabilities of the groups and their members. The logical expectations were democratic groups able to represent their members and advocate for their interest in policy formulation and implementation. The process started from either community or farm or enterprise based organizations at the grass root in order to harness family or community initiatives to promote production, marketing or processing/manufacturing with clear pathway of advancement to LGAs, states, regional and national levels. This effort was again abandoned after the demise of the first leaders and a top-down approach was imposed where national, state and LGAs officers are selected into various offices without visible and functional link to the base-organizations at the wards and grass root levels. Thus, the desire to promote cooperatives that are partners in developing the agric sector was changed to having cooperatives that were parasitic and dependent on the public for the survival contributing very little to the growth of the agricultural sector and rural economy.

These unfortunate realities pin point to the fact that an entire generation committed a mistake where the silent majority just watched the few, which culminated in the decimal performance of the north in the most virile sector. The sum total can be summarized as follows: in the share holding of key infrastructure located in the

north compared to the other regions of the country over the last 50 years. The north has 51.8% of the total 193000 km road network and 64.8% of total 4500 km rail line. The latter experienced stagnation since early 1980's. Furthermore, another index of misplacement of priority by the northern leadership is more apparent in the power sector. Out of the 7519MW of power generation output, the north can only boast for 2140MW representing only 28.5%, in 2013, which continue to drop as a result of several avoidable constraints. This has direct effect on population of agro-allied Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in the north as compared to those located in the south. Out of registered 768 MSMEs only 383 MSMEs are located in the north representing 49.8%. This low figure is attributable to the failure of the immediate leadership to further develop and advance family trades/businesses into MSMEs to provide the necessary and important pathway to migrate from agricultural commodities to products. The examples left by SAB-SS are around cotton, groundnut and hides & skins. The clusters of ginneries, textiles, oil mills, tanneries and leather factories in Kaduna, Kano, Funtua, Gusau, Zaria, etc are testimonies.

The failure of the northern past leadership, except the first team of SAB-SS, is also apparent in the banking and finance, which are necessary tools to develop the agricultural sector, and by

extension the rural economy. The decimal performance is the north has only 3% banking assets and 2% insurance despite the huge economic activities pivoted by the agricultural sector. A clearer pointer of the wrong steps taken by the northern leadership is the 25.4% (240) participation in Micro Finance Bank (MFBs) out of a total of 951 MFBs in the country.

4. Matters arising

The leadership in the north, comprising of politicians, elites, religious, traditional, intellectuals, must wake up from the long slumber and face the present realities. The successive leadership after the demise of SAB-SS not only failed to continue with the implementation of the well-articulated socio-economic development agenda but also changed course of the history of their people in all ramifications. The results of this prodigious error of judgment are apparent today permeating all facets of our lives. One area everybody agrees the north can favorably compete and lead is the agricultural sector, which has been established globally, as the springboard used to change the fortunes of many nations. The pathway is agro-industrialization, which is summarized, in the four developmental phases:

- **Phase One:** Begins when agricultural productivity per worker rises. The key indexes are land productivity, water productivity, and labour productivity. This increased

productivity creates a surplus along with challenges of pre- and post harvest losses, storage, preservation, etc.

- **Phase Two:** The surplus can be tapped directly, through taxation and factor flows, or indirectly, through government intervention into the rural-urban terms of trade. This surplus can be utilized to develop the non-agricultural sector, and this phase has been the focus of most dual economy models of development. For resources to flow out of agriculture, rural factor and product markets must become better integrated with those in the rest of the economy.

- **Phase Three:** The progressive integration of the agricultural sector into the macro economy, via improved infrastructure and market-equilibrium linkages, trigger real agricultural development.

- **Phase Four:** When agricultural development is successful, the role of agriculture in industrialized economies is little different from the role of the steel, housing, or insurance sectors. But when the integration is not successfully accomplished governments encounter serious problems of resource allocation and even problems beyond their borders because of pervasive attempts by high-income countries to protect their farmers from foreign competition. Most countries have found it extremely difficult for political reasons.

4.1 What is agro-industrialization

Though many changes fall under the term, two stand out as

defining features. First, industrialization brings a shift from agricultural commodities to food products. Second, it leads to a shift from spot auction markets to more direct market channels, such as production contracts. To a considerable extent, therefore, industrialization is about converting agriculture from a “here is what we produce” mentality to “here is what consumers want” philosophy.

4.2 What triggers agro-industrialization

Agro-industrialization is the result of two powerful forces--a new consumer and a new producer--and the impact these two players have on the markets where they meet. The new consumer is a highly demanding sort, the kind of buyer that has come to realize that his/her/their actions can humble even huge corporations. The new producer, on the other hand is being armed with array of new technology and management tools that enable food to be engineered--from the farm to the dinner table. A more demanding consumer and a more capable producer would seem to be a perfect match not only to sustain agro-industrialization but also to promote the process to the higher phases of economic development. The only problem is that the traditional markets that have moved food from farmers to consumers don't deal with these kinds of partnerships very well.

Also of critical importance are the new lifestyles, shifting

demographics, and a growing appreciation for the link between diet and health are leading to wholesale change in the way Nigerians eat and the foods they buy. The most fundamental implication of these food consumption changes is the splintering of the mass food market into numerous niches.

5. Outlook for agro-industrialization

A number of forces point to the fact that agro-industrialization in Nigeria is at the corner. Three will be particularly important: scale economics, new technologies that enhance coordination, and the emergence of strong “integrators.” Taken together, economic forces, new technology, and well-structured market and firms are pushing agriculture in the direction of rapid industrialization. It is difficult to provide precise pathways on the issue but it is clear that the tempo of change would be sustained.

5.1 What changes is agro-industrialization likely to bring

Change will probably come first to the Horticultural, Cotton, Oil seeds, and some aspects livestock (Hides & Skins, dairy) industries, where appreciable advances were recorded. Fisheries, Cassava Cattle feeding are probably next. Ranching would probably never will be industrialized, simply because there are too many people for whom ranching is mostly a way of life

and for whom market incentives are not decisive in business decisions. Cereal crops will also move toward industrialization, although much will depend on the future direction of policies supporting the commodity and marketing programmes. Radical shifts on targeted subsidies for both programs would attract more growers and improved the markets operations.

Freelance farmers, who are not participating in any sort of contract farming, produce majority of the nation's major grain crops. The practice of contract farming was lost with the major changes on marketing boards of the early 1970's. Application of geneticists in production of agricultural products is likely to unlock more special-use grains—a development that almost certainly will encourage identity-preserved products.

Agro-industrialization will bring a further the healthy polarization to agriculture into-commodities and products. The rate of agro-industrialization would increasingly favour the latter against the former. One can think of commodity agriculture as the “sea” that covers most of the farm belt. But emerging out of this sea will be an ever-increasing number of islands of specialized production outside traditional markets. Some of the islands will be big, such as the diary/fruits industry, while others will be small, such as popcorn for corn chips. The big

difference between these two agricultures will be profit margins. Commodity agriculture will be low margin, and producers and processors will operate at low cost and high volume. The islands of specialized production will be more profitable, because more value is added. The question will be how the profits are divided between producers and integrators.

6. The Implications of agro-industrialization

6.1 Changes in agricultural policy

Agro-industrialization cuts to the core of many fundamental farm and agricultural policies because it makes agriculture more like many other industries. This will have a major impact on the future of commodity production programs and the role of government in agricultural markets vis-a-vis the emergence of products programs. At the state and local level, policies that would promote the dual goals with deliberate preference on the products over the commodities need to be developed. Laws on farm corporate structure, rural institutions and environmental regulations will influence where industrialized production takes place.

6.2 Changes in the rural economy

Agro-industrialization will have a major impact on the rural economy, though these impacts are not well understood. Industrialization has a positive

effect on a number of rural communities, because it brings value-added processing to them. The textile, broiler/diary or catfish industry are good examples. Ginneries, packinghouses, have located near the production hubs, bringing jobs and income to those communities. But not all communities will benefit. Indeed, a casual survey would show that textile, broiler industries, flour mills, are mostly in larger peri-urban communities, not in small towns. Moreover, agro-industrialized production structures have a smaller indirect economic impact on communities where they do locate. More production inputs, including financial capital, are purchased from non-local sources. And more of the profits go to non-local owners of the firm.

In short, agro-industrialization suggests a rural economy where economic impacts are much more concentrated than under the more popular market structure, where commodity production is the backbone for many rural communities. Moreover, agro-industrialization will revamp agriculture's multiplier even in those communities that are hubs for industrialized production. This suggests that communities have much more complex economic development decisions to make.

6.3 Changes in institutions connected with agric sector

6.3.1 Agric extension services

Finally, agro-industrialization

will reshape many agricultural institutions, both public and private. Two public institutions that will clearly be affected will be the extension service and the Research-Development-Education-Training (R-D-E-TA) approach promoted by the “Land Grant Universities”.

Although many forces confront the extension service, agro-industrialization promises to force some critical decisions. By altering the links among the links in the food system, the extension service will have to decide who its customers really are. Should the extension system aim to provide services to growers (contract or freelance), processors, rural communities, or all of the above? How much of the research and development in agriculture is being undertaken by private sector?. With more of the research and development in industrialized agriculture flowing from the private sector, does the extension service have a compelling role in technology transfer process?. What should be the mode of financing extension services whether public or a mixture of public and private?.

6.3.2 Agric research and development

Institutions involved in (R-D-E-TA) face some of the same choices in redefining their roles and their clientele. Is the food processor the client of these institutions, and if so, what research does the public provide and what does the firm provide?

Is the commodity producer or grower the client? If so, what does that suggest about the research and education

programs of these institutions? Traditional farm education programs have focused on giving farmers the skills to manage production and market their crop. Under an agro-industrialized structure, more and more farmers will determine their income through negotiation, not through the use of futures contracts.

6.3.3 Agric education and training programmes

Do current training curricula in Colleges and Universities reflect the trend of emerging of more and sophisticated food processor as against traditional commodity growers?. In another dimension, the consumer is a growing client for of the (R-D-E-TA). Are the colleges and university providing quality standards and nutritional information on food products produced under an agro-industrialized structure? In answering all these questions, the thrust of (R-D-E-TA) agricultural programs is likely to undergo substantial change.

7. Conclusion

Agro-industrialization is inevitable and would reshape Nigeria agriculture if properly handled. Consumers want food that is consistently tailored to their tastes and preferences. Armed with new technology and production practices, farmers are increasingly able to fine tune food products from the earliest stages of production.

The firms that bring farm products to consumers are forging new marketing arrangements to ensure that food supplies hit the new consumer targets. These capital-intensive firms are the

“integrators” that are the real driving force behind industrialization. Facing both wall street and the impulses of the new consumer, these firms have discovered that vertically coordinated business relationships reduce their financial and quality risks.

Agro-industrialization must pilot-tested in few areas with well-defined market segments, it however, must be tail-guided to spread to other segments of agriculture—more of responsive to genuine client's needs. The pace of change appears to be increasing in the recent past (6years back). In the period ahead it now seems likely that agro-industrialization will spread to more diverse segments of agriculture including the grain production.

A new way of doing business, agro-industrialization will bring change to many things that have long depended on a more traditional market structure. Agricultural policy makers will raise new questions about basing farm programs on commodities when more farm production is product driven.

As more products move to consumers outside of traditional markets, the federal government's role in monitoring such markets will be re-evaluated. State and local governments may try to resist the more corporate structure of industrialized agriculture, but the industry may simply go where it is welcome. Finally, agro-industrialization will bring fundamental changes to the extension service and land grant universities as both try to assess who their new customers are.

AN OUTLOOK OF 2016 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET

According to oxford dictionary of economics, a budget is a statement of a government planned receipts and expenditure for some future period, normally a year. This is usually accompanied by a statement of actual receipts and expenditure for the previous period. A budget can either be a surplus budget or deficit budget. A budget surplus means that total government receipts exceeds spending while a budget deficit means that spending by a government exceeds its proceeds.

The approved 2016 budget of Nigeria shows that huge allocations are centered on the headquarters in most ministries. This allocation is mainly for financing salaries and allowances making less capital budgets in all the regions. Debt financing of the budget is mainly from domestic sources which could have more interest rate than the foreign debt. As such the deficit is probably going to be financed by increasing taxes from either multinational companies or its citizenry although this is unpopular, it is the best way to finance budget deficit, other ways are to cut government spending as I highlighted earlier and print money which should be avoided. Although the government has not categorically state what it will do with the funds gotten from

TSA and funds recovered from the fight of corruption. This could be used to finance the deficit if need arises.

In relation to Revenue which is drying up, the government needs an overhaul of its tax system, a lot of companies do not pay tax, and the government should also renegotiate the upstream sector which could bring more royalties which will increase its revenue.

KEY CONCEPTS IN A BUDGET DEBT SERVICE AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE

In the 2016 approved budget, debt service is expected to increase while capital expenditure is projected to increase. The proposed proportion in debt service expenditure is 24.34% compared to 32.4% in the 2015 estimates. Total debt service amount to N1,475 trillion in 2016 approved budget compared to N943 billion and N712 in 2015 and 2014 respectively. Although, debt management office attributes the high debt service in Nigeria to six factors; inefficiency trade and exchange rates policies, unfavourable exchange rates movement, unfavourable interest rates movement, poor lending and inefficient loan utilization, poor debt management and accumulation of areas and penalties. The present administration decision

to float exchange rate regime will present a challenge on debt servicing and we are looking forward to observe how it affect Nigerian economy. Giving the significant increase in capital expenditure, it appears that funds are being borrowed to finance to finance developmental projects rather than recurrent expenditure. As a percentage of aggregate expenditure, capital expenditure accounts for 26.2%. This is a sharp increase from 2015 when capital expenditure amounted to 14.5% of aggregate expenditure.

RECURRENT EXPENDITURE

An aggregate expenditure of N6, 060 trillion has been approved for 2016 budget. This is higher compared to N4, 358 trillion for the year 2015. The expenditure figure consist of N351 billion in 2016, which is lower compared to N412 billion in 2015 for statutory transfer (for Judiciary, National assembly etc.). Recurrent expenditure slightly increase to N2,646 trillion in 2016 from N2,616 trillion in 2015.

Government has to plan to curb recurrent expenditure through cuts in international travels and training, reducing non-essential administrative expenditure. I think more creative measures are required to reverse the trend of increasing recurrent expenditure in Nigeria.

GOVERNMENT REVENUE

Nigerian government relies heavily on crude oil revenue to fund government spending. Oil account to about 80% of government foreign exchange. Due to fall in price of oil, out of N6,060 trillion approved budget for 2016, N820 billion is made up of oil revenue, while N2,892 trillion is projected to come from non-oil revenue. However, in 2015 budget, the budget proposal revenue has an aggregate revenue of N3.60 billion, which made up of oil revenue of N1,918 trillion and non-oil revenue of N1,684 (implying a ratio of 53% oil revenues to 47% non-oil). The government intends to increase tax revenue in 2016 through company income tax, value

added tax and custom duties tax accounting to N867 billion, N198 billion and N324 respectively.

It was mentioned that government will work with various agencies to ensure they remit funds to the Treasury and with banks to ensure strict compliance in order to achieve the revenue forecast. The implementation of single treasury account by federal government had ensured strict compliance and we project that the revenue forecast will be realised.

Analyses of approved 2016 budget by ministries and geographical zones

Federal Ministry of Transportation

According to the approved 2016 budget for Federal Ministry of Transport, it was observed that North West political zone was allocated with 47% of the total approved budget for the ministry. This was followed by South West zone with an allocation of 33% of the ministry's budget. Others are the ministry headquarters 9%; North Central 5%; South East 1%; South South 4%; &FCT 1%. North East has the least percent of the allocation which was 0.44%. The following table and figure presented the budget distribution according to the zones and allocation:

Table1: 2016 FEDERAL BUDGET APPROVED (Federal Ministry of Transportation)

S/N	Zone	States	Allocation	Percentage
1	North Central	Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger & Plateau	N10,343,435,158.61	5.48%
2	North East	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, &Yobe	N835, 430,656.23	0.44%
3	North West	Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Jigawa, Kaduna and Zamfara&Kebbi	N88,265,252,143.58	46.78%
4	South East	Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, & Imo	N2,432,727,259.73	1.29%
5	South South	Akwa Ibo m, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo & Rivers	N 6,809,798,443.23	3.61%
6	South West	Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun & Oyo	N62,813,075,606.62	33.29%
7	FCT	FCT	N1,991,897,940.00	1.06%
8	Headquarters	Abuja	N15,183,062,466.00	8.05%
Grand Total			N188,674,679,674.00	100%




Fig1: Federal Ministry of Transportation 2016 approved budget

Federal Ministry of Works, Power and Housing

The 2016 Federal budget approved for the Ministry of Works, Power and Housing depicted that South West zone has the highest allocation of 19.44%, followed by the ministry's headquarters 18.98%, then North West zone with 16.36%, followed by North Central 12.58%. Others are South South, South East, and FCT with 9.96%; 8.98% and 2.02% respectively. Table 2 and Figure 2 displayed the distribution of the approved budget allocation and percentages for the ministry according to each political zone and FCT.

Table 2: 2016 FEDERAL BUDGET APPROVED (Federal Ministry of Works, Power & Housing)

S/N	Zone	States	Allocation	Percentage
1	North Central	Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger & Plateau	N53,218,953,402.28	12.58%
2	North East	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, & Yobe	N49,416,346,354.26	11.68%
3	North West	Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Jigawa, Kaduna and Zamfara&Kebbi	N69,204,893,681.05	16.36%
4	South East	Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, & Imo	N38,000,779,177.04	8.98%
5	South South	Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo & Rivers	N42,110,990,008.14	9.96%
6	South West	Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun & Oyo	N 82,203,568,697.84	19.44%
7	FCT	FCT	N8,536,545,427.38	2.02%
8	Headquarters	Abuja	N80,272,851,747.00	18.98%
Grand Total			N422,964,928,495.00	100%

Federal Ministry of Works, Power and Housing




Fig 2: Federal Ministry of Works, Power & Housing 2016 approved budget

Federal Ministry of Water Resources

The approved budget for the Ministry of Water Resources indicated that North West Zone has the highest share of the allocation represented by 25.28%, following north west closely was North Central with 24.03% of the total allocation of the ministry. The ministry's headquarters ranked third in terms of allocation represented by 13.03%, then South South 10.82%. Others are South West, North East and South East with 9.11%; 9.10 and 8.63% respectively. The distribution of the allocation in terms of zones is displayed in Figure 3 below:

Federal Ministry of Water Resources




Fig 3: Federal Ministry of Water Resources 2016 approved budget

Federal Ministry of Education

The 2016 approved budget for the Ministry of Education revealed that the ministry's headquarters has the highest allocation of 29.29% compared with the six geo-political zones of the country which have less than 15% each. North West zone ranked second with 14.58%, followed by North East 13.67% and South West 11.66%. Others are South South 9.08%, North Central 8.38%, FCT 7.88 while South East zone has the least allocation of 5.46% as displayed in Table 4 and Figure 4 respectively

Table 4: 2016 FEDERAL BUDGET APPROVED (Federal Ministry of Education)

S/N	Zone	States	Allocation	Percentage
1	North Central	Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger & Plateau	N2,970,469,213.95	8.38%
2	North East	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, & Yobe	N4,844,887,443.69	13.67%
3	North West	Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Jigawa, Kaduna and Zamfara&Kebbi	N5,166,852,148.38	14.58%
4	South East	Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, & Imo	N1,933,383,673.05	5.46%
5	South South	Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo & Rivers	N3,216,622,553.10	9.08%
6	South West	Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun & Oyo	N4,130,518,679.94	11.66%
7	FCT	FCT	N2,793,640,868.91	7.88%
8	Headquaters	Abuja	N10,377,112,885.00	29.29%
Grand Total			N35,433,487,466.00	100%




Fig. 4: Federal Ministry of Education 2016 approved budget

Federal Ministry of Health

The approved 2016 budget for the Federal Ministry of Health showed that the ministry's headquarters catered away with the largest share of the total money allotted to the ministry. Table 5 below showed that (64.62%) goes to the headquarters, North West has 7.25% followed by North East zone with an allocation of 6.35% of the budget, South West 6.15%; then North Central 5.16%; South South 4.10%; South East 3.84% and FCT 2.53%. The distribution of the fiscal allocation is presented according to zones and percentage

Table 5: 2016 FEDERAL BUDGET APPROVED (Federal Ministry of Health)

S/N	Zone	States	Allocation	Percentage
1	North Central	Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger & Plateau	N 1,479,512,620.53	5.16%
2	North East	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, & Yobe	N 1,818,983,536.44	6.35%
3	North West	Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Jigawa, Kaduna and Zamfara&Kebbi	N2,076,949,387.12	7.25%
4	South East	Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, & Imo	N1,100,573,618.08	3.84%
5	South South	Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo & Rivers	N1,174,140,154.82	4.10%
6	South West	Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun & Oyo	N1,761,660,661.95	6.15%
7	FCT	FCT	N725,685,716.06	2.53%
8	Headquarters	Abuja	N18,512,837,292.00	64.62%
Grand Total			28,650,342,987.00	100%




Fig 5: Federal Ministry of Health 2016 approved budget

Federal Ministry of Environment

The same case was also found in the Federal Ministry of Environment as in the Federal Ministry of Health whereby the larger percentage of the approved budget for the ministry goes to the headquarters. Here also, the headquarters was allocated with 41.77% of the budget, next to it was South West zone 20.33%; followed by North Central 19.34%; South South 10.01%. North West and North East have the lowest allocation of 3.98% and 3.52% respectively. The approved budget also indicated that FCT has a 0% allocation as displayed in Table 6 and Figure 6 below

Table 6: 2016 FEDERAL BUDGET APPROVED (Federal Ministry of Environment)

S/N	Zone	States	Allocation	Percentage
1	North Central	Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger & Plateau	N 958,911,523.33	19.34%
2	North East	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, & Yobe	N174,415,999.33	3.52%
3	North West	Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Jigawa, Kaduna and Zamfara&Kebbi	N197,148,688.33	3.98%
4	South East	Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, & Imo	N52,279,339.34	1.05%
5	South South	Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo & Rivers	N496,271,130.33	10.01%
6	South West	Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun & Oyo	N1,007,929,918.34	20.33%
7	FCT	FCT	N0.00	0.00%
8	Headquarters	Abuja	N2,071,008,039.00	41.77%
Grand Total			N4,957,964,638.00	100%




Fig 6: Federal Ministry of Environment 2016 approved budget

Budget Summary

According to the schedule of appropriation of the 2016 Federal budget approved, it was indicated that 43.66% of the budget will go for recurrent (non-debt) expenditure. Capital expenditure is allocated with 26.20%, followed by domestic debts 21.57%. Statutory transfers 5.80%; sinking fund to retire maturing loans 1.87% and foreign debts was allocated with 0.90%. Table 7 and Figure 7 below displayed the schedule of appropriation.

Table 7: 2016 Federal Budget Summaries

S/N	Details	Appropriation (N)	%Allocation
1	Domestic Debts	N 1,307,400,000,000.00	21.57%
2	Foreign Debts	N54,480,000,000.00	0.90%
3	Sinking Fund to Retire Maturing Loans	N113,440,000,000.00	1.87%
4	Recurrent (Non-Debt) Expenditure	N2,646,389,236,196.00	43.66%
5	Capital Expenditure	N1,587,598,122,031.00	26.20%
6	Statutory Transfers	N351,370,000,000.00	5.80%
		N 6,060,677,358,227.00	100%




Fig.7: 2016 Federal Budget summaries

Revenue Expectation

The revenue expectations as approved in the 2016 Federal Budget suggested that 38.75% will come from deficit; 24.75% is expected from Federal Government Independent Revenue; 14.31% from Company Income Tax; 13.53% from Oil Revenue; 5.39% from Customs and Duties; while 3.27% will be generated from Value Added Tax. The 2016 revenue expectations are displayed in the following table and figure.

Table 8: 2016 Federal Budget Revenue Expectations

S/N	Details	Appropriation (N)	%Allocation
1	Oil Revenue	820,000,000,000.00	13.53%
2	Company Income Tax	867,460,000,000.00	14.31%
3	Value Added Tax	198,240,000,000.00	3.27%
4	Customs & Duties	326,440,000,000.00	5.39%
5	FG Independent Revenue	1,500,000,000,000.00	24.75%
6	Deficit	2,348,537,358,227.00	38.75%
	Total	6,060,677,358,227.00	100.00



Fig.8: 2016 Federal Budget Revenue Expectations

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Nigeria government still relies heavily on oil revenue. A lot of focus by analyst have been on the deregulation of downstream sector and almost nothing have been articulated about the upstream sector were major oil exploration takes place. The government needs to set up a department that will be responsible for monitoring the amount of oil that's explored within the Nigerian territory and not rely on the estimates given by multi-national companies. I believe there is a need to renegotiate the terms of royalties being paid to Nigerian governments which can be done through world trade organisation or through negotiating with oil companies or home countries. This is a short term solution, in the long-run, we need to diversify the economy and move away from oil due to Dutch disease syndrome that most oil endowed countries experience. Government needs to increase future expected revenue from taxation. According to the Heritage Foundation 2012 data, France had a tax to GDP ratio of 44.6%, Sweden 45.6%, UK 39%, US 27% Tanzania 12%, Burkina Faso 11.5%, Nigeria 6.1%. Hence, government needs to systematically improve the tax to GDP ratios in Nigeria by focusing on sectors were taxes are not optimally received.

OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF 2016 BUDGET FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

(FMARD AND ITS 41 PARASTATALS AND AGENCIES)

By Prof. S.Z. Abubakar

1. INTRODUCTION

The much-awaited budget of hope and change for the new administration is finally with the national assembly (NASS) for deliberation and passing into a formal bill to deuce the unprecedented expectations across the country. The process of subjecting the budget proposal of the FGN is not a restricted responsibility of the NASS but of all Nigerians who can add value and draw attention of the appropriate quarters for improvement or complete change. It is on this premise that this exercise is carried with the hope this humble input would reach the targeted quarter and concerned individuals or groups.

The FGN budget proposal for the Agricultural Sector (AS) prepared by FMARD was in two parts: Budget for the Main Ministry (BMM) and Budget for the 41 Parastatals and Agencies (BPAs). The total allocation to the AS is 76,753,672,275 representing 1.78% of the nation's total budget appropriation for 2016. This is clearly below the Mapotu declaration where a minimum of 10% of the total budget appropriation is recommended to be allocated to the agricultural sector in a strategic way if the desired economic growth of the nation is to be achieved. Perhaps the realities of today this is not

attainable from conventional funding through budget. Other more radical mechanisms for funding the agricultural sector are very essential now. This issue would be addressed in the recommendations of this submission.

The allocation is shared as follows:

- a) Personnel Cost --- 28,052,924,408 (36.549%)
- b) Overhead Cost ----- 1,699,622,233 (02.214%)
- c) Capital Cost ----- 47,001,125,634 (61.236%)

The distribution of the budget allocation into main sub-heads is very impressive and is in line with the declaration of the new administration to reverse the trend of services the recurrent expenditure at the detriment of the capital expenditure. A total of 61.24% of the total budget proposal id allocated to capital projects is therefore commendable and it is our pray that this new planning would continue in subsequent years. Thus the observations and analysis of the budget proposal of FMARD would be focused on allocations for the Capital Projects to both MM and PAs respectively.

2. BUDGET OF THE MAIN MINISTRY (BMM)

A total sum of 40,918,856,927

is the proposed budget for the MM in 2016 with the breakdown as follows:

- a) Personnel Cost----- 6,182,470,524 (15%),
- b) Overhead Cost ----- 235,259,192 (0.6%) and
- c) Capital Projects -34,501,127,211 (84%)

The allocation of 84% of the Capital Projects to the BMM is predicated upon 5 thrusts as:

- 1) Import substitution commodity value chain (I S C V C s) ----- 10,401,592,202
- 2) Export substitution commodity value chain (E S C V C s) ----- 9,634,714,356
- 3) Labour intensive family enterprise programmes (L I F E P) - - 2,651,127,206
- 4) Agricultural mechanization (AM)--- ----- -1,009,650,000
- 5) Grazing reserve/stock routes development (G R S R D) ----- 1,000,000,000

This approach suggest that the MM is laying great emphasis on direct and central implementation and coordination of programmes and projects rather than playing the conventional role of policy and strategies formulation, monitoring and evaluation of

implementation by the relevant agencies and parastatals. Fortunately, most the agencies of FMARD are R&D and Training / Capacity development oriented which placed them in a favourable position to lead the implementation of most of the programmes and project contrary to what is being proposed in 2016.

The following Commodity Value Chains (CVCs) were selected for each of the above thrusts and allocated the following funds:

1) ISCVCS (10 Commodities):

Rice-2bn, Wheat-1.9bn, Soyabeans-0.8bn, Maize-1.5bn, Fisheries-0.4bn, Milk/Cattle breeding-0.63bn, Fruits/Vegetables-0.53bn, Cassava-1.16bn, Gum-Arabic-0.8bn and Cowpea-0.7bn

2) ESCVCS (15 Commodities):

Cocoa-1.9bn, Oil Palm-1.2bn, Cashew - 0.75bn, Sesame/Acha-0.5bn, Honey-0.185bn, Bush Mango-0.35bn, Kenaf-0.5bn, Cotton-1.66bn, Shea Butter-0.127bn, Rubber-0.48bn, G/Nut-0.85bn, Sorghum/Millet-0.899bn, Smoking kiln-0.15bn, leather-0.04bn and Beef Production-0.155bn.

3) LIFEP (2 Major focal areas):

- Provision and installation of small and large mills (68 cottage mills for G/Nut, 40 cottage mills for Palm Oil, 40 cottage mills for Palm Kernel)
- Establishment of 6 small mills processing plants for cluster dairy farmers
- Establishment of 1800 household poultry production units.

- Aquaculture programmes

4) AM (2 major areas):

- Provision of Animal traction to 3,377 farmers in core ecologies

- Attract 5000 youths per state to cultivate 2ha each

5) GRSRD (No details on this project/programme)

3. OBSERVATIONS ON ALLOCATIONS TO CAPITAL PROJECTS OF MAIN MINISTRY

1) The details provided for thrusts 1 (ISCVCS) and 2 (ESCVCS) clearly shows emphasis is laid on production aspect of most commodities with very little attention to marketing and value addition. The strategies for either backward or forward integration for each commodity value chain are missing, which is the key for job creation for the youths.

2) It also very obvious that the FMARD is still directly involved in the production cycle of most listed commodity value chains especially at production input level. This would prevent unlocking the upstream markets thereby restrict growth of the rural economy.

3) The following listed key capital projects directly being handle by the Main Ministry are very closely tied to the State, LGAs and Community levels. Strategies for their successfully implementation are missing in spite of the huge allocation made:

- a. National grazing reserve and stock routes development – 1bn

b. Agricultural extension service support – 1bn

c. Guarantee minimum price scheme – 1bn

d. Support to farmer group cooperatives – 33.5m only. The role indicated for FGN to play is actual the roles of SGs and GLCs in this regard. Thus a different strategy needs to be identified for FGN to play complimentary role.

4) Another capital project is irrigation and crop development – 622m. The listed activities are NOT linked with any functional public irrigation scheme (PIS) in the country under the RBDAS-FMWR. There are on-going interventions by TRIMING Project under counterpart funding with WB which 5 selected key PISs across the country. FMARD need to channel these funds in this direction with clear partnership arrangement with affected SGs, LGCs and FMWR for the nation to achieve the desired growth in this area.

4. BUDGET ALLOCATION TO PARASTATALS AND AGENCIES OF FMARD

The FMARD has a total of 41 parastatals and agencies (PAs) with 17 research centers, 16 specialized colleges of agriculture and other 8 agencies. The balance of 12, 499, 998, 423 of the total allocated capital budget to FMARD was shared to the 41 PAs representing only 26.6%. The Table below shows the capital projects allocation to each category of the PAs of FMARD for 2016.

Budget Allocation to Parastatals and Agencies of FMARD IN 2016

SN	G/Political Zone	Res Institutes	Amt Allocated (Nx10 ⁶)	Federal Colleges of Agriculture	Amt Allocated (Nx10 ⁶)	Remarks
1	North West	IAR, Samaru	271.47	PI&SPTech, Kano	63.17	
		NAPRI, Shika	274.94	Cooperatives, Kdn	469.34	
		NAERLS, Zaria	147.58			
Sub-Total			693.99		532.51	
2	North East	LCRI, MDguri	358.18	FWFTech, Baga	295.13	
					303.82	
Sub total			358.18		598.95	
3	North Center	ARMTI, Ilorin	646.89	FWFTech, N/Bussa	052.24	
		NCAM, Ilorin	773.94	AHPTech, Vom	077.77	
		NCRI, Badagi	562.43	VMLTech, Vom	044.78	
		NISPRI, Ilorin	266.64	LRTech, Kuru Jos	074.67	
		NVRI, Vom	745.31			
Sub total			3,318.81		249.46	
4	South West	NIHORT, Ibadan	313.75	Cooperatives, Ibadan	169.50	
		CRIN, Ibadan	333.28	FMTech, Lagos	991.58	
		IAR&T, Ibadan	320.43	AHPTech, Ibadan	439.64	
		NIOMAR, Lagos	822.11	Agric, MP/Ibadan	278.81	
Sub total			1,789.57		2,035.15	
5	South East	NRCRI, Umudike	701.99	Agric, Ishiagu	661.43	
					041.36	
Sub total			701.99		702.79	
6	South South	NIFOR, Benin	145.95	Cooperatives,	131.16	RRIN has zero overhead allocation
		RRIN, Benin	040.46	Orji River		
Sub total			186.41		131.16	
7	Grand Total		7,048.95		4,250.02	

Other Parastatals and Agencies were allocated the following for capital projects:

- NAIC -108.87 (has no personnel cost allocation)
- NAQS – 140.57 (has no personnel cost allocation)
- ARCN–213.38
- NASC–606.11

4. OBSERVATIONS OF ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL PROJECTS TO AGENCIES AND PARASTATALS IN FMARD

1) Marketing aspects is not given proper attention reflecting on the budget allocation for capital projects in both MM and PAs. The only Federal College (FC) that serves the nation in this area is FC of Produce Inspection and

Stored Products located in Kano was allocated 63m as capital. Most of the VCs under both Import and Export Substitution Commodities are affected by poor produce quality and weak grading system that enhance market competitiveness in and outside the country. To improve this poor performance, the nation must critically review its strategies in this area and invest heavily starting from 2016 budget. The 1bn allocated to GMPS by the MM need INTEGRATE with the issue of produce quality, grading system, warehouse and receipt system.

2) Similarly, the issue of livestock production, processing, marketing, NGRSRD, paddock system, SMMPP, etc appeared in

several programmes/projects in the budget of the MM. The only Research Institute responsible for these issues with more than 10 commodities under its mandate ranging from small/large ruminants, birds, pigs, rabbits, grasses, etc and is expected to serve the entire country is NAPRI, Shika. Yet its allocation for capital is only 274m while the MM retained almost 3bn (DCB-0.63bn, NGRSRD-1bn and VSPC-1bn). More allocation is required to both NAPRI, Shika. Stronger and similar argument is also tenable for NVRI, Vom (with 745m as capital) that has installed capacity to provide the required vaccines for most deadly diseases to our livestock.

3) Agricultural Extension Support Services (AESS) across all the import, export substitution value chains (10 plus 15 commodities) and the LIFEPs as well as the development/strengthening of farmer and processor cooperatives is very critical for the 2016 budget to make tangible impact in the agricultural sector across the national, state, LGAs, wards and community levels. The agency that drives this issue nationwide is NAERLS, Zaria with functional regional offices in 6 locations of Kano, Ibadan, Umudike, Badagi-Bida, Maiduguri and P/Harcourt. An allocation of 147m ONLY to NAERLS while the MM retains over 1bn shows lack of undertaking of the critical role of AESS and the principal role other tiers of Gov'ts play facilitated by NAERLS. More allocation to NAERLS is needed if the nation is to see visible results in this area that touches on youths, women and vulnerable groups.

4) Considering the selection of Gum-Arabic and Rubber as one of the import and export substitution value chain commodities by the MM with an allocation of 800m and 481m, respectively, it is ONLY logical to also fund appropriately the corresponding research center RRIN, Benin in order to compliment the renewed effort on this viable commodity. The

current capital allocation of 040m to RRIN with zero allocation on overhead is clearly not adequate and must be reviewed upward if the institute is to play any meaningful role in 2016 fiscal year.

5) Similarly, increased funding to the capital projects of IAR, Samaru, NCRI, Badagi from 271m and 562m respectively being the corresponding RIs with mandate for most of the import and export substitution value chains.

6) The issue of increased land use and improved productivity and conservation of the land mass against deterioration, erosion and degradation, etc is aptly reflected in the budget of the

MM where fertilization and soil amendments were budgeted for in each value chain. However the 2 FCs of Land Resource Technology located in Jos and Owerri responsible to serve the entire nation on this subject matter were allocated 74.6m and 41.4m, respectively. The task of land consolidation, fertility improvement, erosion prevention, etc are critical if the FGN is to achieve the set targets in production and these Colleges can effectively lead in this direction if properly funded.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are key recommendations, which the NASS in collaboration with the FMARD can urgently consider during the on going processing of considering the 2016 budget appropriation:



i. The allocation of 1.68% of the total budget to the agricultural sector is not in tandem with the CHANGE slogan of the APC and is grossly inadequate given the level priority the new administration placed on the sector. In order to key-in to the Maputo declaration of 10%, the budget proposal needs to be reviewed upward to at least 5%.

ii. It is obvious that due to economic downturn the FGN is under tremendous pressure to critically analyze its priorities and come up with other funding mechanisms to finance the agricultural sector. **A proposal on strategies to achieve multiple funding for the agric sector is already developed and ready for discussion,**

iii. The approach of direct and central implementation and coordination of programmes and projects by the MM of FMARD should be discouraged to allowing the agencies and parastatals to lead implementation in their areas of competencies as the world best practice. This would allow deep and effective synergy between FGN, SGs, LGCs and Communities who are often sidelined in the approach being proposed,

iv. The proposed implementation modalities of the Guarantee Minimum Price Scheme (GMPS-1bn) by the MM of FMARD is NOT clear on how it would be harmonized with the SGs on selected Commodities based on the

An allocation of 147m ONLY to NAERLS while the MM retains over 1bn shows lack of undertaking of the critical role of AESS and the principal role other ties of Gov'ts play facilitated by NAERLS.

national policy on food security and self-sufficiency. This can be effectively handled if integrated with the warehouse and receipt system currently being contemplated by some SGs. **A proposal and strategies on how to implement this is already developed and ready for discussion,**

v. The proposed implementation modalities of the Agricultural Extension Support Services (AESS-1bn) by the MM of FMARD is NOT clear on how it would be harmonized with those of the SGs, RBDAs and LGCs who have contact with the grass root clients if tangible impact are expected. The tripartite arrangement of complementarity between these actors is very essential where differentiation of roles and responsibility would be promoted and synergy

enhanced for better results. **A proposal and strategies on this already developed and ready for discussion.**

vi. The specific programmes and projects that would provide direction and strategies for the implementation of the National Grazing Reserve and Stock Routes Development (NGRSRD) is NOT provided in the budget proposal of the MM of FMARD despite the allocation of 1bn. There is apparent absence of specialized agency that can handle this critical national issue within the FMARD. Due to the strategic importance of the issue to both national security and economy, an agency can be established to synergize with and compliment the role of Federal Department of Forestry in the FMARD in order to avoid issue raised in recommendation (ii) above for this crucial area.

The Political Economy of Corruption in Nigeria

by Yima Sen

It is no longer news to suggest that Nigeria is on the verge of being completely destroyed by corruption. What is news is that since the middle of the 19th century, the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to be precise, the biggest theft in world history has been the colonization of Africa.

Second to that and since 1960 the biggest theft in human history, has been the colossal amount of money, approximately US\$450 billion or N285 trillion lost through corruption in Nigeria, the main homeland of blacks in the world, at the beginning of the third millennium. In fact the picture of corruption in Nigeria is sometimes like a horror movie, as more clearly evident since the revelations at the start of the Muhammadu Buhari administration.

This is the compelling reason to begin to understand the political economy of a phenomenon which is doing so much damage to a territory of vast human and material resources that are enough to build a modern state that can compete very well with others worldwide in the era of globalization. While Nigeria has almost functionally failed, it still retains a national carcass which can be resuscitated with good leadership.

Political economy as used here refers to the interconnectedness of political and economic factors in understanding development dynamics in social formations or national entities. And its use precedes the Keynesian paradigm of government intervention in market forces. A political economic analysis integrates considerations of historical, cultural and social factors with those of political and economic systems. In this sense, behaviour and values, in other words psychology and sociology combine with political and power factors and the production, distribution and exchange elements of economics to determine the human condition over historical periods. Ultimately, what is happening to people's incomes, wellbeing and livelihoods, becomes the concern and target of political economy. In the case of the analysis here, the fact that recent studies have established that critical public institutions are the main centres of corruption justifies a political economy analysis of corruption in Nigeria,

What colonialism did was to integrate the pre-industrial mercantilism and petty production economy of the Nigerian colony established fully in 1914 into the global mercantilist, industrial, military - industrial

-communication-entertainment complex in their historical phases. This process of globalization has not been peculiar to Nigeria. What has been exceptional here is the earlier volume of slave trading off the Nigerian coast and the contemporary ruination of the Nigerian political economy by corruption; much of it institutionalized during the military era, and which has become hegemonic with civil rule.

White settler colonialism and European-type productive capacity and a well-guided anti-colonial ideology have helped propel South Africa forward. Egypt to the north has similarly performed well even economically, on the basis of political stability founded on a concrete ideology. South Africa has flourished despite a high crime rate apparently resulting from the transition from injustice to too-slowly evolving equity. And in the case of Egypt, it has marched on despite domestic and regional instability, including cross-border and neighbourhood wars. Where these countries should have been Nigeria's mates in Africa, they have disgraced Nigeria in terms of infrastructure and social services, as well as productive capacity. Not to be outdone, Nigeria has chosen to become the African star in corruption.

The colonial economy of Nigeria was an essentially agricultural and solid minerals economy. Produce like groundnuts, cocoa, palm oil and kernels, beniseed and livestock, including hides and skins were the principal cash agro-products. There were also food agro-products like cassava, yams, rice, maize, corn and others. The solid minerals of tin, columbite and coal also nourished the export-oriented Nigerian economy. Even with the discovery of oil at Oloibiri in 1956 the fundamental economic resources of Nigeria are still agriculture and solid minerals, now abandoned for the monoculture of the hydrocarbon industry, at least for foreign exchange earnings.

The hydrocarbon or oil and gas economy which has come to dominate foreign exchange earnings and accounts for much of what is called the federation account money provides the funding for emoluments and overhead costs of the public sector and finances the capital projects that are implemented mainly by the private sector. Nigeria's oil and gas are extracted by mainly foreign partners of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) within the quotas of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC). Other forms of crude extraction and sales are oil bloc allocations, spot lifts, bunkering and direct oil theft.

On balance, oil resources have immediate target beneficiaries of about two million Nigerians and through multiplier effects of about five to ten million people. This is the money that is appropriated and expended by the President, Ministers, Federal Agencies and Departments, the National Assembly, Governors, Commissioners, State Assemblies, Local Government Chairmen, and Councilors as well as sundry government contractors (who inflate

Nigeria's oil and gas are extracted by mainly foreign partners of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) within the quotas of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC).

contracts), consultants and others. The excess crude account which captures the surplus from favourable international crude oil pricing has become a controversial fund subject to abuse.

Outside the capital that is managed in the non-contracting private sector, the mainstream economy including manufacturers, bankers and traders, it is the federation account money that has been

the main victim of corruption. Of course fraud and other forms of crimes exist in the wider society on an unacceptable scale. There have been other forms of politically-induced corrupt accumulation through indigenization, privatization and monetization. The biggest damage to the society seems to come from the theft of public money which is meant for development purposes like power, education, health, public transportation, water, housing and national security, among other sectors.

All forms of corruption are bad, but the one that bites hardest seems to be political corruption. However, in the case of the federation account, it is distributed to the federal government, states and local governments. Its distribution is in such a way that most non-oil producing states receive about 10 to 15 percent less than the oil-producing states. Within this context is a policy of 13 percent derivation, the Niger Delta Development Commission, the Niger Delta Ministry, and the community development programmes of oil companies, which also channel their revenues from oil back to oil producing communities for community development, environmental rehabilitation, infrastructure and services and human capital development. Much of this money from government and the oil companies is embezzled.

Here are some examples: One of the chief executives of the predecessor to NDDC, a university professor, stole a lot of money and migrated from Nigeria leaving behind his television presenter wife. The “tummy-tuck” governor of oil-rich Bayelsa State, now deceased, was arrested in Europe with large sums of money. He jumped bail and mysteriously returned to Nigeria, only to be impeached and prosecuted. He is reputed to have helped himself with substantial stolen public money while in office. Another oil-state governor on the run, wanted for theft, was arrested in Dubai and is serving time in an English jail. On this one, the whisper is that he took away from the federation account alone, about US\$667 million or N100 billion in a period of eight years in office, slightly less than his colleague from another oil-rich state who took from the same source about US\$800 million, or N120 billion during the same period. Presently another former oil-rich state governor is facing charges of stealing “only” US\$ 300 million or N45 billion. Since then news about theft of billions of dollars of national money in Nigeria is no longer news. What with the scandal surrounding the diversion of national security money by former National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki to the private pockets of military chiefs and politicians, and more?

Even in a country like Nigeria where the big news would be

that there are no corrupt practices to report these revelations are blood cuddling. Governors of other states have also been accused of such wrongdoings, although involving smaller amounts of money. So have Presidents, Ministers and Assemblymen and women. Even top bankers have been exposed to be grand thieves, and more recently, lawyers of the bar and bench have stood accused.

However, the popular masses of Nigeria need to know who is stealing national wealth in order to know where to properly channel their wrath and aggression. The other national wealth comes from local and international loans, and grants and taxes, customs duties and sundry internally-generated revenue at the federal and state levels. All states in the federation receive their statutory allocations from Abuja, their federal character shares of appointments and their underdevelopment should be blamed on their governors and local government chairmen, not on imaginary Hausa-Fulani oppressors, even when a Yoruba man is President and bombs 20 settlements in Tiv land. Recent terrorist activities from Boko Haram, cattle herds' folk and Biafranists require equal attention in terms of solutions.

Within the framework of a political economy analysis, the problem of Nigeria is not that of building alliances within regions or between and among

ethnic or religious groups and mixes of nationalities or zones for elections. There is a problem of a national thieving elite versus the broad masses both of which classes are everywhere. Those who steal public resources use them to purchase political power, so they recycle themselves. They create or amend the constitution to protect their interests and thereby promote the hegemony of corruption. So that despite the ingenuity and relevance of zoning and rotation of political and other top public service positions to deal with the national question in Nigeria, its political development challenges go beyond that. They include how to promote equity and egalitarian development and ensure that due processes are not violated or manipulated in public administration.

Rogues cannot promote a productive economy because they do not need to do that. The monies they steal are hidden or laundered in properties, cars or used to satisfy newly acquired expensive tastes in clothes, jewelry, champagnes, sexual tourism or just plain prostitution. This corruption trickles down to pollute the rest of the society and correlates with or promotes bribery and other forms of crimes and vices. They do not have a need for a productive economy because the objectives of production are to make money and provide services. However, since they are anti-social and irresponsible, and their money is made easily and is substantial and needs to be hidden, why bother about production?

In any case, Nigeria's factors of production are too weak or rendered too weak to propel the country forward: difficult land access; underemployed, unpaid or unemployed labour; scarce capital; largely misplaced entrepreneurial skills; low technology; and a hardly existence industrial base. Low productivity engenders unemployment and poverty which promote a youth bulge leading to criminal militancy or even war and a high crime rate. This is the story of the political economy of corruption in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and the main home of blacks worldwide.

This is the problem that has been thrown into the laps of three agencies: the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). So when the EFCC boss, Farida Waziri cried out that courts and the press are used by corrupt people and there should be capital punishment for some categories of offenders, we know that as a lawyer and a former senior police officer, she has appraised the problem to be very very serious.

Nigeria could have done better but it seems to have derailed. Maybe the derailment was caused by military rule, the civil war and the discovery of oil which have cumulatively and conjointly corrupted the country and rubbished it of good leaders. Some of the

present crop of political leaders in Nigeria, perhaps until the Buhari intervention of hope, are probably the worst that are running any twenty-first century state anywhere in the world. They are opportunistic, unprincipled, mercenary and despicable. There is as a result no alternative to the return of Nigeria back on its correct political economic track except through a revolutionary reconstruction of its society, economy and polity. Today that revolution seems to a velvet revolution led by Buhari. If he fails, this could lead to a red revolution, which may be bloody.

Capitalism, whose theoretical foundation is rooted in self interest and greed, is more prone to corruption than socialism especially primitive accumulation. However, legislation, reforms and checks and balances have somehow blunted the vicious fangs of capitalism in many global communities, despite its crash around 2008, which has highlighted its weak foundations and vulnerability. In Nigeria, we seem to have moved into a combined phase of barbarism and savagery in a colony of corruption, run by its hegemons.

There are two approaches at solution: One, the international community, in the post-cold war era, must push Nigeria towards a social democratic leadership; and two, Nigerians themselves regardless of clan, ethnicity, religion, section,

Low productivity engenders unemployment and poverty which promote a youth bulge leading to criminal militancy or even war and a high crime rate.

zone or region must rise up against their oppressors and enthrone a leadership also in the social democratic tradition. This leadership must be situated within a system of governance that rewards propriety and virtue substantially and punishes corruption and crime severely.

Other than that, the Nigerian political economy becomes a factory for churning out poverty and underdevelopment or "dirty rich" people, on whom the manufactured poor depend for either systemic "safety nets" which in any case are not available or become useless, or philanthropy. A better society is one that has systemic equity and egalitarianism, and which makes safety nets and philanthropy irrelevant.

**Sen teaches mass communication, political science and international relations at Baze University, Abuja, Nigeria.*



The End of Oil

How to play the greatest shift in the energy market for 100 years

In this report you will discover:

- Why the collapse of the oil kings is imminent
- Three little charts and the coming solar revolution
- Winston Churchill's greatest gamble
- How to play the race for "white diesel"

Dear Fellow Investor,

Oil's place at the heart of the world economy is over. Empires will fall. And fortunes will be made.

If you're pressed for time, that's the three sentence version of

what this report is about.

Of course, there's a lot going on in those few sentences. A huge shift in the energy markets – dominated by oil and oil derivatives for so long – is under way. It is perhaps the greatest shift the energy world has or will see for a century. And it will entirely remake the world as we know it.

Nations that have long relied on oil as their route to wealth and power will, at best, suffer a decline and, at worst, collapse altogether.

In fact, earlier in the year I published a somewhat controversial report on the looming threat to oil dependent

nations like Saudi Arabia. I called the report "Fall of the House of Saud". If you didn't see it, the idea was simple: the House of Saud – rulers of Saudi Arabia – has used the Kingdom's oil reserves to accrue huge wealth and status. No oil, no power, no House of Saud.

It was a controversial claim – and a risk to publish. After all, Saudi Arabia is still one of the wealthiest nations on the planet, with the financial and political influence to get what it wants. So I'll admit: I've been surprised by how quickly the story has moved from informed speculation to reality.

For instance, at the start of May, the Saudi's sacked their Oil Minister of 20 years... and even renamed the Oil Ministry itself – replacing it with a new Ministry of Energy, Industry and Mining.

Then Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the man charged with turning the economy round, made the problem rather more explicit.

"We have an addiction to oil. This is dangerous."

And of course, recent short term developments have betrayed the Saudi state of panic...

DESPERATE: The country is now looking to sell an estimated 5% stake in Saudi Aramco – the state-owned oil company – to raise capital. This would be unthinkable if they saw the current price collapse as just a 'blip'.

BROKE: The country has to pay its contractors in IOUs, because they don't have enough money to hand.

SHEDDING MONEY: The country's foreign reserves are falling by \$10bn (£6.9bn) a month.

SHAKY ECONOMY: French bank Societe Generale is betting the country will have to ditch the riyal's peg to the dollar – which has been their economic policy since 1986 – to protect the Saudi's finances, which would cause the oil price to collapse even further.

These moves were unthinkable until the oil price crash, which has shown the Gulf state for the economic basket case it really is... totally dependent on crude for its survival.

But – for all the drama – those developments have all been just a taste of what it to come. Oil's days are numbered – but not for the reason anyone expected

You're probably familiar with the "Peak Oil" theory.

It's a theory popularised by analyst M King Hubbert in the 1950s. But it's had more than its 15 minutes of fame over the years, with several generations (right up to our own) of analysts subscribing to the concept. Like all popular ideas it is easy to understand: oil is finite and sooner or later we'll hit the point at which production begins to fall.

That would inevitably lead to shortages. Supply would become extremely tight. It'd be like the 1970s oil embargo on steroids.

From that point of view, the "end of oil" would come about in a blaze of high prices, resource scarcity and the oil wells running dry. We'd run out, and that would be the end of that.

But it didn't quite turn out like that.

In fact, the current oil slump – prices fell from over \$100 a

barrel to \$30 in two years – was caused by oversupply. Technology, which of course is our beat here at Exponential Investor, played a key role. New oil drilling techniques like hydraulic fracturing (fracking) opened up vast new supplies of oil in America. That scared traditional oil producing nations like Saudi Arabia and precipitated an all-out price war. The Saudi's flooded the market with way more oil than was needed to meet demand and prices fell.

Their goal? Drop prices enough to destroy the shale oil business in America.

They certainly succeeded in dropping prices. Whether the shale oil industry will drop with them is still up for debate.

But it's not the current slump that I want to talk to you about in this report. It's the final slump – the ultimate end of oil.

Which – as you're about to see – could be driven not by us running out of oil (the traditional argument)... but by demand for oil falling off a cliff.

What if we have gallons of oil... but nobody needs it?

Or to put it another way, what if we're approaching "peak demand"?

This was actually the conclusion the research house McKinsey came to in a report published in June. According to their analysts, demand for oil could peak entirely by 2030. As The Telegraph reported:

McKinsey's Occo Roelofsen said despite an expected increase in global population of around 36pc, and a doubling in global gross domestic product (GDP), shifting energy sector dynamics are set to depress energy demand.

"This change is driven by three factors: first, overall GDP growth is structurally lower as the population ages; second, the global economy is shifting away from energy-intensive industry towards services; and third, energy efficiency continues to improve significantly," he said. "Peak oil demand could be reached around 2030."

Or to put it another way, we're seeing huge improvements in alternative ways of producing energy efficiently that are now challenging the supremacy of oil. Renewables mean we're

able to get our energy from different sources – leading to a decline in demand for oil.

And further down the pipe, we're seeing a revolution in the transport industry – the rise of electric and driverless cars. That alone could slash millions of barrels of oil from global demand.

And therein lies the opportunity. The crumbling of oil-based empires will trigger transfer of wealth the like of which the world hasn't seen for decades. Helping you get on the right side of that transfer is one of our goals here at Exponential Investor.

The question is, which energy sources are rising to challenge oil? Click here to find out which investment opportunities our experts recommend. Three little charts and the coming solar revolution

I mentioned earlier that it was technology – hydraulic fracturing – that helped spark the current oil slump.


Well, it's another technology that could ultimately be the nail in the coffin for oil fossil fuels.

I'm talking about solar.

See, the key to so many emerging technologies is the fact that they're getting smaller, faster, cheaper. Those are the results of exponential growth. They're the driving forces behind everything from quantum computing to the next iPhone.


The same forces are driving the solar industry. Solar energy is getting cheaper. It is becoming more efficient. These trends are accelerating. And that's leading to rapidly growing numbers of new installations.

Look:



The price of solar energy has collapsed. That's led to an explosion of new installations.

The reason those trends appear so dramatic is because the numbers go back forty years. But narrow your focus to the last few years and the trend is the same. Look:




The price per watt of electricity generated by solar has more than halved in the last decade. Installations have increased six fold since 2010.

The chart tells the story. Falling prices allow increasing numbers of people to use solar energy as a viable energy source.

And that's exactly what they've been doing:


2014 New Electric Capacity Installed



These figures are from 2014 (the latest data set available through the Solar Energy Industry Association). What the above chart shows is the percentage of new energy installations coming onstream broken down by sector. Solar energy outstripped every other new supply.

All three charts tell the same story. The trends at work in the solar industry right now are driving it towards a moment of critical mass – the point at which solar becomes a genuine challenger to oil. In fact, some would say we’ve already hit that point. Consider:

- Since 2010, Italy has increased its solar capacity by over 410%
- In 2014, Germany acquired 6.9% of its entire energy needs from solar.
- But that’s nothing compared to the USA. Between 2004 and 2014, American capacity increased 40 times over as the chart below proves.



Source: Data from US Energy Information Administration’s Monthly Energy Review table 7.2a.

And the trend is accelerating. By the end of this year, US capacity is expected to double again.

That's an increase of 7,900% in just 12 years.

We're at a critical point. Rapidly improving technology and funding from governments and tech firms worldwide are combining to create the kind of opportunity you have to consider. Not only that, they're progressing at a rate that will make solar a viable option for power generation worldwide soon. That could signal a major shift in the energy market – and hasten the decline of oil.

But that's not the only thing challenging oil.

See, power generation is one part of the story. Transportation is another.

The race for "white petrol"

"It is a gospel fact...that a fleet with oil fuel will have an overwhelming strategic advantage over a coal fleet."

Those were the words of the British Navy Admiral, John Fisher, in 1902. Perhaps his point of view – that oil is a better and more efficient fuel than coal – is obvious to you now. It wasn't at the time. Fisher was something of a visionary in his day. In fact he was known as an "oil maniac". It was a description he liked.

The argument against oil in 1902 was actually pretty strong.

We didn't have much of it in Britain. In comparison, we had huge and ready supplies of coal. British coal could fuel British ships.

Over time, though, the advantages of using oil started to become clearer. It was more efficient, which meant boilers could be smaller and ships could run twice as far.

Admiral Fisher eventually found a powerful supporter – the First Lord Admiral of the British Navy, Winston Churchill. Churchill had decided to convert the navy to oil. He asked Fisher to oversee a Royal Commission on Oil Supply. As he told Fisher:

This liquid fuel problem has got to be solved...[It requires] the drive and enthusiasm of a big man. I want you for this, viz. to crack the nut. No one else can do it so well. Perhaps no one else can do it at all. I will put you in a position where you can crack the nut, if indeed it is crackable.

The problem, as I said, was finding a ready supply of oil. America already had large supplies. But rather than look west Churchill looked east – to the Middle East and in particular to Persia (modern day Iran).

That decision had many momentous consequences. Most of them are outside the remit of Exponential Investor. One of the most important outcomes of Churchill's

decision was it sparked a mad rush to secure oil supplies. As I'll show you, history is repeating itself once again in today's markets.

Churchill's first move was to acquire a stake in an oil exploration firm in Persia. As Dan Denning wrote a few years back:

On 17 June 1914, Churchill presented the British Parliament with a bill that authorised the Admiralty to buy 51% of Anglo-Persian's stock for £2.2 million. The bill passed by a vote of 254 to 18. Eleven days later, on 28 June, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated by the Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company would later be renamed British Petroleum, which, as you know, is still around today.

Let's just think about what was really happening here. This may sound predominately like a resources story – the world suddenly needed oil which kicked off a race to find it. But why did that happen?

It was technology. In the same way that the invention of the car created a massive demand for petroleum, the technology that allowed warships to run on oil revolutionised global demand for oil. They're both part of the same story.

Fast forward to today. The same story is repeating itself. Technology is once again at the

heart of things. This time it's petrol – and by extension oil – whose place is under threat. That's because battery technology has advanced to the point where it's becoming a genuinely viable alternative.

At the forefront of this is Tesla. Just a couple of weeks ago it announced its Tesla Model 3 electric car. According to reports, there have already been 400,000 pre-orders (the deposit was \$1,000).

But it's wrong to see this as just about Tesla. As one piece I read last week put it:

Chinese billionaire Jia Yueting is stepping onto Tesla's playing field with its own electric car start-up, Faraday Future, and Apple is planning one too, by 2019. Through its Alphabet holding company, Google is also getting into the game with plans for a self-driving car.

Then you have Ford, Honda, Toyota, Nissan all investing in the technology. On top of that you have commercial vehicle companies like Fed-ex working on similar ideas. There were even rumours here in Britain that Dyson were working on a project (a line in a government report describing the project was published and then swiftly deleted – more on that another day perhaps).

I've said this before, but I'll say it again because it sums the story up so neatly. The horseless carriage is being replaced by the petrol-less car.

That's sparked another mad rush from the companies at the forefront of the trend. But it's not oil they need. It's lithium.

Lithium is a vital component in a huge number of batteries (the most common kind of battery in use is known as a lithium-ion type battery).

If you're unfamiliar, lithium is the lightest of all metals. If you were to see it in the wild, it would appear soft and silver-white, which is why it's known as "white petrol". It's an alkali metal so lithium is highly reactive and flammable.

The last time you took a plane you might have seen warnings about taking lithium batteries on planes. In fact when Boeing released the Dreamliner replacement for the 747 it was plagued with problems with its batteries. Parts of the plane catching fire were a major issue until better housings were developed. The fact lithium is reactive makes it ideal for use as the anode (positive charge) in some batteries and as the electrolyte in others.

Major innovations are coming down the line in the development of lithium vanadium batteries, which will be used utilities, and Cambridge researchers have developed highly efficient lithium-air batteries but so far there are few replacements of lithium in the production of rechargeable batteries.

We'll look at that side of things

another day. Right now though, let's just consider the opportunity this is presenting. Because just as with oil a century ago, the mad race to secure large supplies of lithium is creating a major opportunity for lithium suppliers.

As The Economist put it at the start of the year:

Demand is on the up. At the moment, the main lithium-ion battery-makers are Samsung and LG of South Korea, Panasonic and Sony of Japan, and ATL of Hong Kong.

But China also has many battery-makers. Adam Collins of Liberum, another investment bank, talks of an "inflection-point" in Chinese demand for lithium salts. Its government is stepping up the promotion of lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles, with the biggest emphasis on buses. Sales of "new energy" vehicles in China almost tripled in the first ten months of 2015 compared with the same period in 2014, to 171,000.

This major ramping up in demand has – as you'd expect – translated into a sharp increase in lithium prices. This chart tells the story – pay particular attention to the doubling in prices at the backend of last year:

Charging up

Lithium carbonate spot price per tonne
 \$'000



Source: Citigroup

That kind of massive ramp up in price tells us a couple of things. It would say it shows signs of panic buying. The price could slide once the panic subsides. But the panic itself tells us that there are people in the market who do not want to miss the boat, and are worried there won't be enough lithium to meet demand.

Perhaps Elon Musk, founder and CEO of Tesla Motors, is one of them. As he said put it, "In order to produce a half million cars per year... we would basically need to absorb the entire world's lithium-ion production."

That gives lithium producers a strong hand. I doubt Tesla will be able to corner the entire market. But a message like that is a signal that producers can invest in bringing new supplies online to meet the demand.

History is repeating itself. Technology is changing the

way we travel. That's having a knock on effect on the resources we demand. First came oil and petrol, now the race is on to grab supplies of "white petrol".

And here's another similarity between lithium and oil (certainly oil a century ago). It's not all that abundant. There are only a handful of places in the world we can find it. South America has more than 50% of global supplies. America and China have roughly 13% each. The rest of Asia and Europe don't really supply any meaningful amount of lithium at all.

This situation will change, as you can imagine. Exploding demand and tight supply creates a great incentive to develop new ways of producing lithium. The market will sort that side of things out.

But right now, this spells opportunity.

In fact, the whole "end of oil" story is ripe with opportunity.

It's an opportunity that tech expert Eoin Treacy has been investigating for a year now. Eoin writes Frontier Tech Investor – our sister publication. In it, Eoin goes a step further than we do here at Exponential Investor and gives you specific, actionable recommendations you can use to invest your money directly in the companies driving this change.

For instance, Eoin has uncovered a highly unusual play on the rise of solar... and the race to find supplies of lithium. He's expecting triple digit returns on both of those plays.

Nick O'Connor
 Publisher, Exponential Investor

This Article was first published by the



AN ANALYSIS OF SOLID MINERAL RESOURCES INVENTORY OF NORTHERN NIGERIA

By Prof. Saidu Baba

Department of Geology, University of Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

Nigeria as a nation is endowed with enormous solid mineral resources. Current records have shown that there are about 62 mineral types occurring in about 1207 locations in Nigeria. The geological settings of northern Nigeria made up of vast areas of Precambrian Basement Complex and Cretaceous-Tertiary sedimentary basins are favorable for various types of mineralizations.

Analysis of the recent updated solid minerals inventory from the Ministry of Solid Minerals Development (MSMD), Nigerian Geological Survey Agency (NGSA), Raw Material Research and Development Council (RMRDC) and other relevant agencies and published research works indicate that all the 62 mineral types located are present in the northern part of the country except bitumen which is not mapped yet. Of the 1207 solid mineral locations 736 (61%) occur in the north. Over 58% of the Industrial minerals locations, 62% of the metallic minerals locations, 77% of the gemstones locations and 41.46% of the energy minerals locations in Nigeria are situated in the north. On the average over 60% of the Nigerian solid mineral occurrences are located in the three northern geo-political zones. Furthermore, of the seven (7) world class minerals, six (6) of them (Coal, Iron ore, Limestone, Baryte, Gold and Lead/Zinc) are dominantly located in the north. If these solid minerals can be developed the northern part of the country will play a leading role in revenue generation of the country and the agitation for resource control currently heating the policy will be minimized.

Introduction

A mineral by general definition is a naturally occurring homogenous substance, usually solid, inorganically formed, having a definite chemical composition and a systematic internal arrangement of atoms. Nigeria's Mineral and mining Act 2007, however, defined solid mineral as any substance whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form occurring in or on the earth, formed by or subjected to geological processes including occurrences or deposit of rocks, coal, coal bed gases, bituminous shales, tar sands, any substance that may be extracted from coal, shale, tar

sands, mineral water and mineral components in tailings and waste piles, but with the exclusion of petroleum and waters without mineral content. A mineral resource on the other hand is the total endowment (occurrences, deposits and reserves) that is ultimately available for extraction at profit.

Mineral resources are synonymous with Industrial power, and industrial power in turn is dependent upon ownership of large quantities of mineral resources that have become the backbone of industrial way of life. History has shown that the development

of the leading industrialized nations coincided with the exploitation of their mineral resources; initially coal then iron, for coal is one energy that makes the wheels move and the wheels are made of iron. Solid minerals are therefore one of the best alternative sources of economic development. In Nigeria, solid minerals, along with agriculture, fully funded the colonial administrations development projects despite the exploitative policies at that time.

Nigeria is generally endowed with abundant solid mineral resources distributed fairly across all the states of the

federation .Organized mining activities in Nigeria started in 1903 and continued into 1970s and 1980s. The solid minerals sector in Nigeria has witnessed several stages of development from pre-colonial era when there was no legislation and policies to the colonial era when proper documentation began. The post-colonial era witnessed various and inconsistent policies and programmes as well as political instability. In the immediate post-independent era, Nigeria depended to a very large extent on solid minerals, particularly tin, Columbite, coal, lead/zinc and gold for its foreign exchange earnings. At one time Nigeria was among the top six producers of tin and a leading exporter of Columbite (both of which were being mined from northern Nigeria) in the world (Lukman, 1983).

During that time the solid mineral sector ranked second only to agriculture as a source of foreign exchange earner. The sector also contributed substantially to the national output accounting for about 10% of the GDP in 1970 (Kogbe, 1976). The annual average output of the sector was put at 130.8 thousand metric tons over the years 1970-1973 and it employed over 49 thousand workers per annum over the period 1958-1970. However, with the exit of the multinational mining companies in the wake of the indigenization decree of 1972, the performance of the sector declined.

The discovery of oil in 1957/1958 which led to the oil boom of 1970s and 1980s pushed the mining sector, and of course agricultural sector, to the back seat of our economy. Government attention shifted to petroleum industry hence the contribution of solid minerals sector to the nation's GDP dropped from about 3% in 1978 to less than 0.3% in 2009. The earnings from the oil sector which was expected to be used to develop other sectors of the economy, including solid minerals, unfortunately did not happen. Consequently Nigeria became a one-commodity economy.

The Nigerian solid mineral sector is currently dominated by artisanal miners who use non-mechanical (crude) methods of exploration, extraction and processing within small-scale mining lease areas, producing very low tonnage of minerals products. Although they are currently being organized into corporative by the Artisanal and Small Scale (ASM) department of the Ministry of Solid Minerals Development, the aim is yet to be achieved. The large scale miners currently comprise only of quarry operations made up mostly of cement manufacturing and construction companies. By 2010 these operations generated less than ₦2 billion for the government.

In 1996 it was estimated that, if properly harnessed, Nigeria could earn over \$20 billion

(approx. ₦4 trillion) from solid mineral sector. Contemporary countries like India and South Africa earn over \$6 billion (approx. ₦1.2 trillion) and \$30 billion (approx. ₦6 trillion) annually from the same sector respectively (Baba,2013).

Despite its very strong potential for enhancing the nation's revenue base solid mineral sector has remained somewhat inert. This paper, the first and introductory to a series of planned contributions to solid mineral discourse, intends to highlight and analyze the solid mineral occurrences in the northern part of the country with a view to stimulating discussions and encouraging governments at various levels to pay more attention to this indispensable alternative source of economic development/

Synopsis of the Geology of Northern Nigeria

The geology of northern Nigeria, part of the geology of the entire country, is made up of three main litho-petrological units, namely; the Basement Complex Rocks, the Younger Granites and the Sedimentary Basins.

The Basement Complex: The Basement Complex forms the oldest group of rocks and is Precambrian (more than 570 million years old) in age. It comprises of four broad groups of rocks (i) Migmatite-Gneiss Complex (MGC), (ii) Schist Belts, (iii) Older Granites and (iv) Unmetamorphosed Acid and Basic Dykes (Rahaman, 1988).

(i) The MGC is considered to be the Basement complex *sensu stricto* and is the most widespread of all rock types in Nigeria exposed typically in the central (Abuja, Keffi, Akwanga, Okene), western (Kaduna, Kano, Funtua) and eastern (Bauchi, Hong-Mubi-Michika, Zing, Jalingo) parts of northern Nigeria. The rocks are high-grade metamorphic types including migmatites and gneisses with minor quartzites and marbles. These rocks are sources of construction materials and host some other economic mineral deposits.

(ii) The Schist Belts comprise of low-grade sediment-dominated metamorphic rocks trending in N-S direction best developed in the western part of the region. Lithologic units in this group include coarse-fine clastic, pelitic schists, phyllites, banded iron formation, carbonate rocks and amphibolites which are variably exposed in Maru, Anka, Zuru, Kazaure, Kuseriki, Zungeru and Kushaka in the western

part of the northern Nigeria. The age of these rocks have been reported to be 1040 ± 25 Million years by Ogezi (1977). This group of rocks is the main host for gold mineral mineralization in Nigeria.

(iii) The Older Granites (Pan-African Granitoids) are deep-sealed often concordant Precambrian granites (650 ± 5 Million years old) as distinguished from the high-level discordant tin-bearing Jurassic (145 Million years old) Younger Granites of Jos plateau (Falconer, 1911). The suite is composed dominantly of granites of variables textures, granodiorites and syenites with minor monzonites, gabbros and charnockites. Though these rocks are notable for their lack of associated mineralization they are good sources of construction materials and polished/dimension/decorative stones.

(iv) The Acid and Basic dykes are late to post-tectonic rocks whose emplacement marked the close of pan-African orogeny. They

are made up of pegmatitic, aplitic and syenitic dykes as acid bodies while the basic components are basaltic, doleritic and lamprophytic dykes. The pegmatites are known to host gemstones (e.g. tourmaline and beryl) and some metallic ores (cassiterite, columbite and tantalite).

The Younger Granites

These are non-Orogenic rocks which intruded the late Pan-African rocks of northern Nigeria in a N-S trend (Turner, 1989). They were emplaced by piece-meal stopping through collapsed central blocks as a result of ring fracturing and cauldron subsidence during the late Jurassic (140-305 Million years ago) period (Bowen et al., 1976). They outcrop as ring complexes concentrated around Jos in northern Nigeria where about 50 ring complexes have been mapped. Compositionally they compose of 95% acid rocks (granites and syenites) associated with minor basic rocks. The Younger Granites are the major sources of cassiterite (tin) and columbite mineralization as well as other important economic minerals such as tantalite, wolframite, galena, sphalerite, pyrochlore and gemstones (Lar et al. 2007).

The Sedimentary Basins

Of the seven major sedimentary basins in Nigeria four are in the

north viz: (i) Benue Trough (upper and middle), (ii) Bornu Basin (Nigeria sector of the Chad Basin), (iii) Bida Basin (mid Niger Basin) and (iv) Sokoto Basin (part of Iullemeden Basin)

(i) Benue Trough: The entire Benue Trough in Nigeria is divided into three; upper, middle and lower. The first two fall within the political north of the country. The Trough trends NNE-SSE from Yola in the north to Makurdi in the south. It contains about 6000m thick of Cretaceous- Tertiary sediments. Major localities that constitute the depocentres include Makurdi, Yendeve, Obi, Lafia and Wukari in the middle Benue Trough and Pindiga, Gombe, Ashaka, Bambam, Tula and Numan in the upper Benue Trough (Gongola sub-basin and Yola Arm). The general stratigraphic succession in the upper Benue Trough includes Bima sandstones, Yolde Formation, Gongila/Pindiga Formation, Dukul/Jessu/Sekule/Numanha/Lamja Formations, Fika shales, Gombe sandstones and Kerri-Kerri Formation while in the middle Benue Trough they comprise of Asu River Group, Ezeaku Formation, Keana/Awe Formation, Awgu Formation, Makurdi and Lafiya sandstones.

(ii) Bornu Basin: This is the Nigerian sector of the larger Chad basin covering an area of about 2,335,000km² and straddles five countries of Nigeria, Chad republic,

Cameroon republic, Niger republic and the Central African Republic. The Bornu basin is about one tenth of the total basin. The stratigraphy of the basin comprises of Bima sandstones which directly overlie the basement complex, followed by Gongila Formation, Fika shales, Gombe sandstones, Kerri-Kerri Formation and lastly the Chad Formation. Total sediment thickness in the basin is about ...

(iii) Sokoto Basin: The Sokoto (Iullemeden) basin in north-western Nigeria comprises of Pre-Cretaceous to Eocene sediments made up of the Gundumi-Ilo Formation, Rima group (Taloka, Dukamaje and Wurno Formations), Sokoto group (Dange, Kalambaina and Gamba Formations) and Gwandu Formation. Total sediment thickness in the basin is about 1200m.

(iv) Bida Basin (Mid-Niger Basin): This is a NW-SE trending intracratonic structure extending from Kontagora in Niger state to Lokoja in Kogi state and trends perpendicular to the Benue Trough. It is divided into two, namely the northern Bida basin and the southern Bida basin. The northern Bida basin comprises of Bida sandstones, Sakpe Iron stone, Enagi siltstone and Batati Formation while those in the southern Bida basin include Lokoja sandstone, Patti Formation and Agbaja Ironstones.

These various rock types

(Basement complex, Younger Granites and Sedimentary rocks) making up the geology of Nigeria are variably associated with different types of solid minerals. Some of these minerals occur in all rock types while others are restricted to specific rock types. The sedimentary basins have great potentials for petroleum generation, accumulation and trapping, but this is a subject for another day.

Solid Mineral Resources Inventory

As said earlier, Nigeria is blessed with enormous solid mineral resources spread fairly across the country. In 1995, when the Ministry of Solid Minerals Development was created, Nigeria was known to have thirty four (34) mineral types occurring in 450 locations. By the year 2010, more mineral types had been discovered and increased to 44 types occurring in over 700 locations. Geological and Mineral maps of geopolitical zones of Nigeria produced by the Nigerian Geological Survey Agency (2011) indicate that the north central zone has 15 mineral types, north east 34 mineral types and northwest has 31 mineral types. The most recent solid minerals inventory in the Ministry of Solid Minerals Development (2012) shows that Nigeria has 62 known mineral types occurring in over 1207 locations across the country. These mineral types are grouped into four (4) categories Viz :- (i) Industrial Minerals (ii) Metallic Minerals (iii) Gemstones (Precious and Semi-Precious) and (iv) Energy (and radioactive) minerals.

Of the 62 mineral types 34 are industrial types which include limestone, marble, dolomite, gypsum, baryte, asbestos, clays (bentonitic, bauxitic, ball clay, fire clay, brick clay and pottery clay), talc, feldspars, trona, brines (plus other salts), graphite, chromite, fluorite, garnet, galane, phosphate, kyanite, mica, magnesite, manganese, nickel, pyrite, quartz, topaz, monazite, sillimanite, lepidolite, bitumen,

tar sand, zircon, lead/zinc, silica, and dimension stones; eight (8) metallic minerals including tin ore (cassiterite), iron ore, columbite, tantalite, wolframite, gold/silver, and copper minerals ; seven (7) gemstones, (beryl, aquamarine, emerald, corundum, sapphire, ruby and tourmaline) and four (4) energy minerals (coal, lignite, uranium and bitumen/tar sand). In terms of number of occurrences of these

mineral types across the country, industrial minerals occur in 777 locations, metallic minerals in 224 locations, gemstones in 165 locations and energy minerals in 41 locations.

All these 62 mineral types occur in northern part of Nigeria except bitumen/tar sand which has not yet been mapped. Table 1 below shows the mineral types occurrences in each state and geopolitical zones of northern Nigeria.

Table 1: Solid mineral types occurring in northern Nigeria by states and zones

Zones	States	Solid Mineral Types
North central	Benue	Limestone, Marble, Baryte, Feldspar, Mica, Quartz, Felds par, Galena, Magnetite, Ilmenite, Bauxite, Clays, Laterite, Silica Sand, Dimension Stones
	Kwara	Limestone, Marble, Dolomite, Feldspar, Quartz, Cassiterite, Tantalite, Gold, Tourmaline, Kaolin, Clays, Laterite, Granite
	Kogi	Limestone, Marble, Dolomite, Kaolin, Clays, Feldspar, Mica, Phosphate, Sand, Later ite, Dimension Stones/Ornamental Stones, Cassiterite, Iron Ore, Gemstones, Coal
	Nasarawa	Marble, Baryte, Glass Sand, Laterite, Granite, Cassiterite, Columbite, Copper, Iron Ore, Galena, Gold, Gemstones (Tourmaline) Zircon, Monazite, Coal
	Niger	Limestone, Marble, Dolomite, A sbestos, Kaolin, Ball clay, Tale, Glass sandy, Quartz, Laterite, Granite, Tantalite, Wolframite, Iron ore, Gold, Gemstone (Tourmaline)
	Plateau	Marble Gypsum, Baryte Talc, Kaolin, Feldspar, Mica, Quartz, Granite, Tantalite, Columbite, Wolframite, Iron ore , Molybdenite, Zircon, Galena, Monazite, Pyrochlore, Xenotime
	FCT	Limestone, Marble, Dolomite, Feldspar, Mica, Tak, Kaolin sand, Topaz, Gold, Lead, Tin (Cassiterite), Columbite
North-East	Adamawa	Limestone, Marble, Gypsum, Baryte, Trona, Kaolin, Magnetite, Clays, Laterite, Granite, Coal, Uranium

	Bauchi	Gypsum, Trona, Kaolin, Feldspar, Quartz, Muscovite (mica), Talc, Glass sand, Laterite, Granite, (Cassiterite), Columbite, Tantalite, Wolframite, Lead/Zinc, Galena, Tungsten, Copper, Iron ore, Ilmenite, Rutile, Sphalerite, Gemstones (Agate), Coal, Monazite, Zircon
	Borno	Limestone, Gypsum, Trona, Feldspar, Quartz, Bentonite, Kaolin, Refractory clays, Silica sand, Laterite, Dimension stones, Iron ore, Gemstones (aquamarine, sapphire, topaz)
	Gombe	Limestone, Gypsum, Diatomite, Baryte, Kaolin, Laterite, Silica sand, Granite, Halite, Lead/Zinc Coal
	Taraba	Limestone, Baryte, Bentonite, Tin (Cassiterite), Columbite, Tantalite, Galena, Gemstones (sapphire, tourmaline, fluorspar), Zircon
	Yobe	Limestone, Gypsum, Diatomite, Trona, Salt (epsomite), Bentonite, Kaolin, Silica sand, Granite, Iron ore
North-West	Kaduna	Muscovite, Manganese, Limonite, Kyanite, Clays, Laterite, Granite, Tin (Cassiterite), Columbite, Iron ore, Beryl, Zircon, Gold
	Kano	Feldspar, Kaolin, Halite, Granite, Tin, Columbite, Wolframite, Ilmenite, Beryl, Amethyst, Galena, Monazite, Pyrochlore, Thorium
	Katsina	Gypsum, Granite, (Trona), Feldspar, Mica, Quartz, Asbestos, Sillimanite, Serpentine, Kaolin, Laterite, Silica sand, Granite, Iron ore, Manganese, Chromite, Tourmaline, Amethyst, Diamond, Uranium
	Kebbi	Limestone, Mica, Quartz, Bauxite clay, Kaolin, Salt, Magnesite, Laterite, Granite, Iron ore, Gold
	Jigawa	Kaolin, Talc, Glass sand, Laterite, Granite, Iron ore, Ilmenite, Columbite, Gemstones
	Sokoto	Limestone, Silica sand, Granite, Clays, Iron ore, Wolframite, Copper, Chromite, Gold
	Zamfara	Feldspar, Sand, Granite, Clays, Iron ore, Wolframite, Copper, Chromite, Gold

In terms of number of occurrence (locations) table 2 below shows the distribution of the mineral type groups in Nigeria and in the three northern zones.

Table 2: Distribution of Solid Mineral Resources (by number of occurrence) in Northern Nigeria by Geopolitical Zones

	Industrial minerals	Metallic minerals	Gemstones	Energy minerals	Total
Nigeria	777	224	165	41	1207
North central Zones	181	86	65	12	344
Northeast Zones	133	15	18	05	171
Northwest Zones	140	37	144	-	221
Total for Northern Region	454	138	127	17	736

Out of the 1207 mineral locations in Nigeria 736 (60.98%) are situated in northern Nigeria. Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of solid mineral occurrences in Nigeria as a whole compared to the two regions of north and south. Figure 2 is a pie chart showing the dominance of solid mineral occurrences in the north (61%) as compared to the south (39%).




Fig 1: Histogram of frequency distribution of solid minerals occurrences in Nigeria and in the two regions



Figure 2: Pie Chart showing the distribution of solid mineral resources in northern and southern Nigeria

Of the 777 industrial minerals occurrences in Nigeria 454 (58.43%) are located in the north; 138 (61.61%) of the 224 metallic minerals locations are in the north; 127 (76.97%) of the 165 gemstones locations are in the north and 17 (41.46%) of the country's energy minerals occurrences are located in the north (Table 2). Comparisons of these occurrences of mineral types in northern Nigeria with those in southern Nigeria are illustrated in figures 3, 4, and 6 below which show the regional distribution of these mineral groups in Nigeria.




Fig.3: Pie chart showing the distribution of industrial minerals in the two regions of Nigeria.

Number of occurrences




Fig.4: Pie chart showing the distribution of metallic mineral in the two regions of Nigeria.

Number of occurrences




Fig.5: Pie chart showing the distribution of gemstones in northern and southern Nigeria.

Number of occurrences




Fig.6: Pie chart showing the distribution of energy minerals in the two regions of Nigeria.

The pie-charts clearly show that at present northern Nigeria has more occurrences/deposits /reserves of industrial (58%), metallic ((62%), and gemstone (77%) mineral types with significant energy mineral occurrences (41%) compared to the 42%, 38%, 23% and 59% respectively for southern Nigeria. Further analysis of these figures and table 2 will show that about 61% of the total solid mineral occurrences so far mapped are in the northern part of the country. It can also be seen that all the three northern geopolitical zones are endowed with all the mineral group types except the northwest where energy minerals are yet to be mapped.

A state by state breakdown of these minerals in the north (Table 3) shows that all the states are variously endowed with enormous industrial minerals from a minimum of 6 locations in Katsina state to a maximum of 45 locations in Sokoto state.

Table 3: Distribution of mineral resources by number off location of state in northern Nigeria

	Industrial minerals	Metallic minerals	Gemstones	Energy minerals	Total
Adamawa	12	02	-	01	15
Bauchi	08	08	10	-	26
Benue	41	-	-	04	45
Borno	32	-	04	-	36
Gombe	22	-	-	04	26
Jigawa	21	06	06	-	33
Kaduna	16	12	09	-	37
Kano	21	07	04	-	32
Katsina	06	02	01	-	09
Kebbi	19	05	13	-	37
Kwara	15	15	13	-	43
Kogi	43	12	20	08	83
Nasarawa	16	04	04	-	24
Niger	09	03	13	-	21
Plateau	17	46	09	-	76
Sokoto	45	-	01	-	46
Taraba	18	05	04	-	27
Yobe	41	-	-	-	41
Zamfara	12	05	10	-	27
FCT	40	06	06	-	52
Total	454	138	127	17	736

All the states are also endowed with metallic minerals except 4 (Adamawa, Benue, Gombe and Yobe). Gemstones are also present in all the states of northern Nigeria except Adamawa, Benue, Gombe and Yobe states. The occurrences of energy minerals, particularly coal and Uranium, appear to be restricted to those states situated in the Benue Trough (Adamawa, Benue, Gombe and Kogi states). It is important to mention here that absence of a mineral in an area at a particular time does not rule out its occurrence. It is probably not yet located because of the scale of mapping. Most official geological mappings in Nigeria are on scales of 1:250,000 to 1:1,000,000. For proper mineral location, geological mapping should be on a scale 1:50,000 or even less. Again there are many reported mineral occurrences which are not yet documented and are therefore not included in this analysis. For instance micas and gemstones have been reported to occur within the Precambrian basement complex rocks of Gany-Toungo area of Adamawa State and copper mineralization in the Cretaceous sediments in Gujba area of Yobe state.

World Class Minerals

Nigeria geological surveys agency (NGSA) classified seven of the industrial minerals occurring in Nigeria as “**world class**”. They include coal, iron ore, baryte, gold, lead/zinc, limestone and bitumen, six of which (except

bitumen) dominantly occur in northern Nigeria.

Coal: Coal was first discovered in 1909 in eastern Nigeria. In 1950, the Nigerian coal corporation was formed and charged with the responsibility of exploration, envelopment and mining of coal resources. Between 1905 and 1959 production reached over 900,000 tonnes per annum. By 1980 production declined to less than 100,000 tonnes annually due to over reliance on non-coal power generating facilities. Nigerian coal has been found to be suitable for boiler fuel, production of high calorific gas, domestic heating, briquettes, formed coke and manufacture of wide range of chemicals (Waxes, resins, adhesives and dyes), It has low sulfur and ash content as well as low thermoplastic properties which make it ideal for coal-fired electric power plant (MMSD, 2008).

Available records in NGSAs shows that of the 28 coal deposits in Nigeria, 16 are located in the north (4 in Benue state, 4 in Gombe state and 8 in Kogi state). It has also been reported that the Benue and Kogi states deposits have reserve that can support a coal-fired power plant with combined ultimate capacity of 7,000 MW (RMRDC, 1996). Coal is also an essential raw material for steel industry.

Iron ore: Two types of Iron ore occur in the northern part of Nigeria (I) the Banded iron

formation (BIF) in folded bands associated with the Precambrian Schist Belt in northern Nigeria and (ii) the Oolitic iron deposits in north central and northeastern Nigeria. The Iron ores are mainly hematite and magnetite having Fe content of 34% - 70% with less than 0.1% Sulphur in all cases making them easy to beneficiate (Rahaman, 2012). Rough reserve estimates of the deposits indicate the availability of over 2,500 million tonnes of Iron ore in northern Nigeria (MMSD, 2008). Iron ore is the most essential raw material for steel industry.

Baryte: Baryte, the most common barium mineral, occurs principally as a gangue mineral in hydrothermal metalliferous veins which have formed at moderate to low temperature. Most of the occurrences in Nigeria are associated with the Cretaceous sandstones where they appear as fracture-filings. In northern Nigeria baryte occurs in Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa and Taraba states. The quality of Nigerian baryte is high having the specific gravity (SG) values ranging from 3.7 to 4.4, BaSO₄ content of 76% to 87% and silica and iron oxide contents of less than 10% and 3% respectively (RMRDC, 1996). Baryte is a very important raw material in the manufacture of drilling mud, paint and paper. At present, Nigeria imports a considerable quantity of baryte for use in the oil industry.

Gold: Gold in Nigeria is restricted to the western half of the country associated with the Precambrian supracrustal schist belts. In the zone, it occurs in Zamfara, Kebbi, Niger, Kogi and Kwara States. Officially recorded production in Nigeria started by 1913 and reached its peak in the period 1933-1943 when 1.4 tonnes of gold were produced annually (Lukman, 1983). The production declined during the Second World War period and never recovered. Nigeria mining corporation (NMC) started exploration for gold in the early 1980s but failed to be sustained due to lack of funding and the domination of the Nigeria economy by the oil sector.

Recent investigation by NGSa and private companies indicate that the assay values of the Nigerian gold range from 4.1g/tonnes in Kwara state to about 120g/tonnes in Zamfara state.

Lead/Zinc: The Pb/Zn mineralization in Nigeria is geologically restricted to the eastern part, particularly associated with the Benue Trough, two third of which is situated in northern part of the country. In the Upper Benue Trough it occurs in Isimiya, Diji and Gidan Dari while in the middle Benue Trough it is in Akwana and Arugu areas. The grade of the ore ranges from 3-5% lead. Recent exploration by NGSa has shown that there exist lead/zinc mineralization in the basement complex of

northwestern Nigeria in Anka, Abare, FCT etc (MMSD,2008). Lead is used in the manufacture of batteries, cable coverings, pigments and pipes.

Limestones/Marble/Dolomite (carbonates): Carbonate rocks occur in the form of limestones (sedimentary) or marble (metamorphic). In northern Nigeria limestone occurs in all the three geopolitical zones. It occurs in Benue, Nasarawa, Niger, Kwara, Plateau and Kogi States as well as Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in north central, in Adamawa, Gombe, Borno and Taraba States in north east and in Kebbi and Sokoto States in the north west zones. The NSRMEA (1999) analyzed the limestone samples from Yendeve (Benue state) and Kanji (Plateau State) and found them to be suitable for application as fluxes in the steel industry. Also the Jakura marble 40km from Lokoja is chemically pure and adequately meets the requirement of Ajaokuta steel plant. The reserve is put at 46.4 million tones and is presently being used by Dangote Cement Factory for the production of Portland cement just as the Ashaka deposit in Gombe State is being used by Ashaka Cement Company for the same purpose. The Guyuk limestone in Adamawa State has also been assessed as good for the production of Portland cement (Opeloye & Dio, 1999). The Burum (FCT)

dolomite is also chemically good with up to 40% CaO values and an estimated reserve of over 5.5 million tonnes. Despite the seeming progress in carbonate exploitation in northern Nigeria less than half of the occurrences have been mapped and discovered.

Conclusion

The various available geoscientific data obtained from authoritative sources show that the northern Nigeria is significantly endowed with solid mineral resources which if properly harnessed will improve the revenue profile of the region and the country in general. Northern Nigeria hosts over 60% of the identified solid minerals in the country. There are proven existence of large reserves of industrial minerals, excellent quarriable granites and good quality gemstones and energy minerals. All essential raw materials for steel industry are available in northern Nigeria including iron ore, limestone/marble, baryte and refractory clays. Opportunities for investment in solid minerals sector in northern Nigeria are enormous bearing in mind the expansive areas of unexplored potentials. If Nigeria is to return to its past days of glory as a world leading producer of metallic minerals, government needs to refocus and promote mining in the country. Two Road Maps for the development of solid minerals in Nigeria have so far been launched with the latest one been in 2016. Government

should endeavor to implement the recommended strategies in the Road Maps.

References

Baba, S. 2013 Diversifying the Nigerian Economy: Exploiting Nigeria's Solid Mineral Resources. A paper delivered at the NE Zonal Advocacy Workshop on Economic Diversification and Enhance Revenue Generation.

Organized by Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission

Bateman, A. M. and M. L. Jensen. 1981. Economic Minerals Deposits. Third edition. John Wiley & Sons, New York.

Bowden, P., van Breemen, O., Hutchison, J. and Turner, D.C. 1976. Palaeozoic and Mesozoic Age Trends for Some Ring Complexes in Niger and Nigeria. *Nature* 259, 297-299.

Falconer, J. D. 1911. The Geology and Geography of Northern Nigeria. MacMillan, London.

Nigerian Geological Survey Agency (NGSA). 2011. Mineral Resources Map of Nigeria.

Kogbe, C. A. 1976. Paleogeographic History of Nigeria from Albian Times. In: *Geology of Nigeria*. Elizabethan Publishers, Lagos. 15-35.

Lar, U. A., Daspan, R. I., Dibal,

A Lecture delivered at the H. U., Agati, J.Y, and Lekmang, I. C. 2007. *Geology and Mineral Resources of Plateau State*. Jos University Press. 110.

Lukman, R. (1983) Opportunities for Nigeria in Solid Mineral Resources Field. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. 31. Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. 2008. Baryte Exploration Opportunities in Nigeria. 8.

Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. 2008. Coal Exploration and Power Generating Opportunities in Nigeria. 11.

Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. 2008. Gold Exploration Opportunities in Nigeria. 6.

Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. 2008. Exploration Data on Iron Ore in Nigeria. 7.

Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. 2011. Mineral Resources of Nigeria. 30.

Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. 2012. Road Map for the Development of Solid Minerals and Metal Sector. 42.

National Steel Raw Material Exploration Agency (NSRMEA). 1999. Exploration for Steel Raw Materials in Nigeria. Kinard Printing. 175.

Nigerian Geological Survey

Agency (NGSA). *Geology and Mineral Resources of North-East Zone Nigeria; Regional Geology and Mineral Series* (First Edition). 36.

Ogezi, A. E. 1977. *Geochemistry and Geochronology of Basement Complex Rocks from Northwestern Nigeria*. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Leeds.

Opeloye, S. A. and Dio, C. J. 1999. *Geology and Mineral Resources of Adamawa State*, In: Adebayo and Tukur (Eds), *Adamawa State in Maps*. Rahaman, M. A. O. 1988. Recent Advances in the Study of Basement complex of Nigeria. In: *Geological Survey of Nigeria* (Ed), *Precambrian geology of Nigeria*. 11-13.

Rahaman, M. A. O. 2012. *Mineral Exploration: Key to National Development and Economic Transformation*. 24.

Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC). 1996. *Technical Reports on Minerals in Nigeria; Baryte*. Shearson Ltd. 18.

CHALLENGES OF EDUCATION IN THE NORTH: A New Response

By M.T. Maiyashi

Introduction

Many Scholars, policymakers and education practitioners hold varied views on the state education in Nigeria. Education has been a subject of intense debate at, conferences, workshops and discussions in the last two decades. The development of the education sector at local, state, and federal levels has been argued largely around two main premises. The first of these two premises is huge demand for funding for the provision of infrastructure and other important services which the State cannot afford. Some even argue that one of the major causes of our economic crisis is the high level of expenditure in the social services particularly education, far beyond the capacity of government, against the belief that government has the more crucial responsibility of building the material infrastructure. The debates at the various constitutional reviews for the provision of access to education at all levels expressedly show this.

The second premise is that the very products of the educational system are not productive in the economy, and hinder its development because what they learn is not useful and relevant. Arising from these two premises, are series of government policies towards education and employment which, seems to have seriously worsened, the already poor

state of education in the country. Some of the major policies include: (i) inadequate funding of education (ii) imposition of education levies and fees; (iii) large scale retrenchments and massive unemployment particularly youth who have acquired some level of education even at tertiary level.

In spite of the numerous policy reviews over the years, the state of education continuous to deepen into crisis. Perhaps the fundamental question we need to ask ourselves is: What type of education do we need? This question must be addressed against the backdrop of the type of nation and future we want to build for our children, our security and respect in a globalizing world.

Past generations have developed only some of the potential of some of our children. We can be the first generation to realize all of the potential of our country's young people through education. But this can only happen if, we develop the appropriate ideas and initiatives through holistic consultations to inform our decisions in reforming our education delivery to meet the demands of current century.

Nigeria is a country rich in natural resources, experiencing relatively robust economic growth particularly in the last two decades. However, the

degree to which this economic achievement has had an impact on progress in human life development has been abysmally low. More than two-thirds of Nigeria's citizens are living in poverty, and their life expectancy stands at just 52 years. Literacy rates are very low. If Nigeria is to translate its economic wealth into actual improvements in general living standards and quality of life for its citizens, then, education must be the vehicle to make this happen.

But to achieve any meaningful progress, a number of critical barriers must be tackled particularly at the basic level. Current key indicators are sobering. Today, about 42 percent of primary-school-age children, or roughly 10.5 million, are out of school. Ninety percent of these are from the Northern States. Net and gross enrolment rates have also worsened in recent years. Huge geographical disparities exist; the percentage of children out of school in the Northeast is 30 times greater than the percentage in the Southeast. In addition, delayed entry into primary school results in delayed graduation – on average only 37 percent of students finish primary school at the official primary-school-age of 11. Children who are in school are struggling to learn basic literacy and numeracy skills. Children are much worse off in the North, where

more than two – thirds of children who have completed sixth grade are unable to read.

The obstacles to achieving a strong foundation for quality education are numerous and complex and cannot be viewed in isolation. Not many of political elite appreciate this fact. With high levels of poverty and significant opportunity costs, many families are unable to afford sending their children to school. Other barriers, including religious beliefs and cultural norms, still prevent many girls from attending school in the north. Early marriage and subsequent teenage pregnancies have adversely affected attendance, retention, achievement in schools. The education sector has continued to struggle with challenging supply – side constrains. These manifest in insufficient and ill-maintained school infrastructure and lack of appropriate teaching materials and qualified teachers particularly, at the primary and pre- primary levels. These have contributed to the low education outcomes we see today. It is very important and indeed compelling to note that, these constraints are highly related to broader institutional and financial challenges.. The overcentralised institutional structure, lack of minimum standards, limited autonomy and accountability at the school level, and adequate monitoring of service delivery and outcomes have been at the heart of our educational crisis and as it seems, will remain with us for

a long time to come. Quality Assurance Personnel are untrained and ill-equipped to support the school system with solutions for teaching and learning improvement. In addition to these myriad of problems, we are faced a rapidly rising population putting increasing pressure on all sectors, including the education sector. Regrettably, we are not a planning nation. Addressing these complex and interrelated challenges will require comprehensive reforms. Attempts have been made by some of the States through the interventions of international development agencies such as DFID, USAID, UNICEF and the World Bank. But even in these states, the situation remains the same.



Our focus should aim at addressing the critical supply –side and demand –side barriers, with particular attention of the regions backward communities. This will involve:

- Improving the quality of education through

the provision of teacher training and materials for early childhood development, local language, primary – level science and mathematics instruction;

- Addressing urban/rural disparities through school grants and training of specialized teachers for rural schools.
- Improving governance and increased accountability through school-based management committees.

Poor Quality of Education

Learning outcomes, in particular literacy and numeracy are very poor and unsatisfactory. National Assessments indicate that three out of five students who have completed grade 4 and 44 percent of students who have completed grade 6 are not able to read a complete sentence in English or in their preferred language. Students perform slightly better in numeracy, mainly in urban schools, measured by a simple test of adding numbers. About 10 percent of students cannot even add numbers at the end of primary school. An analysis based on the 2010 Nigeria Education Data Survey shows that a significant number of students in Nigeria take 10 or more years of schooling to

master the basic competencies of reading, writing, and numeracy.

Learning outcomes are particularly bad in the North, where more than two-thirds of students who have completed grade 6 remain illiterate. This proportion is even higher in the Northeast, where 72 percent of students who completed primary school in grade 6 are unable to read. In the South, this proportion ranges between 18 and 28 percent in grade 6. Geographical disparities are similarly wide in numeracy outcomes. The worst – performing geographical zone is again the Northeast, where about 29 percent of students are unable to do simple addition problem when finishing primary school, compared with only 2 percent in the Southwest. It takes up to grade 10 for all students in the Northeast to grasp basic numeracy skills, whereas all students in the South are able to add numbers correctly by grade 5.

Inadequate School Infrastructure, Teaching Materials, and Poorly Qualified Teachers

Access and quality of schooling in the North is severely affected by a range of supply-side constraints including inadequate school infrastructure, teaching tools and qualified teachers. The national pupil/class ratio in primary classes was 49:1 and 62:1 at the junior secondary

school level in 2009, much higher than the recommended 35:1. Classes are found to especially large in the North where the average class size is 56 students, almost twice as many as an average classroom in the South. Classrooms in early childhood development (ECD) centers are also crowded, with an average of more than 130 pupils per classroom in the North. Even when schools are available they are often physically unsafe; and water, health, and sanitation facilities are inadequate, further discouraging attendance such as the current situation in the Northeast. The ratio of pupils to good classrooms is outrageous. It ranges from 109:1 at the primary level and 125:1 at the junior secondary level. Current estimates indicate a shortfall in classrooms for early childhood education to be 90 percent, primary education, 60 percent, and junior secondary education at 67 percent.

The lack of and poor quality of teachers has remained a serious hindrance to students' enrollment and learning. Teacher/ student ratios per pupil stood at 36:1 at the primary level in 2010 (World Bank 2012d). In addition, estimates from the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) in 2009 -10 indicate that only 60 percent of primary school teachers are qualified. The lack of teachers is particularly acute in the Northwest and Northeast,

where only 50 and 53 percent of teachers are qualified. The Southwest has close to 100 percent qualified teachers. One of the greatest challenges we face is that, even teachers with qualifications do not have the adequate competency to teach. This raises the fundamental issue on the quality of pre-service training in the teacher training institutions-i.e. the colleges of education and the universities. Students and teachers do not have adequate educational tools. About 80 percent or more of students in Nigeria do not have a textbook for a subject, about 60 percent of primary students do not have a mathematics or English textbook, and materials in languages other than English are scarce. There is similarly a dearth of instructional materials for teachers; fewer than 15 percent of teachers in Kaduna, Kwara, and Lagos have teacher guide, and the situation is even worse in Jigawa and Kano (UBEC 2009).

Poverty and Economic Constraints

Despite the Nation's policy, free basic education is far from being realized, and ravaging poverty remains one the key constraints in improving access to basic education. The costs for school – including direct costs, such as fees, uniforms, textbooks; and indirect costs, as a result of the loss of children's time for work – impact the age of primary enrollment, attendance and completion.

The amount of time spent in support of their families with domestic chores, coupled with distance from school all affect contact hours of school. The number of out- of – school children is frightening. The table below illustrates it clearly:

Poverty also affects families' ability to invest in early childhood education, which in turn has an impact on age of entry into primary school and learning outcomes. The government only funds 10 percent of existing early childhood education centers in the country, while parents and other private entities are the largest contributors to this sub sector.

Financing Constraints

There are four main sources of public funding for the public education sector: state governments, local governments, federal support (through UBE Intervention Fund and Education Trust Fund).

Available data clearly point at inadequate funding of the education sector, in particular at the state level. Excluding direct federal support through UBEC and the Education Trust Fund, total state education expenditures in many states. Investment in essential such as text books, Instructional

materials, in-service training, and operations and maintenance of infrastructures and other basic school to improve teaching and learning has been far inadequate in all the northern states. Another critical constraint on finances stems the fact that, a large proportion , often about 90 percent , of total expenditures on education is absorbed by salaries, whereas the benchmark is 67 percent.

Weak Governance and Institutions

Much of the failure to make meaningful progress in our education delivery and particularly at basic level can be

PERCENTAGE OF OUT OF SCHOOL CHILDREN IN NIGERIA BY STATE 2011

Northern Nigeria		
Geo. Zone/State	Primary	Junior Secondary
North Central		
Benue	19.0	11.7
Kwara	23.0	6.9
Kogi	8.6	29.2
Nassarawa	22.7	18.1
Niger	50.0	52.3
Plateau	14.5	15.3
Northeast		
Adamawa	32.9	30.0
Bauchi	58.2	65.4
Borno	73.4	69.4
Gumbe	38.6	41.3
Taraba	31.9	27.2
Yobe	63.5	64.3
Northwest		
Jigawa	61.6	66.5
Kaduna	23.2	22.3
Kano	40.0	44.3
Katsina	55.1	63.9
Kebbi	69.1	67.6
Sokoto	65.3	68.9
Zamfara	76.2	65.5

Southern Nigeria		
Geo. Zone/State	Primary	Junior Secondary
Southeast		
Abia	5.9	2.7
Anambra	3.9	3.7
Ebonyi	18.0	4.7
Enugu	14.6	7.9
Imo	4.8	3.2
South South		
Akwa Ibom	7.3	6.5
Bayelsa	8.4	3.4
Cross Rivers	9.5	8.3
Delta	8.6	6.5
Edo	6.9	4.4
Rivers	12.6	7.2
Southwest		
Ekiti	2.9	2.9
Lagos	4.3	6.3
Ogun	4.3	6.3
Ondo	6.0	2.4
Asun	7.5	3.3
Oyo	23.3	18.2

Source: UNICEF 2011

attributed to institutional issues. The extensive set of institutional and intergovernmental relations for the provision of basic education for example, makes the provision of education very complex. Roles and responsibilities between the three tiers of government, and between government and parastatals, are hazy and largely undefined, leaving no government or agency clearly accountable for results or outcomes. Even with the creation of the UBEC to take charge of basic education, the line of responsibility remains hazy and confusing.

The emerging complexity of the institutional structures responsible for basic education delivery, has generated heated rivalry across institutions at the federal and, even more important, at the state level. The protocols have become unnecessarily complicated and unclear, and processes often unknown and unaccountable. The National minimum standards set in law are not enforced, and resources required to meet established standards are hardly provided. These largely lead to distortions in standards in schools. In addition there no standards for the provision of key inputs – such as class size, educational facilities, teaching and learning materials, health and safety, and teacher provision and qualifications. These are the key factors that directly affect teaching and learning.



Overcentralisation has decreased incentives for service delivery. Local Governments would rather keep enrolments down and hire less expensive and therefore unqualified teachers being that deductions for teachers' salaries come from Local Government allocations. Again, schools have little or no voice on teacher recruitment, weak systems to assess and monitor schools and students, and have low accountability to parents and society. In most cases, have no funds to mage at all.

School inspection and monitoring are far inadequate, in part due to unclear and overlapping roles and responsibilities and lack of accountability. For basic education, UBEC has the responsibility for quality assurance, a role that overlaps the established work of the Federal Inspectorate Service. All institutions in charge of school inspection are ill-equipped and have low capacity to undertake any meaningful school inspection. Data collection is not standardized, and data are unreliable the Annual School Census notwithstanding.

Conclusion

Some of the critical barriers to the delivery of quality education requiring deeper analysis include accountability in education, corruption in education. Corruption has crippled the delivery of education. Corruption creates and increases poverty and exclusion. What is "quality"? It is clear is that those who are responsible for managing and servicing education are yet define "Quality" in education and define the clear understanding on how to attain quality. Our Teacher recruitment, retention and deployment remain very crucial issues requiring a deep understanding for both our policy makers and school managers. We must define our commitment to laying the foundation that would a secure the future of our children. If we desire that the North should play its role in the development of Nigeria, we must provide quality education to our children. This dialogue of the deaf must stop or else we are gravitating into perdition.

The IDP Crisis in North East Nigeria

By Chom Bagu

Nigeria faces significant, longstanding, systemic challenges that have not only enabled the current Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) crisis in the North East to develop but also greatly hindered the ability of the government to address it.

The North Eastern region of Nigeria is marred by poverty and a general lack of resources and capacity, evidenced by low measures of development and clear depictions of destitution, malnutrition, and illiteracy in IDP and host communities in the region. Interviews and discussions with IDPs in this research revealed many had little access to necessary resources even before they were displaced and are now facing even greater scarcity. Others had access to sustainable livelihoods based on arable land or tools and supplies for artisanal or vocational work, but have been displaced to regions with few economic opportunities including a lack of available land, tools, and markets for their trades. This is due in part to the placement of IDPs in camps and households in peri-urban areas that were already poor.

Unsurprisingly, many host communities described situations in which resources were already scarce, and have now been stretched to their limits with the influx of IDPs into their communities. Further,

health care has been a perennial problem for the region. For example, the entirety of Borno state, with a population of over four million, only had 38 qualified medical doctors in 2011 (Idris et al. 2014).

The situation of the region is further complicated by demographic challenges pertaining to urbanisation and a youth bulge. Over the past three decades, many peasants have abandoned their farms in the rural areas and moved to urban centres; today about half of the population of Nigeria live in urban areas. As urbanisation has grown, the informal sector has grown with it at the level of the economy, society, and even religion.

Background and Overview

Over the last five years, about 2.2m people from the North East have been turned into IDPs due to the insurgency. Much of the movement has been from rural areas, smaller cities, and towns across the zone to large cities, particularly to the capital cities of Maiduguri, Yola, Bauchi, Gombe, Jalingo, and Damaturu. Many have gone even further to Jos, Kaduna, and Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Upon arrival, displaced persons typically reside in peripheral and poor areas of these urban centres. Here they experience harsh living conditions and limited economic opportunities alongside host communities.

Nigeria is currently among the leading countries of the world in terms of the number of IDPs. Conflicts with militants in the Niger Delta, inter-community conflicts and cattle rustling in the North Central zone (Plateau, Nassarawa, southern Kaduna and Benue States), rural banditry as well as election-related violence in the North West (Kaduna, Zamfara, Katsina, and Sokoto States), and kidnapping in the South East have all led to the displacement of millions of people from their normal places of abode. The most serious cause generating the increase of IDPs in the country however is the insurgency in the North East. According to the Internal Displaced Monitoring Centre (IDMC), as of July 2014, the estimated number of IDPs in Nigeria was 3.3 million (IDMC Briefing Paper #5), out of which UNOCHA estimates 1.5 million are emanating from the BH-led conflict in the North East (UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin #7). The growth of the IDP population has multiplied five times over the last year, which means that the total number of IDPs in the country today is likely significantly higher than the 3.3 million figure estimated in July 2014.

UNICEF has identified six major drivers of population movements in Nigeria leading to an increased need of humanitarian aid. They are

insurgency, communal conflicts, natural disasters, environmental degradation, poverty and electoral violence (UNICEF 2014). As much as 60 percent of the case load of humanitarian aid is attributed to insurgency in the North East.

These drivers of humanitarian aid may also be viewed within the context of vulnerability. Accordingly, UNOCHA (2013) assessed vulnerability of populations in Nigeria in the six major areas of food security, education, child protection,

health, nutrition, and water, sanitation and hygiene. A composite ranking of vulnerability in these areas by the state is provided in Table 2 for the six states of the North East geopolitical region.

Table 2. Vulnerability Ranking

State	State Average of Vulnerable Population (percent)	Vulnerability Rank (National)	Vulnerability Rank (North East)
Borno	62	1	1
Yobe	47	8	2
Bauchi	48	9	3
Taraba	37	10 (tie)	4 (tie)
Adamawa	48	10 (tie)	4 (tie)
Gombe	34	17	5

Source: UNOCHA 2014 Humanitarian Needs Overview 2013

Apart from the civil war, which occurred from 1967 to 1970 and led to one million deaths and widespread starvation, the recent displacements triggered by the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency in the North Eastern part of the country pose the greatest humanitarian challenge in the country's history. The BH insurgency, which started in 2002 in a remote corner of Yobe State, later grew to affect the whole region leading to the declaration of State of Emergency in three of the six states of the region. One estimate claims that the conflict affects 5,972,672 people, of which 3,373,392 are women and children (Nigeria Humanitarian News Overview, 2014).

A joint humanitarian, inter-agency, multi-sectorial needs assessment mission was organized by UNOCHA in the six States of the North East with technical support from UNICEF in May 2014. The assessment showed the number of IDPs to be increasing, and some of the reported impacts included fear and loss of life, assets, and livelihoods (UNICEF 2014). IDPs and host families alike have been struggling to cope with basic needs; the greatest impact appears to be in the areas of education and trauma suffered by displaced persons.

Schools in Borno and Yobe have remained closed for almost one year while some families and communities have

been involved in multiple displacements following a series of attacks on them by insurgents. They are in dire need of material and psycho-social support. Displaced communities and persons may not always relate well with host communities. It was reported that 235 IDPs from Gwoza living in a camp in Mubi (Adamawa State) were relocated to a camp in Maiduguri (Borno State) due to poor relations between the two communities (NTA Maiduguri News Report 2014). UNICEF (2014) identified the following as priority needs for the states under emergency rule in the region:

Health

- Supply of essential

drugs and disposables in health facilities.

- Access to basic health care services mainly provided through bordering States

Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

- Provision of water and sanitation services especially in areas of population upsurge.

Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFIs)

- Humanitarian needs of large numbers of IDPs who have lost property and homes.
- Emergency support in response to damaged schools, water, and sanitation networks.

Education

- Need for mapping of damaged/destroyed schools and psychosocial support for students.

Security

- Need for increasing security along the roads leading to and from the States under emergency.

Livelihoods/Food Security

- Expansion of cash transfer to target individuals in the affected areas.
- Advocacy for the government to release grains from the national reserve to ameliorate

the high food prices in the States under emergency.

- Support for child protection networks to continue monitoring, reporting, and responding to child rights violations in the States under emergency as well as to establish better understanding of protection caseload in these and neighbouring States.

Data on IDPs: Some Methodological Concerns

Nigeria has ratified the Kampala convention on IDPs, but it has not yet been domesticated by the National Assembly. This means that at present no legislation exists that deals explicitly with IDPs and no governmental organization has explicit responsibility to handle IDP registration and other related matters. The government set up a committee to draft a National Policy on IDPs but this is yet to be officially adopted. The net effect is that there is a general lack of high quality data or information for humanitarian planning and action in Nigeria. The government's limited capacity to register and monitor IDPs was overwhelmed by displacement following the 2012 floods and more so by the on-going insurgency ravaging most parts of the North Eastern part of the country (Nigeria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2014).

While three main agencies

collect information on IDPs, the data is not disaggregated by sex, age, or location. In fact, no official standardized methodology is operational and findings are not harmonized and sometimes conflict. The full-scale impact of displacements (including IDPs displaced by BH) in Nigeria has not been evident due to a complex web of vulnerabilities and the informal nature of displacement dynamics (IDMC 2013). This is further complicated by poor access to IDPs that hinders the generation of relevant data on needs assessments and movement patterns.

IDPs therefore face numerous challenges of adjustment in their new environments with peculiarities that may be rooted in geography, culture, and economic conditions that inform not only vulnerabilities but also a unique culture of resilience that need to be properly understood.

A General Profile of IDPs in the North East

This section examines the state of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the North East geopolitical zone of Nigeria, specifically in the five states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Yobe. The data presented was gathered from desk research, key informant interviews (KIIs) with IDPs and other stakeholders, and focus group discussions (FGDs) with the selected target respondents across the five states under a research funded by the World Bank.

A total of 506 IDP households were interviewed in the five study States. As Table 3 shows, children (defined as those under the age of 18) comprise a larger portion of the total population

in comparison to adults (defined as those over 18 years of age). There are more male children than female. Among the 506 households visited, there were 2,800 children and

2,400 adults. Thus, the total number of the IDPs captured within the 506 households visited during the fieldwork was 5,200.

Table 3. Gender Distributions of IDPs Living in the 506 Households Visited Across Five States

Total number of IDPs living in the 506 households visited across five states	5,200 total	
	2,716 Males	2,484 Females
Males under 5 years	538	
Females under 5 years	495	
Males age 5-18	940	
Females age 5-18	827	
Males age 18+	1,238	
Females age 18+)	1,162	
Total number of IDPs	5,200	


Overview

Most of the IDPs live under difficult conditions and are unable to take care of their needs. The general implication is that majority of the IDPs fall under the dependent category. Most of them came from poor families in their community of origin but displacement has made them even more vulnerable. Many of them have lost relatives and other important linkages with their support networks, including parents and/or caregivers, during various attacks on their home communities by the insurgents. Many in their families were killed while others lost contact as people sought to escape insurgent attacks.

Figure 3 shows that while some IDPs found their situations post-displacement better, likely due to having left the violence and terror of the insurgency behind, 68 percent are of the opinion that their overall situation as IDPs is worse than before they were displaced. Most of them left their homes without having the opportunity to pack and take their possessions and cannot return because the insecurity in their former homes has persisted. The few whose situation is marginally better are those that were able to relocate with some of their valuable possessions as soon as they heard that BH would be attacking on a certain day (KIIs 2014).

Many left in a hurry, some with just the clothes they were wearing (KIIs 2014). They abandoned their property, food, animals, and farming and artisanal work implements. The insurgents subsequently burned many of their homes and property. This means therefore that the likelihood of subsequently recovering some of what they had to abandon due to the emergency is nil. For those engaged in commerce, many lost their goods, capital, and customers. Those that were artisans also lost their tools, stock, and markets (KIIs 2014). Their lives have therefore become much more precarious.


Figure 3. Perceived Change in Situation of IDP Respondents



Source: IDP KIIs 2014

The study revealed that most of the household heads are male. Figure 4, which illustrates the household heads that responded to the researchers during the study, shows that 68 percent are male while 29 percent are female, and the 3 percent no response refers to the returned research instruments where the person administering the instruments had not indicated the gender. Many households are headed by women because men were killed, conscripted into BH, were in hiding for fear of conscription into BH or were victims of indiscriminate arrest by law enforcement agencies conducting BH raids, or left the community to seek for better economic opportunities.


Figure 4. Gender of Household Heads



Source: IDP KIIs 2014

The research conducted for this study also examined household income, and included in the figures collected both wages earned from any formal or informal employment as well as the monetary value of any gifts, charitable support, or government assistance received. 274 out of the 506 participating household heads did not indicate their monthly income. But of the 231 who did, the majority have very low monthly incomes, with 53 percent earning less than 20,000 Naira (approximately \$108 US) on a monthly basis (see Figure 5). While a very few number of higher-earners were skilled and accessed livelihoods like carpentry, the overwhelming majority had to make do with menial, often informal jobs such as street hawking or refuse disposal. Others were not able bodied and had no source of income other than gifts. This explains the wide range of incomes revealed.


Figure 5. Monthly Income Range among IDP Households



Source: IDP KIIs 2014

The North East zone is very ethnically heterogeneous, which is reflected in the ethnic profile of the IDPs across the five states under study. In each State, there are at least two predominant ethnic groups within the IDP community. Figure 6 below illustrates the various ethnic groups where the IDPs come from. From the study, it is clear that the Kanuri ethnic group is the most affected and is spread across Yobe, Borno, and Bauchi states, followed by the Michika ethnic group.

Figure 6. Ethnic Profile of the IDPs in the Households/camps Visited



Source: IDP KIIs 2014

Number and Distribution of IDPs across the Five States

The National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons has statutory responsibility for IDPs in the country but has not published figures for the insurgency in the North East. In a recent press conference, the Commission gave a figure of 750,000 for IDPs in Nigeria, while Geneva-based IDMC has provided the much larger figure of 3.3 million (IDMC Briefing Paper #5). NEMA has been much more active in monitoring and providing for IDPs. As of 2 December 2014, NEMA claims it has registered 680,000 IDPs in the three States where the insurgency is most active: Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. It was, however, not able to provide an estimate of the total number of IDPs in the North East (Mohammed 2014).

While conducting this research, the researchers attempted to get

estimates of number of IDPs in the five States studied. This proved difficult for three reasons:

1. IDPs are highly mobile, changing locations depending on the conditions they face.
2. Most IDPs are not officially registered and live with families and friends or in makeshift accommodation.
3. IDP camps (which house only about 10% of the affected population) are not permanent structures and house transient populations, and the camps are frequently moved or disbanded.

Of note, the number of registered IDPs reported by the various State Emergency

Management Agencies (SEMAs) was lower than the estimates provided by NEMA and international organisations, showing that there is yet a lot of work to be done registering and counting IDPs.

For example, the total number of registered IDPs reported by SEMA in Adamawa State was only 2,934. This number represents those living at the NYSC camp in the Girei LGA. A third of this population (886) was female while children under five years constituted about 12 percent of the population (378). Most of the IDPs in the State were living with relatives or were hosted by individuals, organisations and philanthropists. The American University of Nigeria-Yola has registered a total of 6,954 IDPs in Adamawa State, a number much higher than what ASEMA indicated during interviews (KIIs, 9/10/2014). This research was done at a time in

which many cities and towns in Adamawa State were falling to the insurgents so it was almost impossible to identify accurate numbers, which were increasing daily. Before the worsening of the situation there had been four official camps established by NEMA in conjunction with ASEMA. Some of the camps in Mubi and Maiha were later closed because of the increasing attacks in the area. IDPs were then forced to move to the NYSC camp in Yola (KIIs, 9/10/2014).

In Adamawa State, official government assistance was

only provided to those IDPs that were registered and staying in the camps (IDPs KIIs, Adamawa, 2014; KIIs with ASEMA, 05/10/2014). But this study shows that the majority of IDPs were accommodated in households, not camps. The bulk of the current assistance being offered to these IDPs is from the non-governmental sources such as private philanthropists and NGOs (IDPs KIIs, Adamawa, 2014).

The support and relief materials that are distributed to IDPs in Adamawa State, which are received daily from different sources, are usually kept in the

custody of the ASEMA working closely with NEMA (KIIs with ASEMA, 2014).

As in all the States studied, most of the IDPs in **Borno** State were living with their relatives and friends or are housed by their religious organisations, although some were housed in camps (see Table 5). Of the 106 households interviewed in Borno State, a majority were male. Further inquiry on the gender distribution shows that out of the 298 IDPs in the households interviewed, 165 were children and 133 were adults

Table 5: Borno Camps and number of IDPs Residing

S/n	Camp	Number of IDPs
1	NYSC camp	
2	Government Girls College Yelwa Camp	About 3,750 IDPs – most of them came from Konduga
3	Chad Basin Authority camp	5,336 IDPs – most of the came from Gamboru-Ngala
4	Women Teachers College camp	About 4,320 IDPs
5	Army Primary School Baga Road camp	2,000 IDPs – most of them came from Fotokol

Source: IDPs KIIs, Borno, 2014

In **Bauchi** State, there are several camps with thousands of IDPs. Bauchi Sate has been receiving a large number of IDPs over the past 15 years, most of them from the inter-communal conflicts in Plateau State. The research team interviewed 99 households where IDPs were staying. Most of the displaced people were from the Kanuri speaking population of Borno and Yobe States, but there were some of Hausa and Fulani origin. A large majority of the IDPs were Muslim. For the purpose of the study, the research team was able to visit two LGAs (Toro and Bauchi Municipal Council) (IDPs KIIs, Bauchi, 2014). Out of the 99 households interviewed, the study found out that 294 IDPs were housed in individual households. Table 6 shows that majority of the IDPs were adult males and females - there were 136 children and 158 adults.

Table 6. Category and Number of IDPs in the households visited in Bauchi

Category	Number
Males over 18 years old living in the households	88
Females over 18 years old living in the households	70
Male children between 5 and 18 years old living in the household	51
Female children between 5 and 18 years old living in the household	40
Male children under 5 years old living in the households	24
Female children under 5 years old living in the households	21

Source: IDPs KIIs, Bauchi, 2014

Due to its proximity to Adamawa and Borno States, **Gombe** has a large number of IDPs. The exact number of IDPs in Gombe State is not known but there are at least 15,000 registered IDPs with the emergency agency, SEMA, located mainly in Gombe City, Akko, and Dikko LGAs. These IDPs are hosted either in the camps (e.g., Gombe City) or residing with host communities in households. Because of relative peace in the State, numerous IDPs prefer to be in Gombe where emergency relief is provided to them.

The vulnerable groups identified were mainly persons with disabilities (PWD), the elderly, pregnant women, children, and orphans. IDPs have asked for the provision of special healthcare and special education for these groups, and possibly stipends for them in addition to psychological counselling (KIIs, Gombe, 16/10/2014). There are also

requests for special dietary supplements and a habitable environment for the vulnerable groups. The pregnant women need antenatal care and malnourished children need balanced meals (KIIs, Gombe, 12/10/2014 and 16/10/2014).

This study further observed that disabled children have, in some cases, stopped attending school because of stigmatisation by other children or lack of special services to meet their needs and integrate them into mainstream education. As no special assistance is provided to the disabled children, those with more serious or severe disabilities are forced to give up their studies and socialization with other children, which has led to a situation of further isolation and marginalization.

Yobe State initially acted as a destination for IDPs from Borno State in 2012 when the insurgency was at its peak in Maiduguri. Hundreds of IDPs

settled in Potiskum waiting for the security situation to improve. The displacement of BH from Maiduguri in 2013 led to an increase in the level of attacks in Yobe State with the resultant displacement of thousands of people in Gujba and Gulani LGAs. The attacks on these two LGAs initially led to the establishment of four IDP camps by the state government in the first quarter of 2014. Continued attacks on the towns and villages in the two LGAs however led to the closure of the camps and subsequent migration of camped IDPs into different parts of the North East. At present, there are no IDP camps in Yobe state, so the total number of IDPs is difficult to ascertain. This has been complicated by the fact that IDPs initially registered have suffered further displacements. To overcome this problem, survey data of the 100 IDPs living in communities sampled was also used to estimate the number of IDPs living in households in the state (Table 8).

There were a total of 1,400 IDPs of varying ages (641 females and 759 males) per hundred households or an average of 14 persons per household. Both Tables 8 and 9 reveal certain anomalies. While the number of women in Table 8 is abnormally high, the average number of persons per household in Table 9 is equally high. Some IDPs have argued the government is inflating statistics for the purpose of resource allocation (IDPs KIIs, Yobe, 2014). However, discrepancies in the number of IDPs quoted by different agencies are not uncommon in Nigeria.

Table 8. Distribution of IDPs in Yobe State

LGA	Camp	No. of IDPs	Men	Women	Children
Gujba	Goniri	3,357	605	1,846	906
Gujba	Buni-Yadi/ Buni Gari	4,700	666	2,797	1,237
Gujba	Katarko	2,810	429	1,587	794
Gujba	Gujba	4,943	653	2,965	1,325
	Total	15,810	2,353	9,195	4,262

Source: NEMA North East Office, 2014

Table 9. Number of IDPs living in Sampled Households (n=100)

Category	Male	Female	Total
Under 5	147	134	281
5 – 18 years	247	204	451
18 years and over	365	303	668
Total	759	641	1400

Source: IDP KIIs, Yobe, 2014

The survey of IDPs conducted in Yobe State revealed 72 males and 28 females ranging from 15 and 84 years of age; greater proportion belong to the 30-39 age category (27 percent), while IDPs who are 60 years and above were the smallest proportion (10 percent). About half of the sample population had attained secondary school education (51 percent) while 29 percent had attained no formal education. Babur/Bura, Kanuri, and Manga were the predominant ethnic groups featured. Other ethnic groups in the sample included Hausa, Fulani, Kare, Ngizim, and Bolewa. The predominance of Babur/Bura ethnic group is because both Gujba and Gulani LGAs, where the displacement took place, have significant Babur/Bura population.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There should be improved security, return of the IDPs to their respective homes to unite with their families, create more jobs opportunities, provide civic education to the IDPs, and also create good vocational and skill acquisition centres in those affected areas (KII, Jimeta, 16/10/2014).

Construct and rebuild the burnt and destroyed houses, financial assistance of all kind, like loans, credit facilities/fund. Provide food, water, medical care and even means of transportation (KII, Jimeta, 16/10/2014).

Below is a matrix of recommendations for government, International agencies and local civil society.

Recommendations

Recommendations	For Government	For Civil Society	For International Partners
1. Improve the Capacity of the security forces to Fight Insurgency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Better equip security forces - Build trust with citizens - Reduce corruption and human rights abuses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pre-empt recruitment into violent extremism through alternatives for at-risk youth - Help identify potential violence before it happens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide security sector reform strategies - Provide trust-building dialogues - Advise on alternatives for at-risk youth
2. Build Nigeria's Policy and Legal Architecture to Administer Emergency Relief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Appoint a Presidential Humanitarian Coordinator - Develop a Humanitarian Response Framework - Establish a Standing Humanitarian Fund - Enshrine the rights of IDPs in law 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Advocate for government policy and legal framework reforms - Campaign to have IDP rights enshrined in law - Facilitate communication between government and IDPs on the ground 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support advocacy with resources and training - Advise government reforms with expertise from other countries
3. Improve the Delivery of Humanitarian Relief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fund and implement the activities envisioned under PINE - Improve IDP camps - Establish a humanitarian relief monitoring mechanism - Ensure all response is gender sensitive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish and participate in a Coordinated Humanitarian Response Mechanism to coordinate and collaborate with other charities and NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Advocate for government of Nigeria to implement PINE and provide matching financial resources
4. Manage Relations between IDPs and Host Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish local leadership platforms for IDPs to play a greater role in decision making - Commit to transparency in the disbursement of resources - Distribute resources directly to IDPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support leadership platforms through training in negotiation and facilitation - Provide sensitization and conflict management training to host communities - Source psychosocial support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide training and coaching to leadership platforms and host communities - Recommend sustainable conflict management mechanisms - Source psychosocial support
5. Support Livelihoods of IDPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Incentivise investment and credit to IDPs to build infrastructure - Provide resources, advice, and training to help kick-start livelihoods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide livelihood capacity building, skills training, and coaching to IDPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide investment, credit, loans, training, or tools/materials to help IDPs get back on their feet and re-start livelihoods
6. Improve Social Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rebuild schools; incentivise teachers through security assurance; provide educational materials; provide informal education to camps and communities with IDPs; establish a vocational education system and special education; advocate for children to return to school and counter the association between school and violence. - Provide sanitary facilities, potable water sources, and hygiene/environmental education - Rebuild medical facilities; source drugs and medical supplies; provide mobile clinics; provide trauma counselling - Provide solar power devices; rebuild electricity infrastructure - Rebuild market infrastructure to improve distribution of food and supplies and support livelihoods - Build more skill acquisition centres and equipment to improve livelihoods - Provide vehicles for hire; rebuild bridges and roads; better manage checkpoints - Rebuild water infrastructure; build new wells and boreholes; provide water tanker vehicles 		

Bibliography

Audio-visual

- NTA Maiduguri News Report. 2014. *NTA Maiduguri News Report*, 18 September 2014
 NTA Maiduguri News Report. 2014. *NTA Maiduguri News Report*, 23 September 2014.

Books

- Brun, Catherine. 2005. *Research Guide on Internal Displacement*. Trondheim: Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/internal-displacement/fmo041.pdf>.
- Campbell, John. 2010. *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Mohammed, Abdulkareem and Mohammed Haruna. 2010. *The Paradox of Boko Haram*. Kano: Moving Image Limited.
- Scott, Colin. 1998. "Liberia: A Nation Displaced." In *The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced*, edited by Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, 97-137, Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Seibert, Uwu. 2000. "Languages of Taraba." Accessed 13 July 2011. <http://www.uiowa.edu/intlinet/unijos/nigonnet/nlp/taraba.htm>.
- Young, Helen. 2009. "The Conflict-Livelihood Cycle: Reducing Vulnerability through Understanding Maladaptive Livelihoods." In *Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur*, edited by M. Leroy, 182-193, Addis Ababa: United Nations University for Peace.

News Literature and Bulletins

- "20 killed at Bayero University Church Services Attack." 2012. *Vanguard*, 29 April 2012. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/20-killed-as-gunmen-attack-church-services-in-buk/>.
- "22 Killed in Renewed Boko Haram Attacks in Maiduguri." 2013. *This Day Live*, 19 June 2013. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/22-killed-in-renewed-boko-haram-attacks-in-maiduguri/150856/>.
- Ajayi, Austin. 2014. "Why Nigerian Military has Difficulty Getting Arms from America — U.S. Govt.," *Premium Times*, 9 October 2014. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/169264-why-nigerian-military-has-difficulty-getting-arms-from-america-u-s-govt.html>.
- Ajulo, Luke. 2014. "Nine Million People Affected by Boko Haram-NEMA," *World Stage*, 15 May 2014. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://worldstagegroup.com/index.php?active=news&newscid=15613&catid=2>.
- Allen, Nathaniel, Peter M. Lewis and Hilary Matfess. 2014. "The Boko Haram Insurgency, by the Numbers," *The Washington Post* 6 October 2014. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/06/the-boko-haram-insurgency-by-the-numbers/>.
- Bashir, Misbahu. 2014. "Hopes for an End to Cattle Theft," *Daily Trust*, 4 September 2014. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/feature/33468-hopes-for-an-end-to-cattle-theft>.
- Beauchamp, Zack. 2014. "The Crisis in Nigeria, in 11 Maps and Charts," *Vox Media*, 13 May 2014. Accessed 8 August 2014. <http://www.vox.com/2014/5/13/5710484/boko-haram-maps-charts-nigeria>.

- “Boko Haram Blamed as 13 Die in Kano College Shooting, Blast.” 2014. *Vanguard*, 17 September 2014. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/09/boko-haram-blamed-13-die-kano-college-shooting-blast/>.
- “Boko Haram Challenges Army, Threatens Second Chibok Attack.” 2014. *This Day Live*, 17 June 2014. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-challenges-army-threatens-second-chibok-attack/181165/>.
- “Boko Haram: le Niger Face à L'afflux de Réfugiés Venus du Nigeria.” 2014. *Radio France International*, 1 December 2014. Accessed 15 January 2015. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20141201-boko-haram-niger-afflux-refugies-nigeria-fuient-borno-damasak-diffa/>.
- “Boko Haram Militants Kill 29 Students, Teacher in Yobe School Attack.” 2013. *This Day Live*, 6 July 2013. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-militants-kill-29-students-teacher-in-yobe-school-attack/152599/>.
- Campbell, John. 2014. “Killings in Nigeria's Plateau State,” *Council on Foreign Relations Africa Transition Blog*, 25 February 2014. Accessed 15 January 2015. <http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/02/25/killings-in-nigerias-plateau-state/>.
- Hinshaw, Drew. 2014. “In Nigeria, Many Flee Boko Haram's Terror Spree,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 November 2014. Accessed 15 January 2015. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-nigeria-many-flee-boko-harams-terror-spree-1417218453>.
- Idris, Abdullahi. 2014. “Investigation: Boko Haram Territory Larger than Three States.” *Daily Trust*, 3 November 2014. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/top-stories/38456-investigation-boko-haram-territory-larger-than-3-states>.
- Idris, Hamza, Ibrahim Sawab, Hamisu Kabiru Matazu, Adamu Saleh and Itodo Daniel Sule. 2014. “Doctors Exiting N/East in Doves,” *Daily Trust*, 8 November 2014. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/weekly/index.php/new-news/18129-doctors-exiting-n-east-in-doves>.
- Idris, Hamza and Yahaya Ibrahim. 2014. “Excitement as Schools Re-Open in Maiduguri,” *Daily Trust*, 22 November 2014. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/weekly/index.php/new-news/18256-excitement-as-schools-re-open-in-maiduguri>.
- “Maiduguri: Now, Markets are Attack Targets of Boko Haram.” 2014. *Daily Trust*, 26 February 2014. Accessed 15 January 2015. <http://dailytrust.com.ng/sunday/index.php/news/9380-maiduguri-now-markets-are-attack-targets-of-boko-haram>.
- Matazu, Hamisu Kabir, Hamza Idris, Misbahu Bashir, Isiaka Wakili and Ibrahim Kabiru Sule. 2014. “49 Students Killed at Potiskum School,” *Daily Trust*, 11 November 2014. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/top-stories/39212-49-students-killed-at-potiskum-school>.
- “Nigeria: Plateau State Violence Claimed 53,000 Lives – Report.” 2004. *IRIN News*, 8 September 2004. Accessed 15 January 2015. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/51641/nigeria-plateau-state-violence-claimed-53-000-lives-report>.
- Odeyemi, Joshua and Ibrahim Kabiru Sule. 2014. “760 Unaccompanied Children in IDPs Camps-NEMA,” *Daily Trust*, 11 November 2014. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/news/39196-760-unaccompanied-children-in-idps-camps-nema>.
- “Seven Students, 4 Others Killed in Boko Haram Attacks on Damaturu.” 2013. *This Day Live*, 18 June 2013. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/seven-students-4-others-killed-in-boko-haram-attacks-on-damaturu/150735/>.
- UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin #1. 2014. “Humanitarian Action plan for Nigeria,” *UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Nigeria* 1 (January 2014). Accessed 26 November 2015. http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/system/files/JANUARY_percent2520HB.pdf.

- UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin #3. 2014. "Update on Boko Haram Insurgency," *UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Nigeria 3* (April 2014). Accessed 26 November 2014. http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/April_percent2520HB_percent2520Nigeria_percent2520v_percent2520FINAL_percent252016.5.2014_1.pdf.
- UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin #7. 2014. "Update on the Northeast," *Humanitarian UNOCHA Bulletin Nigeria 7* (September 2014). Accessed 26 November 2015. <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HB%20sept.pdf>.
- UNOCHA 2014 Humanitarian Needs Overview. 2013. December 2013. Accessed 19 November 2015. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/jhap%20NIGERIA%20HNO%202014-2015_%20FINAL.pdf.

Public Presentation and Speeches

- Oucho, John O. 2009. "Environmental Impact of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Sub Saharan Africa." Keynote address to the African Migration Alliance Biennial Workshop on Climate Change, Environment and Migration, East London, South Africa, 15-16 November 2007.
- Kale, Yemi. 2012. "The Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report." Press Briefing. Abuja, Nigeria, 13 February, 2012. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b410c26c2921c18a6839baebc9b1428fa98fa36a.pdf>.
- Mohammed, Zanna. 2014. "Words from Dr. Zanna Mohammed, Director of NEMA." Murtala Mohammed Foundation Conference on Developing a Sustainable Humanitarian Response Mechanism for Nigeria, Yar'Adua Centre, Abuja, Nigeria 2 December 2014.

Scholarly Materials

- Adesoji, Abimbola. 2010. "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria," *Africa Spectrum* 45 (2), 95-108. <http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/330/330>.
- Bagoni, Alhaji Bukar. 2012. "Nigeria Needs to Take care of Its IDPs,"** *Forced Migration Review* 40. <http://www.fmreview.org/en/young-and-out-of-place/bukar.pdf>.
- Flanagan, Barry E., Edward W. Gregory, Elaine J. Hallisey, Janet L. Heitherd, and Brian Lewis. 2011. "A Social Vulnerability Index for Disaster Management," *Journal of Homeland Security and Disaster Management* 8 (1): 1 - 22. <http://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/svi/A%20Social%20Vulnerability%20Index%20for%20Disaster%20Management.pdf>.
- Hickel, Marguerite Contat. 2001. "Protection of Internally Displaced Persons Affected by Armed Conflict: Concept and Challenges," *Internal Review of the Red Cross* 83 (843): 699-711. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/att3dyyq699-712_contat_hickel.pdf.
- IDMC Briefing Paper #5. 2014. "Nigeria: Fleeing Boko Haram's Relentless Terror," *IDMC Briefing Paper* 5 June 2014. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2014/201406-af-nigeria-boko-haram-brief-en.pdf>.
- Loimeier, Roman. 2012. "Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria," *Africa Spectrum* 43 (2-3): 137 - 155. http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/156712/ichaptersection_singledocument/ala98c91-993f-413e-9808-758923e22bd4/en/555-580-1-PB.pdf.
- Mooney, Erin. 2005. "The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 24 (3), 9-26. <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2005/9/fall%20humanrights%20mooney/9.pdf>.

- Okafor, E. 2011. "Youth Unemployment and Implications for Stability of Democracy in Nigeria," *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 13 (1), 358-373.
- Omoju, Oluwasola E. and Terfa W. Abraham. 2014. "Youth Bulge and Demographic Dividend in Nigeria," *African Population Studies* 27 (2), 352-360.
- Sharif, M. and F. Ahmad. 2013. "Assessment of Vulnerabilities Faced to IDPs settled in Quarga Area of Kabul." A case study/unpublished dissertation, Humanitarian Aid Studies Centre.
- Sheikh, Taiwo Lateef, Abdulaziz Mohammed, Samuel Agunbiade, Joseph Ike, William N. Ebiti and Oluwatosin Adekeye. 2014. "Psycho-Trauma, Psychosocial Adjustment, and Symptomatic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among Internally Displaced Persons in Kaduna, Northwestern Nigeria," *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 5 (127), 1-6. doi: 10.3389.

Technical Reports

- Amundsen, Inge. 2010. "Good Governance in Nigeria: A Study in Political Economy and Donor Support," *Chr. Michelsen Institute and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation* 24 August 2010. Accessed 19 November 2014. file:///C:/Users/cpurcell/Downloads/Good%20Governance%20in%20Nigeria%20A%20Study%20in%20Political%20Economy%20and%20Donor%20Support.pdf.
- CFR Nigeria Security Tracker. 2014. "Mapping Violence in Nigeria," *Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker*. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483>.
- FEWS NET. 2014. "Nigeria Food Security Outlook: July to December 2014," *Famine Early Warning System Network*. Accessed 15 January 2015. http://www.fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Nigeria_OL_2014_07_EN.pdf.
- ICG Africa Report #216. 2014. "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency," *International Crisis Group Africa Report #216* 3 April 2014. Accessed 15 January 2015. [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf).
- ICRC. 2010. "Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Law." *International Committee of the Red Cross Legal Factsheet* 31 March 2010. Accessed 26 November 2014. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/internally-displaced-persons-and-international-humanitarian-law-factsheet#.VLaY-PnF9qV>.
- IDMC Global Overview 2014. 2014. "People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence," *IDMC Global Overview 2014*. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2014/201405-global-overview-2014-en.pdf>.
- IDMC Report. 2013. "Nigeria: Fragmented Response to Internal Displacement amid Boko Haram Attacks and Flood Season," *IDMC Nigeria Report* 23 July 2013. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Africa/Nigeria/pdf/201307-af-nigeria-overview-en.pdf>.
- IEP. 2014. "Global Terrorism Index: 2014," *Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index: 2014*. Accessed 19 November 2014. http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf.
- IFRC. 2011. "What is a Livelihood?" International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/from-crisis-to-recovery/what-is-a-livelihood/>.
- ISIM. 2007. "Institute for the Study of International Migration Guiding Principles." Accessed 26 November 2014. http://www.law.georgetown.edu/idp/english/id_faq.html.
- National Bureau of Statistics. 2010. Government of Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics: The Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-poverty-profile-2010-report>.

- National Population Commission. 2003. "Basic Education Profile for Northeast Nigeria: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe States." Nigeria National Population Commission. Accessed 15 January 2015. http://www.epdc.org/sites/default/files/documents/nigeria_subnatn_ne_0.pdf.
- López, Roberto Carlos Vidal, Clara Inés Atehortúa Arredondo and Jorge Salcedo. 2011. "The Effects of Internal Migration on Host Communities: A Case Study of Suba and Ciudad Bolívar Localities in Bogotá, Colombia." Bogotá: Brookings Institution-London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement and International Committee of the Red Cross in Colombia. <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2011/10/host%20communities%20columbia%20idp/host%20communities%20colombia%20english.pdf>.
- Schmeidl, Susanne, Alexander D. Mundt and Nick Miskak. 2010. "Beyond the Blanket: Towards More Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan." A Report of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Migration and The Liaison Office, May 2010. Accessed 26 November 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2010/5/idp%20protection%20afghanistan/05_idp_protection_afghanistan.pdf.
- UNDP. 2009. "Human Development Report Nigeria 2008- 2009: Achieving Growth with Equity." Accessed 26 November 2014. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/nhdr_nigeria_2008-2009.pdf.
- UNHCR. 2003. "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines for Prevention and Response." Accessed 15 January 2015. <http://www.unhcr.org/3f696bcc4.html>.
- UNHCR. 2013. "Internal Displacement: Responsibility and Action," *Handbook of Parliamentarians*. Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/Displacement-e.pdf>.
- UNHCR/JIPS. 2014. "Assessment of the Needs of the Internally Displaced Persons in Serbia." *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Joint IDP Profiling Service Report*. Accessed 26 November 2014. http://www.unhcr.rs/media/IDP_Needs_AssessmentENGLISH.pdf.
- UNHCR/The World Bank. 2011. "Research Study on IDPs in Urban Settings." Accessed 26 November 2014. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1265299949041/6766328-1265299960363/WB-UNHCR-IDP_Full-Report.pdf.
- UNICEF. 2014. "Nigeria CO Humanitarian Situation Report." Accessed 26 November 2014. <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Nigeria%20SitRep%20June%202014.pdf>.
- Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict. 2014. "Who will Care for us? Grave Violations against Children in Northeastern Nigeria," September 2014. Accessed 15 January 2015. http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2111-Watchlist-Nigeria_LR.pdf.
- World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. 2013. "Country Data Report for Nigeria, 1996-2013," *The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators*. Accessed 19 November 2014. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx?fileName=c161.pdf>.

Senior Advisor Peace & Governance Search for Common Ground Nigeria jamchombagu@gmail.com
 (This article depended heavily on a research by Search for Common Ground and funded by the World Bank in 2014)

REPORT ON AgVCF IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES CONFERENCE AND TOT ORGANIZED BY AFRACA, FAO AND CTA HELD AT KIGALI RWANDA BETWEEN 1ST -5TH AUGUST 2016

INTRODUCTION

The engagement of ARDP with the 7 NWGs on reinventing the agricultural sector to diversify the economy of the region and by extension of the nation culminated into an issue that is central for the take up and sustainability of the laudable initiative. The availability and accessibility to finances and drive the various initiatives advocated by ARDP from either the public sector or from the private investors was not clear to all. An opportunity on training on how to finance agricultural value chains offered itself through a colleague, the Secretary General of African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (Afraca) based in Nairobi, Kenya. A team of two members of ARDP, Dr. Usman Bugaje and Prof. Sadiq Z. Abubakar, were selected to attend and participate in the dual event of international conference on Best Practices in Rural & Agricultural Finance: Fast-tracking Replicability of Functional Models in Rural and Agricultural Finance and TOT on agricultural value chain finance scheduled to hold in Kigali, the Capital of Rwanda. The 7 NW states also agreed to send at least 3 delegates each to also participate in same training. This was with a view to expose the technocrats at the state level to the issues on

financing agribusinesses outside public purse allowing the private sector to lead and the market to direct. Below is the back to station report of the 2 day conference and the –day training workshop.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

International Conference with a theme: Best Practices in Rural & Agricultural Finance: Fast-tracking Replicability of Functional Models in Rural and Agricultural Finance was jointly organized by Afraca, AFR, BRD, CTA, IFAD, FAO and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) and held at Marriot Hotel, Kigali, Rwanda. 35 countries attended the 2-day conference across divide of developed, developing and underdeveloped. Over 260 participants registered and participated in the conference. The conference was under six sub-themes:

- a) State of rural and agricultural finance including best practices and recent innovations in the sector,
- b) Policy perspectives on scalable and replicable models in rural and agricultural finance,
- c) Perspectives from other stakeholders and interest groups on best practices in rural and agricultural finance,
- d) State of rural and

agricultural finance in Africa including best practices and recent innovations in the sector,

- e) Perspectives from other stakeholders and interest groups on best practices and innovations in rural and agricultural finance,
- f) Group work on best practices in rural and agricultural finance.

The Hon. Minister of Agriculture and Animal Resources, Rwanda delivered the keynote address. A total of 14 technical papers were presented supported by 8 panel discussions from representatives of globally renowned institutions, regional and local players from central banks, commercial banks, agricultural banks, microfinance institutions involved in promoting financial inclusion in Africa (AFRACA), Latin America (ALIDE), Asia-Pacific (APRACA), Near East-North Africa (NENARACA) Eastern Europe (CICA), etc.

The conference ended up with syndication were thematic groups discussed and drew future collaboration between nations on key issues including:

- a) How can policy and regulatory interventions promote sustainable and inclusive agricultural finance to ensure development of rural economies based on

comparative and competitive analysis of countries,

b) The critical role of innovation from financial institutions to advance the rate of expansion of agricultural financial services was recognized and agreed to share their innovative talent on financial products targeting smallholder producers and agribusinesses,

c) Resolved to engage all actors involve in agricultural financing to ensure holistic delivery of financial services to rural communities and diverse entrepreneurs,

d) Resolved to share experiences through study tours and exchange visits in order to ensure the promotion and adoption of complementary, inclusive financing models focusing on smallholders producers, youths and women financing deploying alternative systems like Islamic financing, sustainable finance and other functional models in agricultural value chain finance.

THE Train-the-Trainer on Agricultural value chain finance (AgVCF)

The organizers of the international conference designed another equally important activity alongside the conference. Many of the conference participants also registered for a 5-day Train-the-Trainer (TOT) Workshop on agricultural value chain financing which Afraca and FOA. The workshop recorded attendance of 35 participants drawn from Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya, Egypt,

Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra lenon. Trainers were equally drawn from diverse backgrounds Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The training consist of eleven modules as follows:

- i. Overview of Agricultural Value Chains
- ii. Agricultural Value Chain Finance (AgVCF)- Context and Concepts
- iii. Agricultural value chain finance- Business Models
- iv. Overview of AgVCF products and Product Financing Instruments
- v. Receivables Financing Applied to Agricultural Value Chains Finance
- vi. Physical Asset Collateralization Instruments
- vii. Risk Mitigation in Agricultural Value Chain Finance
- viii. Structured Finance and Financing Enhancements for AgVC
- ix. ICT as a facilitating tool in Agricultural Value Chain Finance
- x. AgVCF Innovations, Lessons and Course Wrap-Up
- xi. Islamic Finance for Agricultural Value Chain Finance

The training was structured in such a manner that at the end of every module case studies on the application of the principle were discussed. Also practical exercise on every module was given to each trainee to solve and sometime a group exercise was provided. This was enriched with role-play to drive home the knowledge and skill acquired. Generally the training was very intensive and interesting. There was immediate and effective course evaluation mechanism through the scores of the exercises and feedback to the trainers on areas requiring improvement.

The training is an eye opener on one of the most illusive issues in Nigeria on how to sustain the financing of agricultural projects or interventions initiated by any tier of government or donor organizations on one hand and how to involve and allow the private sector lead agricultural intervention for sustainability. It became clear that the public sector finance might initiate the financing of agribusinesses but most often only ended up financing not more than 15% of agribusinesses. The actors operating within a particular value chain, most of whom are in the private sector and investors, often support its functioning up to 85% through different business models including: producer-driven, buyer-driven, facilitator-driven and integrated models. The training is very relevant to the situation most A

countries. This is more so with Nigeria who is formally declared to be in economic recession and is struggling to diversify its economy using the agricultural sector as the springboard. The recent launching of the FGN Agricultural Promotion Policy (APP) popularly called the Green Alternative is a testimony on this.

OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER TRAINING IN NIGERIA

Out of the 35 participants in the TOT on AgVCF drawn from seven African countries 25 are from Nigeria representing over 70% of the total participation. This is a commendable achievement. ARDP facilitated the attendance of 10 out of the 25 participants from Nigeria. These were drawn from Katsina (4), Kaduna (3) and Sokoto (3). The other 15 Nigerians were drawn from IFAD, BOI, Yobe, Adamawa states, some private organizations and CSOs. ARDP concluded arrangement with Afraca to accommodate at least 3 participants from each of the 7 NW States but unfortunately this opportunity was not fully utilized.

Recognizing the importance of the training and the gap in participation, ARDP organized formal interactions with the trainers and the Afraca leadership on how to organize another similar in Nigeria. The meeting was fruitful with very positive outcome. FAO and NAERLS who are the represent the trainers agreed with Afraca and ADRP that the training can be replicated on a state-by-state basis in Nigeria if the relevant

institutions would be involved. It was also agreed that this batch of trainees can be screened and select from amongst them future trainers who can join the FAO and NAERLS trainers to conduct the future trainings in Nigeria. ARDP is making all the contacts to ensure this happen soonest.

Another relevant training opportunity on warehouse and receipt system to hold in Tanzania in October 2016 was also identified and discussed with the leadership of Afraca. The current approach and situation make it critical that ARDP initiate similar arrangement for the 7 NW states to send delegates to this training.

PLATFORM FOR EFFECTIVE NETWORKING AMONGST NIGERIA PARTICIPANTS

Recognizing the importance of the training on AgVCF and its relevance to the Nigerian participants irrespective of their place of work, ADRP mobilized all participants from Nigeria for a meeting to agree to form a platform and work together as the advocates for new initiative back home. All the 25 participants attended the meeting and signed the agreement for this collective action. Already ARDP collected the coordinates of the 25 signatories and developed Whatup and e-groups platforms. Members of both platforms are already Interacting and sharing information and ideas on how to forge ahead. The important point here is that most of the IFAD and BOI sponsored participants came from different states across the country. We have colleagues from South East, South South, North East and South West. Networking to popularize the financing

concept of the agricultural value chain would be a lot easier if ARDP fully exploit the opportunity. ADRP already registered as a corporate member of Afraca and is now entitled to all the privileges. ARDP should also fast track registration with Africa Wide Agricultural Finance Stakeholders Working Group (AFSWG) and also register with Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A) partnership.

CONCLUSION

The ARDP team under the leadership of Dr. Usman Bugaje wishes to express it appreciation for the support to attend and participate in this very important technical training on one of the sector chosen by NW Governors to pursue with the hope of changing the fortune of the citizenry. Similarly, ARDP want to sincerely thank the States that sponsor and sent delegates to this training. It is essential to note that without supporting these trainees to apply the new knowledge and skill the effort would be worthless. ARDP would soon come to the respective states to commence the process of engagement as contained in the workplan. For the states that couldn't send their delegates, the opportunity offered to ARDP by the FAO and AFRACA would be fully exploited with their full support and they can catch up soon. Finally, the ARDP team wishes to thank the AFRACA leadership in the person of Alh. Sale Usman Gashua who not only supported all these but also promised to play any role that would see the revival of the agricultural sector in Northern Nigeria back to its former glorious state.

Singed
Prof. Sadiq Z. Abubakar

One Day Capacity Building Workshop for Youth NGOs/CSOs on Monitoring & Evaluation of the Federal Government Program for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement of the Northeast Nigeria Held on 12th July, 2016 at Cactus Hotels, Shongo Housing Estate, Gombe, Gombe State -REPORT



Background

The north eastern part of the country has been effectively under siege by insurgents whose scorched-earthed policy left the zone in a sorry state. Where you have atrophied infrastructure in the past you are now left with infrastructure at all. The human catastrophe engendered by the insurgency is best left to the imagination. With peace gradually returning to the zone and the federal government's promise to reconstruct, rehabilitate and resettle the people displaced by the insurgency, the Arewa Research & Development Project (ARDP) organized a one-day Capacity Building workshop for Youth NGOs and CSOs in the North East on Monitoring and Evaluation of the Federal Government Program for Rehabilitating, Reconstructing and Resettling the victims of the insurgency that has bedeviled the area in the past five years.

Youths from various NGOs and CSOs within the zone comprising the six states and they responded enthusiastically. The turn out was very impressive and representation across gender was inspiring.

The Workshop was held on Tuesday July 12th, 2016 and started right on time with Mallam Babayola M. Toungo presiding over the proceedings. He also read the Convener's speech, which to all intents and purposes, set the tone of the workshop. The initial arrangement was for Mallam

Toungo to represent the Convener of ARDP and M. K. Ahmed to Chair the occasion. Dr. Gana Lantewa and Dr. Aminu Magashi were to present papers on Budget Monitoring and Use of Scorecards respectively. Mrs. Maryam Uwais, a Senior Special Assistant to the President was also billed to present a paper.

Unfortunately, due to timing and flight schedules, only Dr. Magashi was able to come in person while Dr. Lantewa's paper was presented by Murtala Abubakr that of Mrs. Uwais was read by Ibrahim Yusuf, the coordinator of the workshop in Gombe. All the papers presented were rich and educative and were received by the participants with rapt attention. The quality of the questions asked by the participants at the end of each presentation was a pointer to how attentive they were.

Executive Summary

The conference will draw the participation of CBOs, CSOs, FBOs, Legislators, and all key non-state actors from the six North-East States in a two-day conference to critically tease out and harness issues, recommendations, and chart out an integrated, harmonized and coordinated people driven response and intervention in the "North-east RRR" project especially the Civil Society

A careful observation and close watch on the Federal Government Program for the Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement of the Northeast Region and with the inauguration of the Presidential Committee for the Program under the Chairmanship of TY Danjuma, a host of concerns have been identified ranging from the very slow and lukewarmness, to non-involvement of the youths/youth groups in the region, and a seemingly exclusion of the Civil Society Organizations in the design and implementation framework of the Project.

Objectives

- To have youth groups in the northeast abreast of the Federal Government Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Rebuilding of the Northeast
- To strengthen the capacity of youth groups and organizations on Result-Based monitoring for effective monitoring of the Federal Government Program for the RRR
- To chart out a "Collective Youth Action" for effective and coordinated monitoring of the project and shared feedback



Cross Section of Participants assimilating workshop objectives/Goal

Workshop Goal

Coordinated, strategic and effective youth participation in the implementation of the RRR Program in the Northeast

Target Audience

100 representatives of Youth Groups/Organizations, CSOs, and the Media from across the six (6) States of the Northeast Region-Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe

Sessions/ Event

Arrival/Registration

Arrival of Organizers/ conveners started at about 7:15am, after which participants started arriving about 8:35, then registration commenced simultaneously with arrival. This was facilitated by the secretariat consisting of four volunteers (two male and two female)

General introductions

This session was facilitated by the Youth Coordinator, Arewa Research and Development Project, Murtala Abubakar, he welcomed and appreciated all participants for making out time to participate in the timely conference, hoping that the conference will be a success.



Murtala, warmly welcoming participants

Goodwill Messages

This session had two goodwill messages delivered thus;

1. *Dr Usman Bugaje, ably represented by Babayola Toungo in his goodwill message urged participants to take the conference seriously and to discard the old notion that they (youths) are the leaders of tomorrow but see themselves as leaders even today. He opined that youths*

are the victims of conflicts, but that they should engage in economic activities, participate actively in the 'RRR', sharpen their vision to actualize them. Adding that ARDP is ever willing to support any initiative for the development of the youth.

2. *A special Adviser to the office of the Vice President on Social Investment, Hajiya Maryam Uwais, suitably represented by Malam Ibrahim Yusuf- Chairman, Association of NGOs (ANGO), Gombe State. In her message she highlighted that the Federal Government has earmarked 1.5 Billion Naira for the development of the youth especially those in the Northeast. Adding that there are other government initiatives aimed at creating more jobs and increasing enrolment. Urging the youth to participate actively, wishing them hitch free deliberations.*



Malam Ibrahim Yusuf, delivering a goodwill message on behalf of the Special Adviser to the Office of the Vice President on Social Investment, Mrs Maryam Uwais during the conference

Technical Sessions/Presentations

1. ***Budget Tracking – Dr Lawal Gana Lantewa (Presented by Murtala Abubakar)***
Areas covered in the course of the session include; Definition of budget, The budget process, Reasons for budgeting, meaning and contrast of Monitoring and Evaluation, components of Monitoring System. He emphasized the place accountability in budget and Monitoring processes. Questions raised by participants include; how can NGOs track budget without them being seen as witch hunters? what are budget tracking methodologies?

Issues/questions

People with disability raised concerns that in their attempt t track budget, they are often despised, and engaging the media they are seen as attacking government officials. It was also affirmed by some participants that they are usually neglected. But it was advised that resilience, persistence and consistency will help deliver result.



Chairman, Joint Association of People with Disability, Gombe State-Honourable Umar Ali Goro affirming a point and their plight

2. Score Card Techniques- Dr Aminu Magashi Garba

The resource person opened the session by informing participants that the following week Nigeria President will be in Rwanda about score card in Africa on Health and education, just buttress the importance of scorecard.

Areas covered in the presentation include; Understanding scorecard/Concept, Scorecard as an assessment tool, Stakeholders involved in administration of scorecard, Basic steps in developing scorecard, Key Questions



Dr Aminu Magashi Garba facilitating a session on Scorecard

Issues/questions

Issues raised by participants include whether or not individual states can develop scorecards or must it be uniform? Also raised as a concern was how to handle it when government sees it as criticism?

Responses suggested that either can serve depending what we want to measure, and starting with presenting good aspect of government performance before pointing out areas that need improvement will sound mild and readily accepted by the government as constructive input and not just criticism.

Situation Reports from States in the Northeast Region

1. Adamawa State

That there is great improvement in CSOs budget tracking in Adamawa State, that the Government involve CSOs in processes such two (2) CSOs are part of the Committee the State Government formed to look into how abandoned buildings can be used by IPs. Issues raised was that some IDPs sell off their items as they are seen in the market.

2. Bauchi State

As a great achievement in Bauchi State, CSOs are part of budget process. CSOs are encouraging and engaging communities to ensure that politicians sign pledge cards on what they promise doing for them so they can be held accountable.

Concerns raised were that fertilizer was not available to farmers even as at July, Civil Servants owed 3 months' salaries though the Government is working towards fetching out gods workers. That generally, the government is trying in the area of Economic development



Bauchi Contingent presenting situation report from Bauchi State

3. Borno State

That relative peace has been realized in the state.

Concerns raised were that; schools had been shut down for the past two and half years, most youths are into drugs abuse as a result of psychological trauma hence the need for rehabilitation, that government claims all donations from philanthropists and international sources, and that intervention is not reaching the southern part of Borno



Situation report from Borno State by their contingent

4. Gombe State

There is effort to bring all NGOs together to speak with one voice, NGOs convention in the Northeast is in the pipeline, and that there is great effort by NGOs to support IDPs, NGOs have analyzed the 2016 budget focusing on Education, Youth empowerment and agriculture, and now tracking its implementation. Concern raised was that the government is doing nothing to empower the youth to serve as agents of change

5. Yobe State

There is relative peace now, though there is high mortality rate but the NGOs are responding very well to it. There is still need for more collaborations among the NGOs. There are a lot of skills acquisition programs going on and the government has employed all graduates in the state. There is need for more economic empowerment for the populace



Yobe State contingent presenting situation report from the State

6. Taraba State

Taraba still remains the most peaceful state though also affected by the IDPs. There is improvement in the level of Internally Generated Revenue of the state.

Concerns raised from the state include; non- payment of workers' salaries for the past 5 months, discrimination against people coming from outside the state as they are termed as Boko Haram, there used to be office of SA to the Governor for People Living with Disability, but now it is n more

General Feedback, Recommendation, Comments, Questions & Answers

Comments raised during general discussions as raised by participants include the need for unity and stronger connectivity among NGOs, the need for NGOs to own the process of interventions for IDPs, and for the IDPs to be empowered enough to be able to carter for themselves. Also raised as a concern was the sustainability of government plan t reach 500,000 youth within the span of 2 years.

Raised as a worry by a participant was that let not the conference be like those that will take place and nothing happens afterwards, and so the need for youth group to access and assess the implementation framework (if there is) of the Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Program, and if there is no frame work yet, then CSOs should take responsibility and develop a prototype to be suggested to the government. Adding there is need for establishing a central coordinating unit for follow up on agreed steps from the conference so that desired result would be achieved.



Participant raising issues and making a point at the heat of the conference

Also emphasized was the need for step training for CSOs on learning from the conference for the benefit of those that were not at the conference. The Northern region was urged to embrace Agriculture as economic alternative for a sustainable development.

Communiqué

At the end of the conference a Communiqué drafted by a four man committee was presented, comments and inputs made by participants was unanimously agreed upon thus;

Observations

The Conference observed as follows:

1. The centrality of the youth in the process of post conflict trauma management of the surviving victims of the carnage.
2. Equally observed is the overriding importance of the participation of the youth in the effort to reconstruct infrastructures destroyed by the insurgents and the resettlement of returnees.
3. The untiring efforts of the government and especially the military in crushing the insurgency in its entire ramification.

4. The role of the youth as the catalyst for any future the zone may have and therefore the need for them to take up leadership mantle and not wait for the proverbial tomorrow.
5. The prevalent level of poverty in the zone thereby making it easy for agents of destruction to recruit our youths into various vices and even into the insurgency bedeviling us at the moment.

Recommendations

The Conference recommends as follows, that:

1. *The youth should henceforth act as the agents of development rather than be cannon fodder to unscrupulous politicians and agents of destruction.*
2. The youth should take particular interest on how the government plan to implement its reconstruction, resettlement and rehabilitation programme.
3. Northeast governors must show more interest in the plight of our Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). They feel abandoned and at the mercy of the vagaries of uncaring governments agencies



Young people making recommendations and suggesting ways forward/Next steps

4. The National Assembly shall hasten the passage of the Bill seeking the establishment of the North East Development Commission.
5. Proper documentation should be carried out for the entire insurgency affected areas in the North East.
6. The rehabilitation and re-integration of the IDPs and those Boko Haram fighters who surrendered to the authorities.
7. The stakeholders of the North East region are urged to contribute their quota in the reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement of the North East.
8. CSOs should intensify their commitments and devise ways of getting information on empowerment initiatives by the government and make such information available and accessible to the general public.

Closing Remarks /Conclusion

On behalf of Arewa Research and Development Project (ARDP), Murtala Abubakar thanked everyone for participation, he urged all present at the meeting continue with actions necessary for the implementation of all that have been agreed upon at the conference.

Also in his closing remarks, the Chairman, Association of NGOs (ANGO) Gombe State, Malam Ibrahim Yusuf urged participants to sustain the tempo and ensure that they keep in touch with one another for the development of the region. He thanked all and wished them safe journey back to their various destinations.

There is no doubt that the meeting was worthwhile considering the energy, passion and drive shown by participants. It is hoped that the desired results and outcomes be seen in no distant time.

Managing Change in a Moment of Great Expectations in Nigeria

Introduction

We are gathered here to participate in the KEDA Annual General Meeting (AGM), an annual event that is usually preceded by delivering what the organizers would say thought provoking papers. Sadly, I am not here to present anything near that but rather to say what you all know even as I may saying it differently. May I thank the organizers for finding me worthy of this presentation, haven done something similar for this forum sometime in 2008. I feel most delighted and honored to be invited and to be part of today's event.

Prior to change that we'll be talking about, the brink and desperate in search of a messiah. It was on this ground that those who handled the campaigns of the then General Buhari cast him in the mould of General Charles de Gaulle and later President of France who at the time he was needed to salvage France. To this extent, many saw in Buhari a version of Nigeria's de Gaulle. It is also to show how many Nigerians yearned for, worked and brought change against the political tragedy that heralded the country, the sapping corruption in the last administration, how people in the opposition, within the APC-led government and outside the government and party

arrangement are viewing Buhari's regime of change. The paper goes on to make calls on what one feels need to be done by President Buhari and the APC handlers as well as by the generality of us to managing the expectations in the government of change. My conclusion is that there is a lot to learn from the 2015 elections so that those who rode to power on the train of change should never take Nigerians who are in reality the vanguard and custodians of change for granted, so that if we allow President Buhari to fail for whatever reason, it would be disastrous for our political future.

Nigeria and the Making of the Change Phenomenon

We are all leaving witnesses to the events towards the 2015 General Election, which graduated with remarkable surprises when for the first time since 1999, an incumbent government was defeated at the Federal level as well as other surprised outcome at the States and National Assembly Elections. What really led to these surprises are issues that commentators have talked about and people may continue to discuss. As the transition was gathering momentum, we are all aware that the various opposition parties felt they needed to do something fast and differently too by dissolving

To this extent, many saw in Buhari a version of Nigeria's de Gaulle.

into a single, strong and united opposition party. In the process, by 2014 a merger was worked out and the baby was named APC and what followed were keenly contested primary elections among strong politicians for the Presidency ticket. The then General Muhammadu Buhari was victorious and the rest is now history as it is always been said. Interestingly, the General, haven won the interesting election in his fourth attempt, became the fourth democratically elected Nigeria's President in the Fourth Republic and the most celebrated for that matter. Though Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was the first Nigeria's leader to rule the country twice as a military Head of State and later President, Buhari made history for being the second in this category but also the first to defeat an incumbent President.

A striking coincidence about these Nigerian leaders is that both were former military commanders and later Heads of State at different times. Both came to power at unexpected times: Obasanjo after the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed in February 1976 and Buhari after sacking the Second Republic in December 1983; both were celebrated when they were coming for the second time as elected Presidents; both came when Nigerians were fed up with the previous regimes: one after a prolonged military dictatorship and the other by a clear incompetence and corrupt regime of the “Drinking Master”. But while Obasanjo shot into the Presidency from prison, Buhari did that after a narrow escape from an attempted assassination by those who felt his candidacy was a threat to their interest. This is true because up to now there is no report of investigation over the attempted murder. Buhari came at a time Nigerians were in the state of despair and despondency and Nigeria was in the brink. In the build-up to the 2015 elections, the APC cast Buhari in the mould of *Charles André Joseph Marie de Gaulle* (Charles de Gaulle), the legendary French military General and statesman who founded the French Fifth Republic in 1958 and was elected the 18th President of France, a position he held until his resignation in 1969. Now let's go to France for comparative analysis.

Briefly speaking, Charles de Gaulle was a French military General who fought both the World Wars for his country. When war broke out between France and Germany, there was much bloodshed and the French Government arranged for a peace deal with Hitler accepting defeat and occupation. De Gaulle did not accept and so fled to England where with the support of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, he organized French armies in the colonies to fight alongside the Allied Powers to free France from German occupation. While in exile organizing anti-German forces, he secured for his nation an occupation zone in Germany at the Yalta Conference where Germany accepted defeat as well as securing for France a seat on the United Nation's Security Council. De Gaulle enjoyed wide support at home and, in 1945, was made President of France's Provisional Government to replace the discredited Vichy Government. In a dispute over greater power for the country's Executive branch, de Gaulle resigned this post in 1953.

France by 1958 was in a serious political and economic mess. By then France was fighting the Algerian War at a time she was defeated in Indo-China by the Vietnamese guerillas fighting for their independence from French colonial domination. The French army was determined not to be humiliated by the Arabs in Algeria as it were in Vietnam and the war

became precarious, economically sapping and disastrous as well as a political embarrassment for the French leading to a mutiny. The French economy suffered most and this led to strikes and demonstration, and the political instability was such that about seven governments emerged and collapsed in less than eight months. For this reason, General De Gualle was recalled from retirement to head the government and salvage France.

De Gaulle was very nationalistic and patriotic. He was a conservative military leader and President, yet he performed credibly well by improving his country's economic situation, bringing quick but painful recovery as well as political stability, which combined to launch France into the position of a Super Power. He was not afraid to take controversial, even unpopular decisions; he was more often inflexible and intractable so that his government was nearly toppled by student and worker's protest in 1968. Though he managed to restore order, but resigned from the Presidency soon after in April 1969. In November 9 1970, he died of heart attack and left France to mourn the loss of its famous statesman, military commander and leader and hero who had seen his country through wars and is best remembered as the President instrumental in his country's recovery and salvation.

This was the man who those that handled Buhari's campaign wanted Nigerians to vote considering the situation in the country then. Was there any similarity in our situation under Goodluck Jonathan's Presidency to what France was before de Gaulle came to power? The answer is somehow yes. Nigeria was fighting insurgency that seemed intractable and was defeating the Nigerian state; three states of the North-East were literally under the Boko Haram; our military there fighting the Boko Haram had even mutinied; they were fighting with less sophisticated weapons and under poor morale; the then government seemed to have cashed on the insurgency, doing less to solving the problem and making some parts of the country as if they had no government at the center that cared for them. The people and economy of the North was comatose; despondency was everywhere, corruption had eaten deep in the polity so that to Obasanjo, corruption had moved from the corridor of power to the bedroom of the Presidency. While President Jonathan was indifferent to governance, corruption, insurgency, giving his ears only to the Ijaw and Igbo hangers-on, he left the government in a moral vacuum and somehow paralyzed so that he was more a head of lootocracy than a democracy. Youth unemployment was a

major problem and the country was in a state comma. To many Nigerians, Jonathan's Transformation Agenda was but a Strangulation Agenda. In this situation, Nigeria like France wanted a de Gaulle and GMB was thought to fit in well to becoming Nigeria's de Gaulle. The campaigns were awesome; the political environment in all nooks and corners was filled with *Sai Baba Buhari!* Haven failed three attempts to Nigeria's

He was not afraid to take controversial, even unpopular decisions; he was more often inflexible and intractable so that his government was nearly toppled by student and worker's protest in 1968.

Presidency, the PDP 'Fixers' were delighted with the Buhari candidature, but most were deeply antagonized and concerned, especially with the sweeping hurricane of massive support that was greeting the campaign train when compared to the massive booring on GEJ. His major campaign promise on security, anti-corruption and the economy were condemned a promise to reinvent military dictatorship, necessitating the

Chatham Declaration' where he pledged to remain a born again democrat.

The electioneering process itself was historic. In spite of the visibly massive support, yet candidate Buhari was dismissed by some as a busy-body; he was harangued and pilloried by others for daring to dream, despite his age. He was even declared as an illiterate who never went to school to acquire any education and suddenly his certificate in the Army Headquarters 'disappeared'. And in the usual PDP shenanigan of making false declaration of election results, Buhari was expected to cry once again. Astonishingly, from Ilelah to Bakassi, from Badagry to Bama, from Riyadh to Bangkok and from Washington to London and other major capitals, many were mesmerized with the slogan of "Change" and *Sai Buhari!* Nigerians thus became committed to change; eager to invade the polling booths to cast their votes and defend them against the usual predatory PDP do or die mentality towards elections especially when there was a new INEC leadership that was determined to make the votes count with its innovative Card Reader. Consequently, when the results were counted, Change became a reality that it replaced the 'Jonathanian' Transformation. And rather than cry, Buhari laughed at last and Nigerians celebrated the victory, with many even dying in the process not living to feel the change as expected.

Now, let us compare France under de Gaulle and Nigeria under Buhari to see if casting Buhari in the mould of de Gaulle was been fair to Nigerians or otherwise. Those who cast Buhari in the image of de Gaulle and in the template of Change made Nigerians to believe that once Buhari came into power, within a twinkle of an eye, it would be a miraculous cure to all our national problems; it was assumed it would be a twinkle of an eye to reinvent Nigeria, fix all its ills and Nigeria would bounce back from being the castrated giant on a wheelchair to the known and deserving Giant of Africa. Nigerians who made the change a reality were not stupid, yet they either naively over-trusted or misunderstood the capacity of Buhari, or they over-rated his capacity and they either misunderstood the gigantic mess left by the Jonathan's PDP or under-rated it. In either case, by the time Buhari took over the reins of power, the air was filled with high expectations that the Messiah has at arrived and our problems are solved in a matter of little time. Those who promoted Buhari's candidature assured Nigerians that by the time Buhari is done, he would be the best thing that ever happened to the country.

The Change in Retrospect

We remember that General Buhari campaigned amidst a flurry of flamboyant promises: the economy (including power supply and employment, security and fighting corruption among many others. Sixteen

months now after taking over, Nigerians have every right and reasons to make some preliminary assessment of the performance of the government they voted on change and for change, especially that the government is being wrapped and trapped by an economy on the brink of recession, security tension in the Niger Delta and seemingly worsening power supply. Some have even invented the Buhariometer towards assessing the regime. Generally, there are three categories of those who w make such assessment. The first are the Wailing Wailers! The second are those who worked for Change and are left out of Change but who still have the hope that Buhari when given more time to settle, he'll deliver, after all he met a bad economy epitomized by brutal corruption and the third are those that would never see anything wrong with Buhari.

The Wailing Wailers are mostly anti-Buhari, anti-APC elements that are against those that are pro-Buhari and pro-APC; they are those that fought both APC and Buhari and their supporters at the polls and would continue to do so. They are those who see nothing good about Buhari and his government; they would be happy that Buhari fails or even the something to happen for the administration to fall. We all know that Buhari inherited a terribly bad government, which though did not hesitate to congratulate Buhari over his victory, but was reluctant to give a comprehensive handing

over notes for the government to hit the ground running. In fact, it was said that the treasury was completely looted.

The Wailing Wailers would not accept this theory. To them, the notion that President Buhari met an empty treasury when he took over is false because they would argue that President Jonathan handed over \$30 billion in Foreign Reserves, \$5 billion in accrued Liquefied Natural Gas dividends, \$3 billion in the Excess Crude Account, and around \$2.4 billion in the Sovereign Wealth Fund. To them, Buhari lacks the capacity to understand simple economics and to engage in scientific governance required in the 21st century; that within one year's of Buhari's Presidency, Nigeria dropped from being the largest economy in Africa to who-knows-where, as well as from the number one investment destination country in Africa to number 13; that In 2013/14, Nigeria was the Third Fastest growing economy in the world, and now it is the 29th in the world; that with the country's current negative GDP of -0.36, Nigeria is in two successive quarters is in recession and is set to be kicked out of the top 50 economies of the world in no time and that there were only three countries with negative GDP growth in Africa in 2015 and Nigeria has made the forth one. They further pointed out that inflation rate that was below 9% before May 29, 2015 is now at 15.6% under Buhari. In one year, they argued, Buhari has

taken our inflation rate from single digit to double digits, even as our GDP growth rate that was at 6.95% under Jonathan, now it is -0.36%, which they claim is the worst in Nigeria's history. In fact, they would not hesitate to conclude that officially, our GDP is in 'recession' and would then query that if this is not a sign that President Buhari has ruined the economy completely in just one year, then what is?

The Wailing Wailers would further say that there is inconsistency in policy c o n c e p t i o n a n d implementation, which might not be out of confusion in Buhari's government. For example, they will say Baba had promised not to deregulate the oil sector by removing subsidy, suddenly he did exactly that; that he promised not to devalue the naira and before we knew it, *fiam* he did it; that he would deal with the Niger Delta Avengers, but turned around to beg for negotiation with them and his cabinet would not speak with one voice so that while the SGF for example, would tell the NASS that government would not execute the constituency projects, the Minister of Finance would go to the NASS and announce that in fact government will soon make release of funds for the purpose etc. Most of them would say Nigeria is standing still with no movement; that Buhari was alone in his personal anti-corruption war that was not

being fought on a level playing ground such that his cabinet and those around him were silent on what ought to have been a priority national programme of the government and that the economy is being managed outside all logic of economics, leading to the difficulty Baba always appeal Nigerians to be more patience. Good governance, we must know is an antidote to corruption. In fact, some of my students would jokingly scoff me "*Mallam kun ce mu yi sak, kuma sai muka ji cik, kun bar Baba sai gashin angulun mahaukaci yake mana!!*" This category of people would harangue the Buhari's regime and would see nothing good to appreciate from it including the gigantic restoration of security and the reversal of Boko Haram insurgency the previous regime appeared to treat with lightheartedness; they would always ask what is happening to the recovered looted funds that government would be saying it

We all know that Buhari inherited a terribly bad government, which though did not hesitate to congratulate Buhari over his victory, but was reluctant to give a comprehensive handing over notes for the government to hit the ground running.

is broke? These are mostly 'Jonathanians' or what the Diehard Buharists would call PDPigs, the beneficiaries of the corrupt regime of Jonathan, whose mouth piece of late used to be the mega phonic Ayodele Fayose before EFCC had unraveled his mind-boggling criminal diversion of public funds and the 'wuru-wuru' elections surrounding his coming to power as Governor of Ekiti State. In these Jonathanians also you find the sponsors of the Niger Delta Avengers, avenging a 'crime' the Buhari's government did not commit. Politically, many in this category will remain in the PDP as PDP or probably PDP in a different name, while some may wait for a split in the APC to form another political party towards 2019.

To the second category, mostly APC stalwarts left in the wing without the kind of government appointments they expected worked for during the electioneering since 2014, they would mildly express grudges in private but in public would say after all Baba Buhari is a human being; that Nigerians voted for Buhari and neither an Angel nor a miracle man to perform the kind of miracles being expected of him. Yet, they would argue that when he was campaigning, Baba Buhari made Nigerians to assume that he knew arts, science and complexity of governance. To them, as a former Military Governor, former Federal Minister, former Head of State

and former head of an important intervention fund the PTF was, Buhari on coming to power, should have marshaled his political and economic agenda, pulled together an economic team and a Think Tank to hit the ground running. Like the Wailing Wailers, some of them would say, Baba doesn't seem to have set his team up to now; that even the appointment of his cabinet members had taken him six gracious months; that he surrounded himself with self-serving cronies who are not after what the *Change* was all about and would prefer doing business as usual and that he was so blinded by a 'cabal' of family and friends and would not hesitate putting a peg in a round hole in most of his appointments. He was accused of nepotism by belonging to family and friends and those introduced by them and not standing by his statement of "I belong to everybody but belong to nobody". In this category, some would privately apologize and even be remorseful for all they did for the merger and campaigns for Buhari and when Buhari should continue to keep those appointments being held by appointees of the previous regime that blocked the vacuum to allow their appointments, they may split the APC to join the PDP or form a new party. We can see some elements of this category also in the National Assembly hobnobbing with the opposition and keeping them to leverage their plump offices in

the NASS even when they are supposed to resign from the offices they were alleged to have gotten by political *wuru wuru* or *chuwa chuwa* and the same people that would not hesitate to 'padding' the budget. In fact, some would even fly the kite of impeaching Baba Buhari to test the waters, which was the usual tactics to attract '*Ghana Must Go*' during the PDP shenanigan, through which our law makers tasted undeserving luxury and feel it is their entitlement and which Baba would not contrive.

The last category forms the 'Diehard Buharists'. In this category are largely the poor masses overwhelmed in a triumphalist jeers and to whom, Buhari is 'divinely' brought to serve with reformist agenda, who sees the anti-corruption war as Buharist war than a governmental ethical reform project. People in this category would never see anything good about the PDP and Jonathan except his 'statesmanship' in accepting defeat and conclusive elections of 2015; they would glorify the security strategy in defeating Boko Haram; they would never see anything wrong with Buhari whose coming to power they would say was a divine intervention that deserves nothing but support and prayers. In this category, the increase in the pump price of petroleum products as much as it would be available and it was the trusted Buhari who removed the subsidy, there's no qualm; to them, the rise in inflation,

prices of essential commodities, increase devaluation of the naira due to rise in the foreign exchange are still better and acceptable than the bomb explosions under Jonathan. In this category are some extremists who would say that to be anti-Buhari is an admission of not appreciating God for accepting the cries and prayers of Nigerians and whose graciousness miraculously saved Nigeria from the brink under Jonathan and therefore appreciating God should be expressed by showing support to Buhari. To them all that Buhari was doing was to clear the mess left by Jonathan's PDP who failed to replicate the simple economic approach used in the antiquity by Joseph in Egypt by saving and investing the surplus from high oil prices for the rainy days ahead. These people would never appreciate the fact that Buhari might be suffering the dilemma of capacity deficit through a missing knowledge gap in governance. A mild scrutiny shows that since his ouster in 1985 by the Babangida-led coupists, Buhari had never build his capacity in any way by acquiring additional knowledge/training of any kind (not even through leadership-enhanced conferences, workshop, seminar at national, regional or global levels); and had never interacted with organizations at national, sub-regional, regional or even international levels (as most former national leaders would often do to further transform them into archetypal, mercurial and meretricious

leaders abreast with global dynamics) to appreciate how the world was changing and what approaches would circumstantially fit the dynamic global economic and political environments. And even with this apparent knowledge gap and regardless of whatever dosage of archaic, unscientific and unfitting approach to governance Buhari might come up with respectively, to this category of Nigerians, Buhari is always right.

However we want to analyse how and why change happened in 2015, it should also guide us in contemplating how such change should be managed by the managers of change. To those of us outside government but yearning for a genuine, sincere, comprehensive and positive change, when the President admitted that that change happens with a dosage of pain and would plead with Nigerians for more understanding, patience and co-operation and even with prayers, it is hypocritical to say that all is not well with Nigeria or everything is going well with this change as the wailing wailers and the diehard Buharists would want us believe respectively. People, especially children were said to be dying in the IDPs for lack of food, nutrition and basic health facilities; the closure of borders from which cheaper imported food items used to come to Nigeria is causing a lot of hardship; the prices of food item are skyrocketing, salaries

in most of the States are not forthcoming as at when due and the bailout by Buhari doesn't seem to make the State Governors proactive and in suspending their profligacy and wastefulness. It is true that the prices of crude oil in the world market has fell drastically when compared to Jonathan's era, but Nigerians expect the removal of the fuel subsidy and the corresponding increase in the pump price from N87 to N145, effectively, the government is making a profit of N56 per liter of petrol bought by Nigerians, the impression that the country is broke seems confusing. And if this means a new window of revenue to the government and more money into the federation account, why can't states get more money from it to pay salaries?

The government of change should remember that the change phenomenon happened in the Nigerian landscape only because the ordinary masses were fed up with what was happening and were ready and indeed they submitted themselves as agents of change. In this case, the managers of change should know that the ordinary Nigerians who massively invaded the polling booths to effect change are the real and *de facto* custodians of change and should never be taken for granted. If there is anything to learn from the 2015 elections, it is that power is ubiquitous, it comes through what political scientists will call *Habitus* and *Habitus* is neither fixed nor permanent.

Instead, it is fluid and can change under unexpected situations as it did in 2015, as it is being created by the interplay between free will and failure to meet expectations over time. Therefore, if the Buhari's regime did not handle the political economy with care and with diligence, coherency and with human face, the *Habitus* in the Nigerian masses, the custodians of change would never hesitate to once again serve as agents of change against change. All they may need is for Chief Obasanjo to write Buhari a letter!! What I mean is that Nigerian masses, depending on how they continue to suffer under change, can still make change happen. After all, they were the same forces that came together to unmake the past under PDP in order to make the future under APC. Their decision to come together as agents of change were not involuntary, but calculated and out of a deliberate judgment. This is known as exemplary judgment, which is both backward and forward looking. Its main politics is the pursuit of means of comfort for humanity beyond the constraints of community and would come into play against any situation that does not easily ply to certain wishes and fantasies.

For change and the government of change to remain relevant; and for change not be allowed to becoming an ordinary slogan; an empty mouthing of ideals, which initially gave it momentum, men and women of

ideas needs to become closer to the President to break that wall of those self-serving courtiers made up of family and friends surrounding Baba Buhari. Whatever are our expectations are and Buhari's shortcomings, we realize the circumstances of his second coming after fourth attempts. He was our focal and last hope in 2015; he rode and was supported on the banner of his trustworthiness, honesty, statesmanship, incorruptibility, principles, patriotism and nationalistic posture. If fails or we allow him to fail, it will be a national disaster as it will render those sterling qualities in a leader we saw in him in 2015 as useless in considering who to govern Nigeria in the future. We can help Buhari by supporting him with ideas, which can come in many forms: mildly or critically, but let it be constructively.

It is worth noting that there is no political system that grows better with criticism than liberal democracy. At the Chatham House in 2015, General Buhari had informed the world that he was 'a born again democrat' and that he would abide by all democratic principles. By that statement, he pledged to shed the toga of tyranny and dictatorship he was infamous of during his military era as Head of State. Haven been elected, Buhari has become an Executive President, and the

Chief functionary of the federal government of Nigeria and he in fact, symbolizes both the Executive arm of the government and the Presidency. In liberal democracy, where an individual has assumed the position of an Executive President, especially through partisan politics, or who anyone acquired his presidential position through partisanship, especially in multi-party system like Nigeria's to deserve criticism in the process of

The government of change should remember that the change phenomenon happened in the Nigerian landscape only because the ordinary masses were fed up with what was happening and were ready and indeed they submitted themselves as agents of change.

appraisals is given and is part of the democratic process. Criticism cannot be separated from the partisan politics, which is competitive. Leadership, especially the type held by a President is a responsibility that must always be appraised and more so by a President like that of Nigeria who has a lot of power to dispense favour and disfavor. Though the President and the Presidency are one and the same, a criticism of the

President is but a criticism of the Presidency than the personality of Buhari. The appraisal is on the President and the Presidency than Buhari as a person. Thus the President is bound to be appraised in the form of criticism from the media, party men, opposition, and the citizens at large and even from the International Community on his ability or inability to satisfying various expectations, demands and obligations. The quality of appraisal is what determines

who a statesman is in a nation. On the whole, an appraisal of a leader is in a way helping that leader to hold tenaciously to his statesmanship in running the affairs of a people or change from certain untoward attitude in their affairs.

Part of our problem is that we prefer to treat our leaders as messiahs who possess super human abilities

to singlehandedly turn things around rather than gifted political leaders who need help and collaboration to succeed. Matters would have been better if government and the civil society had simply interpreted this historic moment as an opportunity that would be lost or won depending on the buy-in of the Nigerian people and our collective determination to permanently keep the current reformist drive on the front burner.

While everyone should commend the anti-corruption war, we should note that in a situation where inflation renders wages meaningless and there are lengthening defaults on workers' salaries across the states, it is not easy to maintain anti-corruption postures. It is even more meaningless to recover and safe the loot than ploughing it back into the economy. To some of us outside the government and without any partisan affiliation therefore, the anti-corruption war must transit from a personal Buhari's war to a collective and national assault on corruption, and the administration must set clear and measurable objectives and guidelines through institutional reforms and reform of the anti-corruption war, to shape the conduct of public and private officials and the civil society groups should be encouraged, empowered and charged with the task of drumming support for the government's reformist programme, while also making input and pointing up lapses in the public agenda. If the extant anti-corruption laws could not effectively stop corruption, then something must be wrong to insist on retaining same laws while expecting yet a positive and conclusive outcome against corruption.

Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, it is in my deliberate opinion that in managing change, Buhari and other torch-bearers of change would need to adopt the style of Alexander the Great, the man

Matters would have been better if government and the civil society had simply interpreted this historic moment as an opportunity that would be lost or won depending on the buy-in of the Nigerian people and our collective determination to permanently keep the current reformist drive on the front burner.

who is known in the Quran as a Dhul-Qarnayn (Khaf:94-99). Dhul-Qarnayn exemplifies sterling leadership qualities in his dealing with the problem posed by the monsters: Gog and Magog (Ya'juuj wa Ma'juuj) against a people and nation who pleaded with him to use his immense power and authority to erect for them a barrier in return for handsome tribute. He accepted helping them while declining their tributes, because Allah's rewards to him in the next world were better than earthly tributes. In managing national expectations of a people he came across with, he exhibited a rare self-restraint and demonstrated self-satisfaction by refusing to succumb to greed in exercising leadership service. Since Allah had already blessed him with wealth, authority and a powerful kingdom, Dhul-Qarnayn considered the tributes unnecessary and decides to help a people and a nation in distress

not only due to his sense of justice but to demonstrate that his God-given power and authority must be used to show mercy over the nation. All he needed other than tribute to solving people's problem he had the skill, power and will to solve, was for the people to equally partake by contributing their labour in erecting the barrier that would prevent the entry and mischief of Gog and Magog against their nation building. In this way, Dhul-Qarnayn modeled the essence of governance with human face, complimented by citizens' collective action in solving national challenges in the form of "let's work together so we all can rise together". In managing change in Nigeria therefore, care must be taken in seeing either Buhari or his government as Mr. Fix All. Rather, citizens from all walks of life should be propelled by an inspiring, selfless and focused leadership that is driven by scientific and

dynamic governance skills, to work out ideas together with the state to fix the nation collectively.

By this, ladies and gentlemen, we must insist that Buhari should have the ability to see beyond assumed or constrictive boundaries of old ideas, surrounded by uninspiring few merchandised family and friends interest group and defended by not so informed diehards for him to come up with solutions or paths that all Nigerians can see and support towards meeting national expectations. If the APC government of change failed to effect the desired change, in spite all the ideas and support graciously offered, 2019 is not too far from now for Nigerians to use their exemplary judgment through the Card Reader. But to succeed, we must all be ready to change our usual ways of doing the wrong things against our nation by revamping our known cherish ethics as a people. If we want change and we cannot change, then change can never come the way we expect it to be managed by the APC.

And lastly, we know Buhari was wrongly cast as an Islamic fundamentalist he is not, Yet, I believe he would be happy to be categorized in the mould of Caliph Umar Ibn al-Khattab who with his capital in Medina would tell citizens that he knew God would query him should a camel in Syria hit its hoof and get injured as a result of a bad road the Caliph should neglect

*In managing
change in
Nigeria
therefore, care
must be taken
in seeing
either Buhari
or his
government as
Mr. Fix All.*

without repair or if any citizen should go to bed hungry without food to eat. Buhari and the APC have been pleading with citizens for patience and cooperation, perhaps knowing how difficult it is with the economy he is elected to superintend for better leaving conditions of Nigerians, which I believe that he like Umar, knows the implication of standing before God in the next world to answer questions on his stewardship of change in Nigeria. But before getting to the next world, let those that were deliberately and willingly trusted with our votes of change in 2015 never allow Nigerians use their exemplary judgment to change the change they couldn't effectively and positively manage to their expectations and disaffection. 2019 will be between a secured Nigeria, better economy and society Vs political parties and

their candidates. If *Buharionomics* would not wear a human face, get reconciled with the Nigerian masses by bringing about a noticeable rise in the prosperity of our people and country all for the sake of a worthy life for Nigerian citizens, then when the time comes, the masses may no longer appreciate candidates with the kind of noble credentials paraded by Baba Buhari in 2015; they may not need Obasanjo to write anybody any letter before changing the change by going for a person who can make competent, effective and proper use of the accumulated potentials God Has abundantly blessed this country with for a noticeable rise in the prosperity of our people and country. By this the change will be changed. And if unfortunately Nigerians changed the change, then this time around, Buhari will transit from his "I belong to everybody and belong to nobody" to "Now that I no longer belong to everybody, my family and friends belongs to me". This may be too bad for him and history especially if that will make him end like *Charles de Gaulle*. In all these, Nigerians will have the best historical judgment to make and this may form the subject of yet another historical conference to come. Thank you for listening.

*By Prof AM Ashafa
Department of History KASU.
Presented at the Kachia Education
Development Association (KEDA)
Annual General Meeting (AGM)
Saturday 23rd July, 2016 @
Government Secondary
School Kachia*

March 15 in Northern Nigeria: A Historical Reflection

Mohammed Adamu

The history of Northern Nigeria is full of colours and events that have shaped and are still shaping happenings in the North and country today. Historically, March 15 is indeed an important date in the history of Northern Nigeria and its people. The date marked the end of the pre-colonial Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 on one hand and the emergence of the post-colonial Caliphate marked by the attainment of Northern Nigeria's Self-Government in 1959 on the other. The British conquest of the territories that were later merged and christened 'Northern Nigerian Protectorate', 'Northern Nigeria' and the Northern Region' respectively was a turning point in the history of the geo-polity. The piecemeal conquest of the Caliphate from the river-rain emirates, leaving Sokoto the Seat of Power as the last action in setting the British Protectorates of Northern Nigeria were unique military British war tactics and strategy executed in Northern Nigeria. Muhammadu Attahiru I who emerged as Caliph in 1902 was at a crucial moment for the Caliphate's encounter with the European colonizers.

The new Sultan was aware that Sokoto was the last frontier for the ravaging British colonial forces. The Caliphate had offered resistance to the British on several occasions, which led to military occupation as the

only possibility to incorporate that large part of the West African region into the Northern Protectorate. The battle of Sokoto in the early hours of March 15 1903 between the British and the Caliph's-led forces was a clear defeat to the latter leading to the hijra towards the East than submitting to the forces of infidels the Caliphate had viewed the British then. After the battle of Sokoto and the hijra of Attahiru I, Lugard summoned the Sokoto Kingmakers and ordered the selection of a new Caliph, which was renamed Sultan in order to mark the end of the pre-colonial Caliphate and the commencement of a 'colonial Caliphate'. Already, several other Emirs had either been similarly defeated or had 'willingly' surrendered to Lugard's forces. Most of them were to join Caliph Attahiru's hijra as defiance to the British and after a fierce battle at Burmi (in today's area of Gombe) killed Caliph Attahiru. These events put end to the powerful pre-colonial Sokoto Caliphate and some prominent citizens refused to submit to the 'New Order' and escaped to settle in Maiwurno in present day Sudan Republic, whose population today exceeds 6 million of these Northern Nigerians.

Following the defeat of the Sokoto Caliphate on 15th March, 1903 after the heroic resistance under the leadership

of Caliph Attahiru I, the British left no one in doubt as to where sovereignty lied in transmuting the title from Caliph to Sultan. For the next six decades or so, the British embarked upon broad administrative, socio-economic and judicial transformations of Northern Nigeria consistent with their pre-determined purpose for colonial dependency based on the 'Lugardian Dual Mandate'. However, the Sokoto Caliphate is remembered for its exemplary leadership style that has re-awakened the consciousness of a greater tomorrow and the future by choosing valiant men into positions of authority. As Dan fodiyo himself once envisioned thus: "if the center breaks, the flanks will fall apart, but the breaking of the flanks does not harm so long as the center remains firm in which case the fleeing man will return to it for rarely has an army achieved victory after its center has broken up". That is to say, the center of the Caliphate has been holding forte and not disintegrating because of great leaders available to propel its progress. This is the legacy Northerners celebrate March 15, certainly not for the defeat suffered, but by the return of sovereignty on March 1959 on the same spot it was taken on March 15 1903 to mark another point of victory over the British.

Prior to the British invasion and defeat of the Caliphate, the

polity under the Caliphate or what later became Northern Nigeria, the large and multi-ethnic and plural 'North' was governed through a deliberate policy of live and lets live. As the frontiers of the Caliphate continued to expand, two kinds of communities had emerged and co-existed side-by-side. By this, a consciously pragmatic policy of administration was evolved in the administration of the Islamic and non-Islamic Caliphate. The Caliphate as a prophetic conception of a state, thus guaranteed non-Muslims full citizenship, free interaction and to hold on to their self-governing polities based on *Amana* (live and let's live in mutual trust and togetherness). This was an apparent indication that in the Sokoto dispensation, not only those non-Muslim communities were protected and were also allowed to maintain their religious and social autonomy while preserving their distinct characteristics; they lived side-by-side in territorial terms without any harm and sense of insecurity with their Muslim counterparts. This was the North that got its self-government on March 15 1959 with the Sardauna, a sage and scion of the founders of the Sokoto Caliphate as the natural leader. Though the Sardauna

later in live as the Premier of the Northern Region got involved in some Islamization campaigns, he ensured that both Islamization and similar activities by European Christian missionaries went side by side with neither friction nor conflict. Muslims and Christians lived side by side in space and in peace and harmony under Sardauna's

After the battle of Sokoto and the hijra of Attahiru I, Lugard summoned the Sokoto Kingmakers and ordered the selection of a new Caliph, which was renamed Sultan in order to mark the end of the pre-colonial Caliphate and the commencement of a 'colonial Caliphate'.

leadership and both Islam and Christianity in Northern Nigeria continued to expand their influences, targeting most significantly those communities who were neither Muslims nor Christians, which the European civilizing missionaries referred to as 'pagans'.

Prior to the British invasion and defeat of the Caliphate, the polity under the Caliphate or what later became Northern Nigeria, the large and multi

-ethnic and plural 'North' was governed through a deliberate policy of live and lets live. As the frontiers of the Caliphate continued to expand, two kinds of communities had emerged and co-existed side-by-side. By this, a consciously pragmatic policy of administration was evolved in the administration of the Islamic and non-Islamic Caliphate. The Caliphate as a prophetic conception of a state, thus guaranteed non-Muslims full citizenship, free interaction and to hold on to their self-governing polities based on *Amana* (live and let's live in mutual trust and togetherness). This was an apparent indication that in the Sokoto dispensation, not only those non-Muslim communities were protected and were also allowed to maintain their religious and social

autonomy while preserving their distinct characteristics; they lived side-by-side in territorial terms without any harm and sense of insecurity with their Muslim counterparts. This was the North that got its self-government on March 15 1959 with the Sardauna, a sage and scion of the founders of the Sokoto Caliphate as the natural leader. Though the Sardauna later in live as the Premier of the Northern Region got involved in some Islamization campaigns, he ensured that

both Islamization and similar activities by European Christian missionaries went side by side with neither friction nor conflict. Muslims and Christians lived side by side in space and in peace and harmony under Sardauna's leadership and both Islam and Christianity in Northern Nigeria continued to expand their influences, targeting most significantly those communities who were neither Muslims nor Christians, which the European civilizing missionaries referred to as 'pagans'.

For sure, British colonialism brought both relative progress and negative change in Northern Nigeria. In modern political development, the North progressed rapidly in relation to the rest of the country. The introduction of Regional Government and the introduction of the Premiership, had upgraded that office and its occupant much more than the Emirs and Chiefs, who held powers in the Native Authority system and based on the reality of time and the changing political atmosphere, they supported the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello was in the request for full internal self-government for the Region. It was a political reality the Britain agreed upon at once. It was left for the Northern Cabinet Ministers to name a day and the Sardauna suggested March 15, 1959 coinciding with the same date Lugard on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in Britain seized

the sovereignty of the Sokoto Caliphate. March 15 2016 therefore is a symbolic and significant date because it was the 113th anniversary of the submission of the Sokoto Caliphate to the British in 1903 and 57th Anniversary Northern Nigerian Self-Government from the British in 1959.

The attainment of self-government in 1959, created a kind of homogenizing framework or platform which through the Northernization policy marked the beginning of a new wave of distinctive integrative process that made the North both homogeneous and different from any geopolitical area in the country. Thus, by this period the North became for northerners a circumambulating pillar for plurality, unity, solidarity, togetherness and brotherhood, irrespective of the extant but immaterial differences in tribal, ethnic, religious and territorial unit identity. Sir Ahmadu Bello Sardauna knew that there were bridges to cross and buildings be erected on the foundations of unity and progress. In fact, seeing the need ahead of him, he had said that the North would be a model of progress, goodwill, tolerance and freedom, not only to Africa, but to the whole world. A tall order no doubt, but which he believed could be reaped from the collective inspiration, aspiration and ambition of a people united in spirit, indeed and in truth.

The motto for the North: "Work

and Worship" was emblazoned on its crest of the new Regional Government. It symbolized the value ethics of the founding fathers of the Region and represented their focus and vision on the future. March 15 gave the vast North with its divergent history, geography and topography as well as its people and places, to produce men of work and worship, men willing work in the vineyard of human progress and worship in the North, in order to take the Region to the larger frontiers of development, recognition and honour, which the Sardauna and his cabinet worked for and a legacy they left for posterity. Such is the forte out of which the Great North was born, bred and blessed on March 15. And the Northern Region, to all intents and purposes, by March 15 was destined to be a great nation in the hands of Sir Ahmadu Bello and his Argonauts to whom the dignity of labour must be balanced and blended with the divinity of faith. March 15 gave them the opportunity to envision that work was to make provisions for the physical man, while the spiritual man must have faith in His Creator. Consequently, the North rose rapidly from what the southerners referred to as backwardness to become the giant of Nigeria by determining the destiny of the country because of its demographic advantage, incomparable resources both real and potentials as well as the unique contumaciously crafted democratic credo of Ahmadu Bello Sardauna who allowed

for differences of opinion and invited both Christians and Muslims to be part and parcel of its developmental progress and at a point, appointed Pastor David Lot who founded the Muslim Zone League that later transformed into the opposition United Middle Belt Congress to act as Premier in his absence.

In addition, the success of Northern Nigeria was not a one-man show. Rather it was the result of careful planning and planting, nursed, nurtured and tendered by a frontier patriots and nationalists who were eager to work for the good of the North and its people. The likes of Michael Audu Buba (Wazirin Shendam), J.S. Tarka, Sunday Awoniyi, Ishaya Audu, Peter Simon Achimugu, Isah Kaita, Sir Kashim Ibrahim, Muhammadu Ribadu, Aminu Kano, Jolly Tanko Yusuf, Ibrahim Biu to mention but a few were matured men of mettle, tested and trusted for their sense of loyalty, commitment for Northern solidarity and progress, assiduity, punctuality and hard work. By not taking religion into policy, by not being discriminatory, by fair and justice, integrating both Christians and Muslims as well as accommodating them in his cabinet and by denying himself the pomp and pageantry that goes together with royal progenies, the Sardauna lived a life of service dedicated to a vision of Great North; creating a New Nigeria where there was opportunity for all to develop their potentials, where our rich

traditional values were coveted and preserved, and where there was fairness and equity. His ethos and ethics put primacy on selection of leadership based on representation, age mix, the legitimacy of institutions, administrative and symbolic leadership roles, benevolence or exchange of resources, decision-making by consensus and delegation of leadership responsibilities, principle of equality an incorruptible and efficient bureaucracy as well as a responsible religious and moral ground-standing for individual actions. All these qualities were brought forth by March 15.

March 15 laid the foundation on which Northern leaders worked for the development, unity and preservation of Nigeria as one country with one destiny in an abiding testimony of faith of the Region and country. March 15 imbibed in Northerners to making the North and its people the catalyst for the unity, stability and development of the country. The country has been relying for direction from the North. This is contrary to what some out there would want the world to believe about the North. History has shown that the unity and strength of the North, with collective sense of purpose and focus has been the bastion for the unity and strength of Nigeria.

Though the strength of Northern and national unity with which Sir Ahmadu Bello carefully created, planted and nurtured, snapped suddenly;

leaving a weaker chain which could not hold the monolithic region together. The heavy air of hopelessness and an uncertain future, which beclouded the region since January 15 1966, is yet to be totally cleared, even as it reels from pillar to post in search of a new beginning. Sadly, the present day Northern leaders and elites have hardly advanced beyond where the Sardauna had stopped. Instead, the much that was achieved was to reverse with impunity the monumental progress made by the Sardauna. That is why any emerging democratic demagogues since the demise of the First Republic have not been sincere in deeds and action, talk less of pronouncements. They live outside the spirit of March 15 and we must work to recreate the ideas and vision of March and sincere people to implement them coming on board through a solid-based political competition and acceptance based on the terms prescribed by liberal democracy. We must consciously reflect back on the history of the March, 15th for the progress of the North and country to harnessing the positive legacies built the Northern Self-Government in March 15. It is through this the North can remain transformed and relevant in the 21st Century Nigeria and beyond and hence any anniversary build on these are justified and be sustained.

OBITUARY

A SHINING LIGHT FLICKERS OUT

**Ahmed Rufa'i Ibrahim, 2nd April 1950-2nd April 2016
(Political Scientist Barrister Journalist)**

By Shehu Othman

I was going to post my birthday wishes to Rufa'i Ibrahim on his Facebook page earlier in the day on 2nd April, then procrastinated for no particular or apparent reason. I soon settled down to a specially prepared health porridge portion, which recipe I was anxious to share with him in view of his health challenges.

Dr Kabiru Chafe, the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) historian, then phoned from Kaduna, and we got absorbed in our usually deep exploration of Nigeria's current dilemmas, something that I also usually engage in with Rufa'i on almost nightly basis until penultimate Thursday, 24th March.

Then his niece Faridah Mohammed interjected with a call, whose tidings I was not prepared for. In her typically diplomatic manner, she calmly announced that Uncle Rufa'i died a moment ago — exactly on his 66th birthday.

I was instantly devastated and speechless, and still cannot recall how we ended the call.

I had known the previous night that he would go into hospital for therapy the next day, and although I had noticed he had become a bit withdrawn in the days since we last spoke on 24th March, nothing had indicated that this shining light was about to flicker out for good.

Tearfully, I also announced to our mutual friend Dr Chafe the tragic news, and we briefly prayed for Rufa'i Ibrahim's departed soul. Dr Chafe soon left me to privately grieve the sudden and sad passing of a brother who in decades past would come to be a mentor, friend and among my closest confidants. In between bursts of tears, I managed to alert relatives and friends.

He had been diagnosed with a very rare form of skin cancer

(Cutaneous T-Cell Lymphoma/Leukemia Mycoma Fungoides/Sezary) in October 2014; and after careful research I arranged for him to receive treatment in one of only half-a-dozen dedicated global specialist centres at the University of Frankfurt Teaching Hospital in Germany. The ailment appeared to have been contained, but he then relapsed and made a second visit in December 2015.

We all felt he was on the mend, only to relapse again soon after, and died of resulting complications at the Gwagwalada Hospital on Saturday, 2nd April, following brief therapeutic interventions, where he had taken himself. Up until that moment, he had carried on bravely; he was never really bed-ridden. If you phoned him and he didn't say it, one couldn't tell he was in any discomfort.

His early education was at Kobi Primary School, Bauchi (1957–60), and Dunama Primary School, Lafia (1961–63). He then attended Government Secondary School, Abuja (now Suleja), where he obtained Grade One in his WASC/ GCE exams in 1968, and proceeded to Boy's High School in Gindiri, Plateau State, for his Higher School Certificate (1969–1970).

At Abuja, Rufa'i won the School's annual table tennis championship four times (from Form 2-5) and the Final Year History Prize (1968), in addition to being the Table Tennis Captain from 1966-68 and the Food Prefect in 1968. Two years on, he would win the same table tennis and history prizes at Gindiri Boy's High School as well. All these were beside his other leading roles in student politics, sports, and clubs & societies, along with his hobbies of travelling and swimming, which he carried on to university.

An alumnus of the University of Ibadan (1971–74), where he graduated among the top in his set, and latterly Jos (1987–90), Rufa'i was a bright political scientist and lawyer, but better known as a leading radical journalist on the Nigerian Left

— easily among the best of his generation. He went into journalism, first briefly at the NTA Jos and then the New Nigerian, after his one-year NYSC in Oron in the then South-East State in July 1975.

Politically, he belonged to the leftist community that was centred and active around the now deceased historian Dr Bala Usman of ABU, Zaria, where Rufa'i was a Graduate Assistant from October 1975 to May 1976.

In 1984, Rufa'i was jailed for nine months without trial, or even the courtesy of a single interrogation, by the Buhari military junta for merely daring to pen a satirical column about the regime. Yet he bore Buhari no grudge; indeed, he later became his ardent advocate.

Many came to refer to Rufa'i simply as Malam, following his passionate involvement as an ideologue and activist in the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP)-era politics of the now

late Malam Aminu Kano and its splinter grouping around Governors Abubakar Rimi (now also deceased) and Balarabe Musa of Kano and Kaduna States respectively during the Second Republic (1979-83).

In 1984, he was jailed for nine months without trial, or even the courtesy of a single interrogation, by the Buhari military junta for merely daring to pen a satirical column about the regime. For his sin, the Nigerian Gestapo once hurled him down into a pitch-dark dungeon where he instantly fainted, but mercifully recovered hours later.

In the period before and after General Ibrahim Babangida's political transition that ended in fiasco in 1992, Rufa'i joined the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and sought vainly to be its national spokesman. Ethno-religious politics trumped competence and principles.

Having returned to the Daily Times from 1990-92 as Editorial Consultant, and qualified as a barrister during that time, he turned his energies to private legal practice and media consultancy to governments and non-state entities, notably, the Nasarawa

State Government, the National Population Commission, and the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (Oputa Commission) until June 2007.

After President Olusegun Obasanjo was succeeded by Umaru 'Yar Adua in 2007, the latter earmarked Rufa'i to initiate and chair a proposed innovation in policy-making in the form of a policy and strategic think-tank for the President. Alas, this was not to be, thanks to the machinations of a youthful insider who very probably saw all this as threatening his planned power grab and ambitions.

In 2010-11, Rufa'i led a small band of Nasarawa State citizens in a "Think-Tank", including yours truly, to provide ideas, coherence and inspiration to what many initially saw as a joke gubernatorial pursuit by Umaru Tanko Al-Makura.

0) His boldest journalistic exploits were when he was at the Daily Times; and as successive founder Editor of Sunday Triumph, The Triumph, The Guardian on Sunday, and The Analyst, where he immersed himself in utterly fearless investigative journalism and commentary

Working largely quietly behind the scenes every weekday, and armed only with bubbling ideas and passion for change, they helped achieve what many felt was well-nigh impossible then—the defeat of an incumbent State Governor by someone on a 10-months old party platform barely known in the State — Buhari's Congress for Progressive Change (CPC).

In the event, this was the only governorship contest the CPC won in the 2011 General Elections. It was testament to the thesis by the famed American anthropologist, Margaret Mead (1901-1978), about the dynamic of change when she famously wrote: "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it's the only thing that ever has."

This was Rufa'i Ibrahim's credo, too. Wherever he went before or thereafter, whether at the New Nigerian (Kaduna), Daily Times (Lagos), The Triumph (Kano), The Guardian on Sunday (Lagos), the Nigerian Standard (Jos), The Analyst magazine (Jos), the Nasarawa Publishing Company Limited, or the Nasarawa Broadcasting Service, he left behind him indelible footprints of professionalism, integrity,

personal honour, service and passionate commitment to the best Nigerian ideals.

His boldest journalistic exploits were when he was at the Daily Times, first as Political Correspondent, then Political Analyst, and finally Chief Leader Writer & Editorial Board Chairman; and as successive founder Editor of Sunday Triumph, The Triumph, The Guardian on Sunday, and The Analyst, where he immersed himself in utterly fearless investigative journalism and commentary.

Rufa'i Ibrahim was born into power and privilege in both the traditional and modern spheres, yet no one who ever had any dealings with him could fail to be disarmed by his humility, simplicity, integrity, patriotism, and unwavering empathy for, and commitment to, the poor and voiceless. His weekly column on Peoples Daily, the national newspaper he co-founded in 2008 and of which he was until his demise its Director and Editor-in-Chief, was aptly titled "For the Masses".

Originally a Kanuri from Lafia but born in Bauchi, where he spent his formative years before going several places with his high-flyer civil servant father, Rufa'i was a formidably good

man, who I've never ever known to raise his voice against anyone and yet was fiercely committed to his high principles and convictions — personal and political. I trusted him more than I ever trusted myself.

Professor Sani Ugya, the American-educated scientist and currently Special Adviser to Governor Al-Makura of Nasarawa State said thus of Rufa'i: "Such a gentle, simple, honest human being. We have known each other for 52 years, since we met in Form One [in] Secondary School".

It's trite to say Rufa'i Ibrahim took his final bow at a time our country so desperately needs people of his intellectual, moral and political calibre, and that his void would be hard to fill. Which was all the more sad that President MBuhari never got round to finding him a fitting role in his presidency.

0) He lived and died a worthy and pious life, never asking for what the people and country can do for him, but what he could do for them

For here was a uniquely talented and selfless individual whose love of common folks and fidelity to the ethics of community and country as well as internationalism never wavered however the temptation. He lived and died a worthy and pious life, never asking for what the people and country can do for him, but what he could do for them.

It was one of Rufa'i Ibrahim's remarkable virtues that he never held grudges against anyone. Not once was he ever bitter against Buhari, his one-time military jailer. Indeed, Rufa'i later became his ardent advocate, and vigorously leaned on Al-Makura to quit the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) for Buhari's nascent CPC in the 2011 elections.

Rufa'i was also utterly loyal to his friends, with deep and enduring bonds across ethnicity, culture and religion — as with his Abuja classmate and Nupe friend, Dr Yahaya Ndanusa; Mohammed Haruna, also Nupe from their New Nigeriandays; and Professor Mvendaga Jibo, his Tiv friend from their university days.

Up until his demise, Rufa'i and Mvendaga spoke almost daily (with the standard opening chatline from one or the other asking, 'What are we going to argue about today, Malam Jibo/Rufa'i?').

Rufa'i was buried amid tears after funeral prayers at the Emir's Palace square, an honour reserved only for the most deserving by the avuncular Emir of Lafia. It speaks volumes about the two men that a custodian of traditionalism should so thoughtfully honour a patrician radical in this way.

Their families, living in different towns, also unfailingly spent Christmas and annual Muslim Sallah festivities together. So it was very touching and not at all surprising that Mvendaga, a Christian, witnessed the Muslim funeral rites of his friend Rufa'i every inch of the way to the grave.



Rufa'i Ibrahim was buried amid tears on Sunday, 3rd April, in his native Lafia after funeral prayers at the Emir's Palace square, an honour reserved only for the most deserving by the avuncular Emir of Lafia, Alhaji Isa Mustapha Agwai I. It speaks volumes about the two men that a custodian of traditionalism should so thoughtfully honour a patrician radical in this way.

There was also another irony to all this. The Emir's Palace square was the venue from

which Rufa'i and others from the old Lafia Division gathered to be conveyed to their secondary schools in various towns at the end of each vacation. My brother Yusuf Shehu and I, who Rufa'i gave extra English tuition, usually saw him off to the square, carrying his suitcases atop our heads. It was from this same spot that Rufa'i would start his last journey back to his Maker.

Rufa'i leaves behind a wife Aisha Ibrahim and a young

son Ada-ullah (A gift from Allah), as well as numerous relatives.

On their behalf, I thank hugely the numerous individuals that have extended their condolences and prayers in our dark moment.

May Allah reward you all abundantly, and rest and forgive Rufa'i Ibrahim's gentle soul, and make Aljannah firdausi his final abode, amen.

Shehu Othman, who grew up with Rufa'i Ibrahim, is a political economist, with especial interest in Nigeria's national & global affairs, based in Oxford, England.

SDL456@hotmail.com

4th April 2015

FOR THE RECORD

Being an Interview with Late Mr. John Mark Samchi on the Leadership Qualities of the late Sir Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto



Sir Ahmadu Bello

Q: When did you first meet Sardauna?

Samchi: I first met him at Zaria when I was attending the Assistant District Officers' (ADO's) course. He was frequently visiting us. He would tell us that he was always praying for us to be successful.

Q: Can you recall the first address he made to those of you attending the course?

Samchi: He told us that he was praying for us and hoped we were not going to disappoint him. He assured us that we were those to replace the expatriates that were leaving the service of the Northern Regional government. So he wanted us to be hardworking to enable us handle the new responsibilities well; and that he was anxious to handover the affairs of the North to Northerners.

Q: How did you understand his message and what effect did it have on you at that time?

Samchi: We took it very seriously. You know, the condition was you had to be ADO for eight years before you become a full District Officer (DO). He instructed that we should be made Dos after two or three years as ADOs. He wanted us to progress and we believed in him

Q: You mentioned his anxiety to handover the affairs of the North to Northerners, how successful were he in doing that?

Samchi: When the Northern Region gained self-government on 15th March 1959, many expatriates had wanted to leave. He was quick to understand the need for them to be replaced by Northerners. Many of them were not happy with the changes, but he insisted that those who were not happy could leave. Meanwhile, he was reassuring Northerners like me that we could do the jobs that would be left behind. We were happy and pledged between ourselves that we wouldn't let him down.

Q: How did that help you in achieving the results?

Samchi: We tried our dead level best so as not to disappoint him. We comport ourselves to learn

from the outgoing expatriates.

Q: When you started work as a civil servant in 1958, was there any given time that you had contact with the Sardauna?

Samchi: Yes, when Princess Alexandria visited Sokoto as part of the ceremony of our self-government in 1959. We held a durbar in her honour. I was involved in the organization and to our amazement; the Sardauna instructed that we prepare local dishes such as *masa* and rice for her lunch. We had wanted to get a caterers from the Rest House to handle that aspects but he said that his house would serve. He said if we go to their country they too serve us with their foods, so when they come to the North, we too should serve them with our foods. I was really amazed by this sense of patriotism.

Q: Did you see any sense in what he did?

Samchi: Of course yes, I did. It showed me that we should take proud of what we have and in ourselves. More so, the Princess ate the food and enjoyed it. Since then Sardauna impressed me.

Q: Are there other things you may recall?

Samchi: I also met him when I was at Lokoja and that was in 1962 during the Town Council

elections. NEPU won the election and some NPC people said I was from Jos and that was why I 'imported' NEPU there. People reported me to him as a 'NEPU District Officer'. So he sent for me through the Provincial Commissioner to report at Kaduna. Ali Akilu took me to him at Nasarawa Premier's lodge. He then asked me: Samchi, news have gotten to me that you don't like my party the NPC? I told him it wasn't true but rather his NPC people were not straight forward. They would confiscate somebody's house and give to another, and they partake in corruption. He then told me something that I can never forget, thus: I am scared of Allah's judgment on me after my death, so I want the truth to be upheld always. The NPC that are dubious write me a letter on them when you return to Lokoja and mention their names. Address your letter to Ahmadu Bello so that not even Ali Akilu can open it". So on my return, I wrote detailed information and sent to him, which as a result, I believe Sardauna spoke with my Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Sani Okin and all those people I mentioned were replaced. Three years later another election was held and NPC won. He was happy with me and since then I regarded him as an honest person. Those that reported me thought I was going to be sacked but he was just a person.

Q: Are there any more example to show that the Sardauna was a just leader?

Samchi: There are many instances. I moved from Lokoja to Kabba as the DO in 1964. An Auditor, Mr. Rangshit who was an Indian, came while I was there. He found S.A. Ajayi wanting in the course of his assignment. But the offence was done long ago when Ajayi was Supervisor of Works before he became the Minister of State in-charge of Forestry. I advised the Auditor not to include his findings in the General Report. Instead that he should pass them through me to the Provincial Secretary, Mr. Rogers and then to the Premier's Office because the person concern was a Minister. This was how it was done. But the Provincial Secretary quoted my covering letter and supported my position in his submission to the Premier. So the Premier minute to S.A. Ajayi and sent the file to him. What the Sardauna wrote in his green ink was: "You will explain and expound explicitly on each of the points raised". The issue was not resolved before the coup and so I do not know how it was resolved. But Ajayi picked up an enmity with my person. He even told Sardauna that I was a drunk but the Premier asked him whether I was doing my job satisfactorily and he said yes. So the Premier said I should continue to drink (laughter). Secondly, there was Mr. Rogers who was Provincial Secretary. He was the Chairman of Women Teachers' College (WTC) IN Kabba. He used to visit one expatriate woman there by name Angela. Mr. S.A. Ajayi also reported this to the

Premier. Sardauna called me when he came to open the school of Agriculture in Kabba to find out what was happening between Rogers and Angela. I told him that Rogers do visit her but he should be aware that in European culture there is courtship before marriage (laughter). So I then reported what happened to Rogers and I also told him that he should either marry Angela or leave her alone. He married her. During the same visit of Sardauna to Kabba, he told me something very encouraging. He said to me: "I do not trust these politicians, policemen I do not trust also; but I trust you people in administration because you are trying in upholding the truth. Whatever you write, I will work on it." This was indeed very encouraging to me.

Q: Sardauna was said to be an impartial person. Do you subscribe to such view?

Samchi: I do. You know I am a Christian but I have realised that he had interest in people as human beings. I can recall my meeting him in Yauri when I was ADO there. When he disembarked from the aircraft, he called out my name-Mr. Samchi. I was amazed. He went on to inform his Private Secretary, Mohammed Hayatuddeen that he was posting me to Goza. That was where the ADO, Mr. Saidu Wase went to collect taxes and the people attacked him with bow and arrows and had to run for his dear life. So I said to him I hope not to run when collecting taxes (laughter). We

all laughed. You can see that he doesn't show difference towards non-Muslims. We used to hear stories from Michael Audu Buba. There was another time he saw Michael and me; he said to Michael: "*Yaya mutanen Plateau gajjejeru ne, Michael*"? Meaning why are you people from the Plateau so short in stature? (Laughter). So Michael said: "Ai Mutanen dutse ne". (You know they are from the hills).

His team included Peter Achimugu, George Ohikere and the rest of them who were Christians, yet you won't notice any religious bias. His criteria for judgment were for one to be "Dan Arewa". We all accepted that. We left Yauri on our way to Birnin Kebbi in the entourage of the Sardauna. Each town we stopped he would greet the traditional ruler and give him fifty pounds. My white DO even asked me how much was the Premier's salary per month. So I said to him what was his worry? One ADO Suleiman yerima who later became a Minister of Works (he was from Gombe), once told me that the Sardauna heard of his wife was delivered of a baby and he gave him plenty of money. There was a time he was on leave and handed the affairs of the North to Pastor David Lot to act in the capacity of the Premier. Mind you, he was a pastor and yet he gave him the North for that period. Is this person that one can say was biased? There were funds that were raised and the money was used to sending Northerners to pursue

secondary school education in England. Each of the 3 Provinces was given a slot. There was absolutely no partiality ever shown by the Sardauna.

Q: Are there things that you understood he wanted to imprint in the minds of the people?

Samchi: There was the issue of religion that I didn't agree with him on. Towards the end of his life he was going round preaching Islam. People that embraced Islam were given counting beads (tasbaha), the Qur'an and the rest. Many people could not differentiate him as Premier from a preacher. This did not please some of us. I personally thought he shouldn't have preached as a Premier. He should have used Mallams.

Q: Yahaya Kwande once requested him to inform people the hat with which he was coming to their areas and observed that the Sardauna wore three hats: a Premier, a politician and a preacher.

Samchi: (Laughter) that was correct. A Premier was Premier whether in the official capacity or as a politician. But for him to appear as a preacher, many did not understand. There was something that he did which beeped up recruitment of our people in the police and the military. He requested for some administrative officers to join the services. I volunteered to join the military on the condition that I know the rank I would be given. That was the reply I didn't get up to the time

the coup was staged. But Joseph Gomwalk, Adamu Suleiman and many other joined the services as a result of his intervention.

Q: Many people said he was a generous person. Have you either witnessed or benefited from his largesse?

Samchi: There were instances he gave me many gifts. When I reported to him on the injustice of some NPC members while at Lokoja, he gave me fifty pounds, which was my salary at the time. When he met me at Kabba, he gave me five hundred pounds. And because I was hosting three other Doss of Okene, Igala and Lokoja, I shared the money between us and if it had not come, it would have all been mine (laughter). And he gave a set of cloths.

Q: What were the projects that you now see and say to yourself they were Sardauna's?

Samchi: First, he gave Northerners the control of the North. He established the Ahmadu Bello University, he built roads, schools, hospitals, radio and television station and many other projects.

Each town we stopped he would greet the traditional ruler and give him fifty pounds.

Q: You have had contact with him at Yauri, Kabba and other places, what did you notice about the way he related with people?

Samchi: He was working according to programme and time. He was never late to occasions. There was always a timekeeper in his entourage who ensured strict adherence to time. I have full appreciation for this aspect of him.

Q: How was he reacting towards erring staff?

Samchi: He normally would have the issue investigated first. If one is found guilty to an offence, he was punished. There was one DO who was at Hadejia; he was reported to have dubiously issued out a cheque. After an investigation was made, he was prosecuted and jailed for five years in Jos.

Q: How will you describe his attitude towards religion?

Samchi: He was no doubt a devout Muslim. He observes prayer times and the Christians working under him were given opportunities to attend church services. He was not known to discriminate against people on the basis of religion.

Q: If you are to think of the life and time of Sir Ahmadu Bello, what is it that would easily come to your mind?

Samchi: Anytime I think of knowing how to lead, honestly, love of the people and uniting people, I am thinking of him. No one has done better. If we had people like him around, we wouldn't have been in the mess

When he met me at Kabba, he gave me five hundred pounds. And because I was hosting three other Dos of Okene, Igala and Lokoja, I shared the money between us and if the had not come, it would have all been mine (laughter).

we are. He was hard working and was after progress of the people. There was a minor incident in Lokoja when I was there. Rogers, the Provincial Secretary, telephoned Kaduna to speak with Ali Akilu who was at the Premier's office. Somehow, the telephone operator connected him with the Premier who told him Akilu was not in. Not everyone could be that simplistic.

Q: What do you think is the way forward for the North?

Samchi: Let us emulate the Sardauna. We should discard whipping up religious animosity, tribalism and desist from looting and wasting public treasury. The Sardauna was given out his money not that of government. All inquiries had

shown that he never stole from government. If we had leaders like him we would have been better off. If you go to Sokoto you will see his house, it is nothing out of the ordinary.

Q: He was credited for blending the old and the young in working together. How did that work for the North?

Samchi: He did that when we finished our ADO training. We were posted to work under experienced Senior Dos. Garba Gobir and I were posted to Kaduna to work under Mr. Steward Maclan. It was after that I got posted to Birnin Kebbi where I was worked with DO Jerry Sonerhith. After we had learnt, others were sent to work under us as well.

Q: Sardauna was said to have masterminded the political power shift from the South to the North. What are your thoughts on this?

Samchi: Sardauna took full cognizance of the disadvantaged position of the North and promoted programmes to address the imbalances. For example, he mobilized Northerners to join the services of the Police, the Armed Forces, customs and Immigration Services and wherever he found that Northerners were under-represented.

Q: In the process of doing what you have said, many people accused him of caring for the North without caring for Nigeria. Do you think that is a valid verdict?

Samchi: His own understanding was the North lagged behind. And that if the federation were to be effectively operational, the North must participate at the center. But he realised there was no education in the North to which he greatly tried to improve. Efforts to ensuring that no area was left behind within the federation were made. If you look at the constitution things like quota system were included to cater for equal participation of interest groups within the federation. So if the federation was to operate realistically, the North must have its own quota in education and all other areas. That is specifically what the Sardauna pursued, which by o means does not indicate that he did not care for Nigeria.

And that if the federation were to be effectively operational, the North must participate at the center. But he realised there was no education in the North to which he greatly tried to improve.

Q: This is quite in line with what people say about him that he had foresight. Are there other things that you can bring forth to support this assertion?

Samchi: Sunday Awoniyi once said, according to Vanguard Newspaper that one Minister once complained to the Sardauna that a lot of money was been spent on Ahmadu Bello University even though there were no Northerners in it. Sardauna's response was: "even if we spent on others now, in the very near future our children will come to enjoy the institution". This we have seen has been achieved but if it had not been for his foresight by allowing non-northerners to operate it for us, the North couldn't have achieved without the ABU.

Q: Any advise to us that are still living?

Samchi: I just pray that we get Northerners that would emulate some of his good qualities for attainment of peaceful co-existence in Nigeria. If we get leaders like him Nigeria will be at peace.

Q: How possible is it that we can get someone like him?

Samchi: Why not? We can if we turn to God. We should concentrate on praying to God to divorce us of our stupidity and embrace honesty. And who ever is honest should be given leadership.

Q: Sir, thank you for your time.

Samchi: I thank you and pray that what is being done by you can be useful.



ARDP

Arewa Research & Development Project



NEW NIGERIA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (NNDC)



NNDC prides itself on being one of the leading conglomerate in Nigeria with a very proud heritage of development of northern region whose investment spans various sectors including:

- Solid Minerals
- Consulting
- Construction
- Manpower Development
- Hotel Management and Hoteliers
- IT & Telecommunications
- Agriculture
- Real Estate Development
- Oil & Gas
- Project Financing



As one of the leading development finance Institutions in Nigeria, **NNDC** has over 64 years corporate experience in joint venture partnership, project financing, investment appraisals and financial intermediation services.



NEW NIGERIA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED

BUSINESS CONTACT ADDRESS:

Ahmed Talib House, 16/19, Ahmadu Bello Way, P.M. 2120, Kaduna - Nigeria
Tel: (+234) 0812 727 6333, 08012 727 6497, 0812 727 6363. 0812 727 6314
email: nndc@nndcgroup.com **website:** www.nndcgroup.com